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ABSTRACT 
Anti-Money laundering legislation has become a major global issue, with nations and organisations 
under pressure to adhere and comply with strict control measures in place. The United States post 
9/11 in league with other big Nations have been at the forefront of strict Anti-Money laundering 
initiatives, but a fair question to ask is how well the system is really doing? The implementation of 
the global AML framework is dependent upon the compliance of individual states, thereby making 
the presence of an adequate legal and institutional framework at national level a requisite 
requirement for an effective Anti-Money laundering system. Despite the incorporation of strict 
Anti-Money Laundering regulations into Nigerian laws, the misappropriation of Nigerian moneys, 
notably by public officials, has continued unabated. While the need for a concise and unambiguous 
harmonisation of international regulations cannot be overemphasised, and despite the concerted 
efforts in this regard, a trans-jurisdictional review by this researcher of both primary and secondary 
sources like conventions and academic literature have unearthed conceptual, legal, regulatory 
problems, as well as a seeming desire for theoretical, rather than practical compliance. In other 
words, global AML efforts seem more academic than practical. Accordingly, legal and regulatory 
reforms to International Anti-Money laundering initiatives can only be achieved with a proper 
appreciation of the culture and unique peculiarities of the receptive jurisdiction where emphasis is 
placed on the local environment rather than a mere response to International requirements for the 
sake of it. International AML regulations, and within this context, the FATF recommendations are 
meant for universal application, traversing the distinct quirks of diverse cultures, but the test here is 
its suitability or otherwise to the socio-cultural, political, economic and legal realities of Nigeria. 
The fleecing of Nigerian public moneys most notably by public officials has continued unabated 
despite the incorporation of strict AML laws. 
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Chapter One  
Introduction: Scope and Hypothesis of the Study 
 
1.0  Introduction 
This research appraises the efficacy of global Anti-Money laundering initiatives with a view to 
assessing the trans-jurisdictional practicalities of an internationally harmonised regime within the 
context of the unique peculiarities of the Nigerian state. The implementation of the global AML 
framework is dependent upon the compliance of individual states, thereby making the presence of 
an adequate legal and institutional framework at national level a requisite requirement for an 
effective Anti-Money laundering system. However, despite the incorporation of strict Anti-Money 
Laundering regulations into Nigerian body laws, the misappropriation of Nigerian moneys, most 
notably by public officials, has continued unabated. The International Community may demand to 
see laws drafted and printed in the statute books, but when the virus of large scale and endemic 
criminal misappropriation finds its root in the economic and moral malaise that threatens the very 
existence of the public sphere, the nexus between law and culture comes into play. In other words, 
despite the benefits that a harmonised Anti-Money laundering regime offers, the success or 
otherwise of such initiatives are dictated by the distinct idiosyncrasies of the receptive jurisdiction.  
1.1 Definition of Money Laundering 
Money laundering is a deliberate, complicated and sophisticated process by which the proceeds of 
crime are camouflaged, organised or made to appear as if they were earned by legitimate means.
1
 It 
is a three-stage process in which (i) the dirty money must be severed from the predicate crime 
generating it; (ii) the money trail must be obscured or destroyed through a series of transactions in 
order to avoid detection; and (iii) the criminal proceeds are then reinvested in furtherance of the 
                                           
1
 Mugarura, N. (2016); The Global Anti-Money Laundering Regulatory Landscape in Less 
Developed Countries, Routledge Ltd, Farnham. 
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business objectives of the launderer.
2
  In effect, laundering is the practice of integrating the 
proceeds of criminal enterprises into the legitimate mainstream of the financial community.
3
 It is a 
technique designed to make illicit acquisition appear legitimate, usually by disguising the 
property's illegal provenance.
4
 Money laundering reveals a practice whereby funds obtained from 
illegal transactions are transferred into secret accounts to shield their detection and possible 
sanctions.
5
 In a more holistic appraisal of the crime, the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organised Crime (UNCTOC) defined Money Laundering as ‗‘the conversion or 
transfer of property, knowing that such property is the proceeds of crime, for the purpose of 
disguising the illicit origin of the property or of helping any person who is involved in the 
commission of the predicate offence to evade legal consequences of his/her action; the concealment 
or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement or ownership of or rights 
with respect to property, knowing that such property is the proceeds of crime; the acquisition, 
possession or use of property, knowing at the time of receipt that such property is the proceeds of 
crime; participation in, association with or conspiracy to commit, attempt to commit and aiding and 
abetting, facilitating and counselling the commission of any of the offences established in 
accordance with this article.‘‘6 Hopton on his part adds another dimension to the aforementioned 
descriptions of money laundering by adding other objects other than money.
7
 According to Hopton, 
                                           
2 Ibid  
 
3 See Sullivan, K. (2015), Anti-Money Laundering in a Nutshell: Awareness and Compliance for 
Financial Personnel and Business, 1st Edition, A Press, Berkeley, CA. 
 
4 Simser, J., (2006)‘‘The Significance of Money Laundering‘‘ Journal of Money Laundering 
Control, 9(3), pp. 293-301 
 
5
 Nlerum Okegbule (2007)‗‘Regulation of money Laundering in Africa; The Nigerian and Zambian 
approaches‘‘ Journal of Money Laundering Control 
 
6
 General Assembly Resolution 55/25 of November 15, 2000 (New York: United Nations, 2004) 
 
7
 Hopton, D.(2009)  Money Laundering: A Concise Guide for All Business, Routledge; 2
nd
 Edition 
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‗‗the historical descriptions are fine as they go but the actual term ‗money laundering‘ is itself a 
misnomer. It does not recognise that in modern world undertaking a laundering operation does not 
have to involve actual money.‘‘Hopton‘s preferred understanding of money laundering thus is that 
Money Laundering happens every time any transaction takes place or relationship is formed which 
involves any form of property or benefit, whether it is tangible or intangible which is derived from 
criminal activity.
8
 
All the aforementioned definitions however, although valid, have mainly focused on the criminal 
aspects, money, the account reports, or the illicit nature of the actions, and the consequences of 
such an approach is an incomplete definition of money laundering, culminating in an improper 
understanding of the money laundering process.
9
 Criticism of these traditional definitions of 
money laundering stems from the fact that they focus on the activities involved in the laundering 
process, and while action oriented, cover a lot of perfectly legitimate activities.
10
 The construction 
and interpretation of the word ‗illicit‘ as is prevalent in most traditional definitions of money 
laundering seems to be a problematic one as Turner
11
 argues that since the basic roles and actions 
are often disputed, and the process is global, the lack of common practice and code of conduct 
leaves room for debate about the meaning of the word ‗illicit‘. Turner points to regular scenarios 
in criminal trials where the standard definitions are usually disputed, with the prosecution 
attempting to coral activities under this title while the defence argues that they are mere business 
activities. As a solution, Turner proffers a process similar to zero-based budgeting where each 
step in the process is built from ground up, creating a viable definition for the objectives and 
                                                                                                                                           
 
8 Ibid  
 
9
 See Turner, J.E. (2011), Money Laundering Prevention: Deterring, Detecting, and Resolving 
Financial Fraud, 1st Edition, John Wiley and Sons Inc., Chichester 
 
10
 Ibid  
 
11 Ibid  
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actions involved in money laundering. Here, recognition of Money Laundering in the criminal 
sense is advanced as involving the use of criminal or illicit funds and assigns criminal liability to 
otherwise legitimate business practices. In arriving at a definition, Jonathan Turner suggests that 
the first task in defining Money laundering is to recognise that it is a business function, and that 
the fact that the activity is criminalised does not change its underlying nature. Thus, Money 
Laundering according to Turner, ‗‘involves the use of traditional business practices to move funds 
and the people who use engage in this activity are doing so to make money.‘‘12 This approach by 
Turner is echoed by the definition considered by this researcher to be the most encompassing, and 
that is the one advanced by William Gilmore who defined Money laundering as ‗‗a process of 
manipulating legally or illegally acquired wealth in a way that obscures its existence, origin, or 
ownership for the purpose of avoiding law enforcement.‘‘13 The taking from Gilmore‘s definition 
is that money laundering is not restricted to illicit earnings; legitimately earned money could 
otherwise be put through a laundering process due to a variety of reasons. For the purposes of this 
work however, the definition advanced by William Gilmore above is this researcher‘s preference 
because it resonates with the thematic preoccupation of this research. Suffice it is to state 
however, that notwithstanding the differences between individual authors, all the definitions bear 
common features and practically mean only the endless variations of the same theme. 
1.2 Historical Evolution 
Scholars and historians alike agree that the concept is as old as crime itself and has been going on 
for several thousands of years. Sterling Seagrave explains in ‗‘the lord of the rims‘‘14 how some 
2000 years BC, some Chinese merchants hid their wealth from rulers for the simple reason that the 
rulers usually took it from them and then proceeded to banish them. In addition to hiding it, they 
                                           
12 Ibid  
 
13
 W.C. Gilmore, (1995)  Dirty Money: The Evolution of Money Laundering Counter-Measures 
(Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing) 
 
14
 Sterling Seagrave,(1995)  Lords of the Rim, Putnam Pub Group; First Printing Edition 
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would move it and invest it in businesses in remote provinces or even outside China. Also, in the 
early 17th century, the Catholic Church considered and decreed against the imposition of usurious 
rates as they considered them as a mortal sin. Necessity being the mother of all inventions, the 
merchants and money lenders decided to engage in a variety of practices that eventually became 
the precursors or models of modern techniques for hiding, washing and moving criminal money. 
The main objective here was to make interests disappear or appear to be something other than they 
were. One way they sought to do this was to artificially inflate the exchange rates to compensate 
for the supposed interest or imposed additional premiums for the business risks or as penalties for 
late payments. Along historical lines also, the evolution of money laundering activities could also 
be traced to the era when pirates preyed on European traders crossing the Atlantic sea and 
thereafter seek financial havens in which they can luxuriously make use of their criminal trade. 
They sought financial havens where they could be welcomed to spend their money, particularly at 
the time of retirement. These practices at that time did not bear the name money laundering- a 
name which originated from the United States of America at about the 1920‘s shortly before the 
prohibition era. It was used to succinctly describe the mafia‘s attempts to launder illegal money 
through cash intensive washing salons or coin laundries, which were controlled by company 
acquisitions or business formations. The Jazz age in America was a period in the 1920‘s when 
everyone seemed to have money and the young ones who formed the basis of this period‘s fame 
wanted more alcohol. However, the 18th amendment of the constitution of the United States of 
America had banned the sale, transportation and manufacture of alcohol within the borders of 
America. It was an attempt to legislate morality. It was clear however, that millions of people 
neither wanted this law, nor were they prepared to respect it. The criminals, sensing the obviously 
huge market for what had been declared illegal, adopted varying mechanisms to disguise the 
origins of the large amounts of money generated by the import and sale of alcohol and other 
rackets such as gambling. This they did by various financial activities, financial transactions and 
14 
 
 
 
investment and stock exchange activities by trying to make it a legal and capital market. Gangsters 
were earning huge sums in cash from extortion, prostitution, gambling and bootleg liquor and 
needed to show a legitimate source of these moneys. Two principal actors in this era were Al-
Capone and Meyer Lansky. 
1.3 Background to the Study  
The world of Money Laundering is a changing one, as are the International recommendations and 
findings which drive international, National legislation and regulations. There continues to be an 
evolution of legislative oversight and opinion impacted by emerging patterns and trends in this 
particular area of crime. Initially, laws and regulations were focused on Money Laundering. Post 
2011, counter terrorist financing was added and more recently sanctions have appeared to become 
the priority. The nature of money laundering means that it operates upon the commission of prior 
crimes known as predicate crimes, and this research has identified corruption as the main predicate 
crime to money laundering in Nigeria. It assumes various forms of practices, ranging between 
activities such as embezzlement, official government corruption, illegal oil bunkering, illegal arms 
sale, smuggling, bribery amongst others. Oil and gas being the second largest contributor to the 
country‘s GDP, accounts for more than 80% of Nigerian foreign exchange earnings which makes it 
a veritable sector for corrupt practices. An estimated 232.000 barrels of crude oil worth an average 
$6.7 Billion per annum are lost by the Nigerian state to oil thieves,
15
 and this is achieved with the 
collaboration of politicians, security agencies, criminal gangs and even multinational oil company 
employees.
16
 Corruption in Nigeria is a way of life, and the abuse and misuse of public office for 
                                           
15
 Kar, D, and Cartwright-Smith, D. (2010) ‗‘Illicit Financial Flows from Africa: Hidden Resource 
for Development.‘‘ Washington DC: Global Financial Integrity. Available[online] 
<http://www.gfintegrity.org/storage/gfip/documents/reports/gfi_africareport_web.pdf> Accessed 
20 January 2016 
 
16
 President Muhammadu Buhari: ‗‘My Plan to Fight Corruption in Nigeria.‘‘ Policy Paper- 
Against Corruption: A Collection of Essays. Published 12 May 2016 Available [online] 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/against-corruption-a-collection-of-essays/against-
15 
 
 
 
private gain has been a constant feature of governance in post-independence Nigeria, with studies 
suggesting that public funds of between $300 Billion and $400 Billion have been lost to the 
menace of corruption since Nigeria became independent in 1960.
17
 Nigeria exhibits the worst 
income disparities in the West African sub-region, with only one percent of the elites controlling 
eighty percent of accrued oil wealth, almost eighty percent of which is held in foreign banks, while 
close to eighty percent of the population live below the undesignated poverty threshold of $1 per 
day.
18
 There have been high profile cases involving senior Nigerian politicians perpetrating the 
flight of public funds to foreign jurisdictions, and it therefore did not come as a surprise when 
Transparency International through its 2004 global perception index ranked Nigeria in 144th 
position out of a possible 145. The corruption perceptions Index ranks countries/territories based 
on how corrupt a country‘s public sector is perceived to be. It is a composite index, drawing on 
corruption-related data from expert and business surveys carried out by a variety of independent 
and reputable institutions. In the next year (2005), Nigeria ranked 152 out of a possible 159. Today 
Nigeria ranks 136 out of a possible 168,
19
 thereby depicting no marked improvement on the 
corruption score which means there is still in existence, illicit funds which will ultimately 
necessitate laundering.  
As previously stated, the illegal transnational flight of Nigerian moneys perpetrated by public 
officials is common place in Nigeria, thus making Money laundering a global problem 
                                                                                                                                           
corruption-a-collection-of-essays#president-muhammadu-buhari-my-plan-to-fight-corruption-in-
nigeria> Accessed 15 May 2016 
 
17
 Ibid  
 
18
 See Abdel-Fatau Musah (2009) ‗‘West Africa: Governance and Security in a Changing Region‘‘ 
Africa Program Working Paper Series, International Peace Institute. Also available [online] 
<https://www.ipinst.org/ > Accessed 15 July 2016 
 
19
 See <https://www.transparency.org/country/#NGA>  Accessed 18 September 2016 
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necessitating an effective and co-ordinated international response.
20
 This was the inspiration behind 
the implementation of series of measures including the United Nations Convention against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances,
21
 the statement of principles of the Basle 
Committee on Banking regulations and Supervisory Practices, the Council of Europe Convention 
on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime and three European 
Money Laundering Directives to reduce the extent of money laundering. The main international 
body that regulates money laundering however is the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) - an 
inter-governmental body established in 1989 by the Ministers of its Member jurisdictions with 
objectives to set standards and promote effective implementation of legal, regulatory and 
operational measures for combating money laundering, terrorist financing and other related threats 
to the integrity of the international financial system.  The FATF is a ―policy-making body‖ which 
works to generate the necessary political will to bring about national legislative and regulatory 
reforms in these areas.
22
 The FATF has developed a series of Recommendations that are recognised 
as the international standard for combating of money laundering and the financing of terrorism and 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  These recommendations form the basis for a co-
ordinated response to these threats to the integrity of the financial system and are meant to help in 
ensuring a level playing field.
23
 First issued in 1990, the FATF Recommendations were revised in 
1996, 2001, then in 2003 and most recently in 2012 to ensure that they remain up to date and 
                                           
20
 Ryder N., (2008) ‗‗The Financial Services Authority and Money Laundering- A Game of Cat 
and Mouse,‘‘ The Cambridge Law Journal, 67 (3) pp 635-653 
 
21
 See D. P. Stewart, (1990) ‗‘Internationalising the War on Drugs: United Nations Convention 
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances‘‘ 18 Denver Journal of 
International Law and Policy 387-404. pp 388 
 
22
 http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/  
 
23
 Ibid  
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relevant, and they are intended to be of universal application.
24
 The importance of a harmonised 
effort cannot be overemphasised, and ‗unless everybody joins in, there is little hope of curbing the 
problem.‘25 Harmonization is needed not only for countries to work together on overlapping global 
issues but also to ease conflict of laws and regulatory extra-territoriality.
26
 
The evolution of AML laws within Nigeria encountered difficult beginnings regarding international 
compliance and this ultimately culminated in Nigeria getting blacklisted as a non-compliant/high 
risk jurisdiction by the FATF. Subsequently, Nigeria effected necessary changes which saw to her 
clearance by the international body as a compliant AML jurisdiction albeit subject to supervision 
by regional AML bodies. The current AML regime in Nigeria encompasses customer due diligence 
procedures, reporting systems for large value payment and suspicious transactions, internal control 
systems and all other requirements in line with the harmonised AML laws. However, the same 
issues that plagued Nigeria pre-compliance with global AML standards still abound, thereby 
calling into question the (in) effectiveness of contemporary AML regulations. No clearer 
illustration of this is to be found than in the analysis of the abject failure of isolated legislative 
responses to the scandal of International Money Laundering. John Broome
27
 in his study of AML 
issues from various perspectives ranging from legislation, prevention, investigation, and 
prosecution, emphasised the importance of AML compliance at every level of an AML system. 
According to Broome, the highest levels of AML compliance in individual nations are achieved 
when driven by a sense of self-interest, and in order to achieve the effective functioning of AML 
                                           
24
 Ibid  
 
25
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compliance in financial sectors, high professional, legal and ethical standards are needed. Jackie 
Johnson
28
points to weaknesses in the global financial system rather than the national levels. 
Johnson emphasises on the source of laundered funds, most notably ‗corruption at the top‘, tax 
evasion, and the reasoning here is that the issue of corrupt senior officials and correspondent 
banking brings higher risk into the international financial system with regards to combatting 
Money laundering, and that the amount of Money Laundering can only be reduced if all the 
loopholes to the global financial system are plugged.
29
 From a developing country perspective, the 
process of implementing normative AML/CTF regimes is dictated by varying dynamics of 
development and intentions of a successful implementation of global AML laws are impeded by 
factors such as the diversity and regulation of financial markets. Other such factors are latent and 
infrastructural deficiencies, disparities in technology and a two lane system, educational 
shortcomings in some societies, the corruption factor, economic structural issues, and the resource 
constraint effect on the sequencing of financial sector reform.
30
 Financial disparity is another 
reason why the perspective on money laundering can differ from country to country because the 
global differentiations of money laundering means that certain countries may feel the economic 
cost of money laundering while some others experience its economic benefits.
31
 All 
aforementioned factors relate to Nigeria but none more than the corruption factor, considering that 
the issue of Nigerian politically exposed persons diverting public funds to personal use has 
increased rather exponentially in recent years. The relationship between corruption and money 
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laundering is inextricable, with the tendency that where one exists, the other lurks in the 
background.
32
 And it is argued in this work from a historical and contemporary perspective that the 
Nigerian society is culturally receptive to corruption, hence the nexus between law and culture 
comes into play. As Geertz has said, law is one way in which we make sense of the world, one way 
of organizing meaning, one ‗distinctive manner of imagining the real.‘33  
Culture means a ‗‗collective identity, nation, race, corporate policy, civilization, arts and letters, 
lifestyle, mass-produced popular artefacts, ritual.‘‘34 For academic scholarship, culture has been 
described as an increasingly prized intellectual commodity, aggressively appropriated by other 
disciplines as an organizing principle.
35
 Indeed, two major developments in the second half of the 
twentieth century have been said to manifest the concept of culture‘s appropriation by academic 
disciplines beyond anthropology, its traditional custodian.
36
 The first development is the rise of 
the cultural studies movement since the mid-twentieth century.
37
 The second is the ―cultural 
turn,‖ the process where, in the closing decades of the twentieth century, scholars in the social 
sciences and the humanities began to employ the concept of culture as an important tool for 
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gaining insights in their research areas.
38
 The legal field has not ignored this appropriation, and 
this realisation that law is a ‗coming together‘ – a normative public synthesis of culture, morality, 
economic planning and a genuine aspiration to the integrity of community – does not make life 
easy for the legal scholar. Nevertheless, the relationship between culture and law is so 
significantly and dramatically interwoven that it makes little sense to speak of an understanding 
of one sphere of activity without a comprehensive and systematic understanding of its 
relationship to the other. Law and culture are so inextricably linked that ‗‗the creation of legal 
meaning (juris-genesis) takes place always through an essentially cultural medium.‘‘39 Similarly, 
Lawrence Rosen makes a case that law is so deeply embedded in the particularities of each 
culture that carving it out as a separate domain and only later making note of its cultural 
connections distorts the nature of both law and culture.
40
 According to Rosen, an isolation of law 
from culture does not make sense, because legal officials make decisions by relying on cultural 
assumptions.
41
 Further reinforcing this position, Pierre Bourdieu holds that ‗‗the law is the 
quintessential form of ‗active‘ discourse, able by its own operation to produce its effects. It would 
not be excessive to say that it creates the social world, but only if we remember that it is this 
world which first creates the law.‘‘42 The implication of Bourdieu‘s definition is that law and 
culture are inseparable because they create meaning in one another. Thus, law creates culture, 
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while culture simultaneously creates law.
43
 Law is simply one of the signifying practices that 
constitute culture and, despite its best efforts; it cannot be divorced from culture. Nor, for that 
matter, can culture be divorced from law.
44
  
1.4 Research Statement and Hypothesis 
The prospective repercussions of being a high risk jurisdiction ‗coerced‘ Nigeria into incorporating 
changes to its domestic laws in line with the International standards prescribed by the Financial 
Action Task Force. While the need for a concise and unambiguous harmonisation of international 
regulations cannot be overemphasised, and despite the concerted efforts in this regard, a trans-
jurisdictional review by this researcher of both primary and secondary sources like conventions and 
academic literature have unearthed conceptual, legal, regulatory problems, as well as a seeming 
desire for theoretical, rather than practical (actual) compliance. In other words, global AML efforts 
seem more academic than practical. The thesis informing this research therefore is that law, culture 
and politics cannot coherently be understood as independent spheres of discourse and practice 
because they interact so dramatically and significantly with each other that it makes little sense to 
speak of an understanding of one sphere of activity without a comprehensive and systematic 
understanding of its relationship to the other two. Accordingly, legal and regulatory reforms to 
International Anti-Money laundering initiatives can only be achieved with a proper appreciation of 
the culture and unique peculiarities of the receptive jurisdiction where emphasis is placed on the 
local environment rather than a mere response to International requirements for the sake of it. 
International AML regulations, and within this context, the FATF recommendations are meant for 
universal application, traversing the distinct quirks of diverse cultures, but the test here is its 
suitability or otherwise to the socio-cultural, political, economic and legal realities of Nigeria. The 
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fleecing of Nigerian public moneys most notably by public officials has continued unabated despite 
the incorporation of strict AML laws into Nigerian body laws. The desire to negate ‗cosmetic‘ 
compliance forms the basis of this work, and the researcher shall avail himself the use of relevant 
literature to address the research aims and objectives with a view to making cogent contributions to 
current literature. 
1.5 Conceptual Framework and Research Design  
This PhD thesis is couched along a number of research lines each carrying its distinct thematic 
preoccupation. Along conceptual lines, the main concern is the definition of money laundering, the 
processes, mechanisms, stages and instruments of the laundering of illegally obtained fund. The 
estimative line of the thesis aims at measuring the size of the money laundering phenomenon and 
its socio-economic impacts/effects and consequences thereof; while the third line of research is that 
of awareness on the need to prevent and fight against the attendant effects of the scourge of money 
laundering in juxtaposition with national and global efforts so far made to put paid to the menace. 
There is also the suggestive line where effort is made to proffer solutions and recommendations for 
reform. 
1.6 Aims and Objectives of Study. 
The aims and objectives of this research are summarised as follows:- 
1) To examine, review and analyse the efficiency of International standards to curb money 
laundering; 
2) To identify the economic impacts of money laundering on International Development and 
especially on developing countries; 
3) To examine and appraise the legal and preventive measures adopted by Nigeria to combat 
money laundering; 
4) To analyse the problems associated with effective harmonisation of AML regulations and 
seeking possible ways of circumventing such problems; 
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5) To seek to attain reasoned conclusions and recommendations as to the ways to curb the 
scourge of the crime of money laundering. 
1.7 Methodology 
There appears to be a trend that a formal review of literature be made part of a methodological 
preface. My view and that of my supervisor is that a ‗literature review‘, i.e. a reading of 
relevant and contemporary materials should reveal itself throughout the course of defending the 
thesis. The idea that one can find ‗a gap in the literature‘ by trawling through what might be 
thought to be pertinent writings is somewhat optimistic. This is because without a well-
developed thesis to guide one‘s research into the literature, it would be impossible to identify 
important contributions, let alone find any gaps. Moreover, if one has a good understanding of 
the various claims that constitute one‘s thesis, one may well discover a wealth of research and 
writings in support of, or critical of one‘s own hypothesis. In this event, the task of the 
researcher is not to plug a gap in literature but to analyse and refine the debate by making clear 
what is essential to an understanding of the phenomenon in question. That said however, 
majority of the research would be library based where both primary and secondary would be 
used. These include treaties, cases as well as legislative enactments for primary sources as well 
as textbooks, journal articles, conference papers and commentaries published in journals. 
Electronic materials on academic web pages would also be used. Being a Law thesis 
notwithstanding, a research on money laundering and financial crimes generally is not strictly 
law inclined. It cuts across various disciplines ranging from sociology, economics and history. 
This dissertation as a result, would be done using an interdisciplinary approach based on each 
discipline it cuts across. Looking at money laundering in the area of history as a discipline, its 
historical evolution must be brought into perspective as this is the only way any reasonable 
solutions can be proffered to its menace. History is usually researched through the use of 
primary sources like text books and articles or narratives of those that were close to or were 
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there when the event being researched took place. This work shall use as much primary source 
type in this regard. In summation, for the purpose of this work, the researcher has employed the 
use of methodology drawn from a plethora of research methods. Emphasis shall be placed on 
analysing the legal and regulatory framework of global Anti-Money laundering laws, a critical 
analysis of its validity and effectiveness. Such analytical approach shall be used to critically 
discuss the reception of these laws into Nigerian legal system as regards how they suit for 
purpose within the Nigerian context.  
Specifically, the researcher shall employ the following methods:- 
Interdisciplinary Legal Study- 
This research albeit based on the legal and regulatory framework of Anti-Money laundering 
regulations, cannot escape the fact that Money laundering is a crime that transcends disciplines. 
The commission of the crime of money laundering carries legal, political, sociological and 
historical connotations to it, hence the impossibility of studying the topic in isolation. From a 
sociological standpoint, law is construed to be a social practice which invariably and to some 
extent seeks to shape and be a reflection of the society. Another view is that law exists in and is 
developed through society. Thus, a critical analysis of the attitude of the Nigerian society 
regarding Anti-Money laundering regulations and its attendant predicate offences such as 
corruption shall be undertaken. The emphasis here shall be on ‗law in practice‘, not just ‗law in 
books‘. The purpose here shall be the facilitation of a future change, either in the law itself, or 
in the manner of its administration.
45
 From a law and economics viewpoint however, emphasis 
shall be on appraising the current legal and regulatory regime with a view to making proposals 
towards improvement in order to make it more efficient in some way. The researcher is aware 
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that this approach may give rise to quantitative research but must stress here that the research is 
entirely library based making use of reputable journal articles, cases, statutes and articles on 
other legal systems online. 
The Black Letter Approach- 
Here, international conventions, decided cases and National laws form the bulk of primary 
sources as regards Anti-money laundering laws. Making use of the black letter approach, the 
researcher will analyse vital instruments such as the 1988 UN Convention(the Vienna 
Convention) which sought to address the threat posed by narcotics trafficking, the Basel 
committee statement on banking supervision, the 49+ recommendations of the Financial Action 
Task Force, the Nigerian Money laundering Prohibition Act amongst others. The focus will be 
on a descriptive analysis of the law as stated within those primary sources through the use of 
some reputable data base from any good quality library. 
Traditional Approach 
Here, a systematic exposition, analysis and critical evaluation shall be made of legal laws, 
principles or doctrines of money laundering and AML/CFT laws and their inter-relationship. 
The researcher shall use this method to look at the problems posed by the gap between 
AML/CFT laws and the present state of achievement. The researcher shall make use of 
statutory materials, case reports, standard textbooks and reference books, legal periodicals, 
legal history and commentaries.  
Historical Research 
The aim of the researcher here is not to embark upon a discussion of every AML/CFT 
regulation neither is it to do same with local laws for the sake of mere intellectual delight. The 
intention rather, like it is with historical research, is to evaluate the present law as it is, to pick 
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the queries out, and explore the circumstances in which the present state of affairs came about. 
The historical evolution of the crime of money laundering right from the prohibition era to what 
it is today is relevant to this research, and this method shall be used for that purpose. Similarly, 
the legal and regulatory aspect of the AML laws shall be critically analysed from this 
perspective. The importance of this method of research cannot be over emphasised, as finding 
out the previous law can give an understanding into the reasons behind the existing law and the 
course of its development. The past often explains the present, most vividly.
46 Here, text books, 
commentaries on conventions, international instruments, local and national laws and the 
historical perceptions of reputable authors shall be used. 
1.8 Research Questions  
This research aims to answer the following questions:- 
1) How has Global AML initiatives fared against the serious threat of the growth of the crime 
of money laundering? 
2) What are the practicalities of the global AML/CFT laws within the contextual peculiarities 
of Nigeria? 
3) How could Nigeria best use international standards and practices in Nigeria‘s policy 
making to improve its AML regime? 
4) Is Nigeria‘s compliance to the global AML/CFT standards a mere academic exercise? Or a 
means to an illusory end? 
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Chapter 2 
Stages of the Cycle, Extent and the Effects of the Crime of Money Laundering 
 
2.0 Introduction  
The aims and objectives of this chapter are to analyse the various stages of the crime of money 
laundering and to then examine the national and global effects of the activity. 
2.1 Stages of the Cycle 
The nature of a money laundering cycle entails several stages each of which may implicate many 
people and institutions, and for this reason, criminals take extreme care to cover their tracks at 
every stage of the process. The way in which laundering takes place is dependent on the purpose 
for which the act is structured, and the particular skill set of the launderer.  Money launderers are 
creative, intelligent and imaginative and they develop their methods by seeking new and un-
captured business opportunities, sometimes by strategically selecting economies where regulations 
are lax or non-existent. Irrespective of individual differences and style, however, money launderers 
depend on the anonymity, speed and complexities of their transactions to carry out the scheme. By 
being anonymous, they make sure transactions with values obtained from offences resemble other 
bona-fide transactions from the environment in which they operate. The cash must have no trace to 
lead to its origin. The launderer‘s dependence on complex transactions is because spreading of 
funds in multiple transactions with electronic speed makes the job of the investigators a difficult or 
even impossible one. A standard laundering process comprises three stages: placement, layering 
and integration.  
2.1.1 The Placement 
This is the initial stage in the money laundering cycle where funds obtained from illegal activities 
are introduced into the legitimate financial markets. It may be done through single or multiple 
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transactions using one or several banks deposits or the purchase of easily negotiable investments 
such as bonds or shares.
47
 The exclusive aim of the launderer at this stage is to remove the cash 
from the location of acquisition in order to avoid detection from authorities and then proceed to 
transform it into other asset forms. When a criminal activity generates substantial profits, the 
individual or group involved must find a way to control the funds without attracting attention to 
the underlying activities or the persons involved. The transnational nature of the crime of money 
laundering means that cash can usually be syphoned across borders and a common technique used 
at the placement stage is the separation of the funds into smaller values for easy lodgements into 
various accounts. Thus the dissipation of large and bulky cash amounts features at this stage of 
the cycle. What amounts to large or bulky cash however, is a subjective rather than an objective 
issue in that any amount that is ‗large‘ enough to arouse suspicion as to the legitimacy of its 
source can be described as  being ‗large and bulky‘. Once the physical cash is injected into the 
financial system, it is replaced by a paper; electronic or digital record that can be conveyed; 
transported or negotiated with ease.
48
 The placement stage is usually considered to be the riskiest 
stage of the laundering cycle because the process involves substantial sums of money being 
passed across counters of banks or other financial institutions.
49
 It is at this stage that detection by 
the authorities is most likely, and this is aptly described by the analogy that ‗‗money in flight will 
be first noticeable when it literally first splashes into the pool.‘‘50 From a regulatory perspective 
therefore, this is a crucial opportunity for intervention and interception because from here on, the 
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ripples become fainter and the cash sinks deeper into the target economy.
51
 In the 1980‘s, Eddie 
Antar, an American business man and co-founder of Crazy Eddie, an American business retail 
outlet that sold electronic goods, skimmed millions of dollars from the company to hide it from 
the Inland Revenue Service. That was the original plan, but he and his co-conspirators eventually 
decided they could make better use of the money if they sent it back to the company disguised as 
revenue which would inflate the company‘s reported assets in preparation for its Initial Public 
Offering (IPO). To inflate earnings and maintain the stock price, Antar and his advisers plotted to 
falsify inventory and profit reports. The scheme employed several tactics. In response to slowing 
sales, Crazy Eddie began by falsely reporting sales to other chains as if they were retail sales. 
Antar had always done a brisk business transhipping goods from manufacturers to other retailers. 
Now, it booked those wholesale transactions as retail sales. Such financial manoeuvrings 
accomplished several things: first, they contributed to the record-setting sales increases with 
which Crazy Eddie was wowing Wall Street in 1985 and 1986. Secondly, and more subtly, they 
inflated same-store sales to analysts (a critical measure of a retail company's profitability, and a 
key to the company's stock market success). As its core business weakened, Antar was desperate 
to produce the extraordinary results that had endeared him to Wall Street.
52
  Falsely reporting 
wholesale transactions as retail sales inflated Crazy Eddie's inventory position and enhanced the 
company's balance sheet. For instance, the company would sell 100 colour televisions which 
would retail for a total of $40,000 to another chain for only $20,000.
53
 Eddie laundered more than 
$8Million and the method he used at the placement stage of his scheme was to make a series of 
separate deposits to a bank in Israel, sometimes making up to twelve deposits in one day. Without 
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detection, Eddie had scaled the first hurdle in the money laundering cycle by successfully 
introducing his funds into the legitimate financial market.  
The placement stage is the foundation stage of the cycle, and versatility and expertise is of 
paramount importance. This expertise plays out in a variety of techniques ranging from ‗smurfing‘ 
to bank fraud. ‗Smurfing‘ is a term ascribed to money launderers who seek to avoid scrutiny from 
authorities by breaking up a large transaction into smaller amounts that remain below the reporting 
threshold.
54
 Runners are used to perform multiple financial transactions to avoid the currency 
reporting requirements. In the Twenties and Thirties in the United States, organised crime groups 
would pay elderly men and women a few hundred dollars each to deposit up to $9,999 in cash into 
various bank accounts. Bank clerks were not expected to suspect elderly people carrying cash, 
however large the amount. Because many of the unwitting depositors were diminutive in nature, 
they were known as ‗smurfs‘.55 Instructive in this regard is the case of Lawrence Druce v Regina.56 
This was an appeal against the amount of a confiscation order after the appellant had pleaded guilty 
to being concerned in a money laundering arrangement, and to possessing criminal property 
contrary to S. 328 (1) of the Proceeds of Crimes Act 2002. Some of the proceeds of the appellants‘ 
dirty deal were paid into various bank accounts he set up himself. He had 16 accounts with the 
Borehamwood branch of HSBC and one account at the Edgware branch of NatWest bank. 
Enquiries revealed that eight of the accounts at least, had received some of the proceeds. It 
appeared that a total of $1,096,818.90 had been transferred to those accounts, much of it being 
passed onto others. This was the criminality on which he was indicted. Conversely, Alberto Barrera 
was the leader of the largest smurfing operation in the early 1980s. His Miami-based smurfing 
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team included dozens of people who took cash delivered by drug traffickers and placed it into 
hundreds of banks in cities across the United States.
57
 Records from the operation that dismantled 
Barrera‘s money laundering network stated that he received large deliveries in cash between 1983 
and 1984 which he usually divided among his team, sending groups of two or three people on 
airline trips to various cities where they would systematically buy money orders or cashier checks 
from banks.
58
 Barrera, however, had no efficient means of liquidating these money orders or 
cashier cheques and this ultimately led to his downfall because the methods he utilised drew the 
attention of the banks.
59
 
Cash smuggling is another option for the money launderer at the placement stage of the crime. It 
is favoured by the criminals because wire transfers (especially trans-national ones) bear the risk of 
exposure of the money trail. It is not a system without its own problems, however. There is a 
mandatory legal requirement on individuals in most jurisdictions for international passengers to 
declare the exact cash sum amounts passengers are carrying before boarding any means of 
transport. This process forces launderers to develop inventive ways of circumventing the system. 
Eddie Antar carried millions of dollars strapped to his body and in his suit case during his money 
laundering scheme. In September 2001, Hong Kong police tracked down the biggest cross border 
money laundering crime, which extended to Canada, Hong Kong, Yunnan province and the 
Guangdong province of china mainland, involving more than 50 Billion HKD.
60
 In this case, the 
criminal groups hired carriers to conduct day by day cash smuggling from Shenzhen Luolu 
customs to Hong Kong over a period of six years. That dirty money, gained by tax evasion and 
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embezzlement in China‘s mainland was transferred to various bank accounts after being 
smuggled into Hong Kong. It could be argued that cash smuggling does not necessarily fall into 
the category of placement as far as money laundering is concerned, because a successful smuggle 
of cash across borders does not necessarily place the cash into the financial system (which is the 
main purport of the launderer at this stage). Smuggling of cash across borders alone is not 
sufficient for the launderer because the physical cash must still be immersed into the financial 
system. Thus taking advantage of laxity or complicity in banking and financial institutions (or 
more actively working to corrupt bank officials) offers other avenues for money laundering.   The 
2006 case of Wachovia bank was a classic case of bank complicity. The authorities in the United 
States of America uncovered billions of dollars in wire transfers, traveller‘s cheques and cash 
shipments through Mexican exchanges into Wachovia accounts. Between 2004 and 2007, illegal 
proceeds totalling $378.4 Billion was transferred into the bank by the Mexican based Casa 
Cambios. The bank had ignored the red flags raised by its senior Anti-Money laundering officer 
as regards dealing with the Mexicans. Recently in the year 2012, HSBC bank was found to have 
regularly laundered money for Iranian terrorists and for Al Qaeda. ‗‗A yearlong investigation by a 
senate committee uncovered that the bank acted as a conduit for drug money, disguised the 
sources of funds to evade its sanctions against Iran, and included amongst its clients, businesses 
with alleged ties to terrorism.‘‘61 In terms of active corruption, Pablo Escobar provides the 
perfect illustration. Laundering money was central to Escobar‘s empire and his recipe for success 
was relatively simple as he once said ‗‗you bribe someone here, you bribe someone there, and 
you pay a friendly banker to help you bring the money back.‘‘62 Irrespective of problems faced by 
the launderers however, smuggling remains a component part of the placement stage due to the 
ease with which criminals can throw authorities of the trail and effectively sever the ties between 
                                           
61
 Carl Levin – Michigan Senator (2012) 
 
62
 See J.D. Rockefeller, (2016) Cocaine King Pablo Escobar: Crimes and Drug Dealings 
 
33 
 
 
 
transactions involving the proceeds of crime and the origin of the crime(s). Money launderers also 
make use of insurance institutions to obliterate the trail of illegal proceeds by buying, altering and 
surrendering insurance policies and then subsequently filing insurance claims. Indirect placement 
can also be accomplished by forward displacement of the money laundering location into 
premiums paid for life insurance policies, or other financial products.
63
 
2.1.2 The Layering Stage 
This is considered the smokescreen stage in a money laundering activity. It is the stage where the 
true origin of money is disguised by making the activity difficult to be detected and uncovered. 
Complex financial transactions are utilised towards separating criminal funds from its origin, and 
methods used at this stage range from the use of offshore account by dealers, online electronic fund 
transfers between tax havens, and suspicious gold transactions in which large purchases of gold are 
undertaken in countries with low Vat rates. Other methods include over invoicing of reported 
goods, the use of gold, rings, bracelets, pendants etc. The value of these items usually remain 
constant, therefore there is the possibility of a single piece being changed many times in order to 
disguise the original form without any significant change to its worth. Another method is the 
creation of false paper trails and the intentional production of false documentary evidence to 
disguise the true source, ownership, location, purpose of or control over the funds. Tangible assets 
are purchased with cash, and converted in order to offset transaction costs. Electronic funds or wire 
transfers are also used at this stage due to its advantage of speed. Once placement is successful 
within the financial system by way of a bank or financial institution, the proceeds can now be 
converted into monetary instruments by the use of bankers‘ drafts and money orders. Another way 
the launderers achieve their aim at this stage is through the acquisition of material assets bought 
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with cash and then sold. Those assets bought with the illicit funds can now then be sold either 
locally or abroad by which way, tracing the origin becomes more difficult.
64
 
At the layering stage of the Antar‘s money laundering scheme, after successfully introducing his 
dirty cash into the financial system via an Israeli bank, and before the authorities noticed the 
sudden huge balance in his account, he caused the Israeli bank to transfer everything back to 
Panama where bank secrecy laws were in force. This afforded him the freedom to make 
anonymous transfers to various offshore accounts.  Another reported case was in Canada where a 
criminal organisation exported a relatively small shipment of scrap metal, but falsely reported the 
shipments as weighing several hundreds of tons.
65
 Commercial invoices, bills of lading and other 
shipping documents were prepared to support the fraudulent transaction. On inspection of the 
cargo, a Canadian customs officer noticed that the hull of ship was still well above the water line 
and as such, inconsistent with the reported weight of the shipment scrap metal. An examination of 
the cargo revealed the discrepancy between the reported and actual weight of the shipment. The 
logical assumption here was that the inflated value of the invoice would have been used to transfer 
criminal funds to Canada.
66
 There seemed a genuine case of an intention to over invoice a foreign 
importer by misrepresenting the quantity of goods. The criminal organisation would then have been 
able to transfer illegal funds back into the country using the trade transaction to justify payment 
through the financial system. In R v Patel (Harish),
67
 in an appeal against convictions for offences 
of entering into or becoming concerned in a money laundering arrangement contrary to the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, it was alleged that lies were told to the banks and other financial 
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institutions and that false documents were used to cover the transactions, and in particular, false 
invoices were issued. The first appellant Harish Patel had one legitimate business and had set up a 
further business in his sole name. The crown alleged that the businesses were used by the 
appellants to launder £4.6M over a period of five months. Money was deposited or transferred in 
Harish Patel‘s name to a bank in the United Kingdom. It would then be transferred to accounts in 
India and Dubai via the United States with false documents used to cover the transfers. The Crown 
further alleged that the businesses set up by Harish Patel did not buy or sell any diamonds or 
jewellery as it claimed, but was solely a vehicle for money laundering. They were convicted on 
those grounds at the court of first instance and their subsequent appeal against sentencing was also 
thrown out.  
Criminals make use of the internet for electronic transfer of funds or wire transfers mostly at the 
layering stage of a laundering scheme because technological advancements means that one smart 
card or computer can store an immeasurable sum of electronic money. This process is quick and 
bridges the miles of distance and makes it difficult for regulators to make use of the customer 
identification policy as the complex nature of laundering money over the internet makes it difficult 
to be supervised. It leaves regulators with a very difficult task of determining whether the crime 
took place where the server is located or where the accounts are held. This sparks up a 
jurisdictional issue as to which regulatory body or authority should prosecute or follow the trail and 
ends up buying time for the launderer to dissolve his proceeds into untraceable channels. 
2.1.3 The Integration Stage 
At this stage, the illegal proceeds have been safely placed, mingled with legitimate funds and ready 
to return to the launderer through legitimate means as clean and legal money. This means the 
criminal has a point of reference as to source of wealth in the event of questioning by law 
enforcement agents or regulators. A common technique at this conclusive stage of the laundering 
36 
 
 
 
process is the use of real estate transactions by shell companies using illicit proceeds. Such 
properties can then be sold with the proceeds appearing as clean money from a legitimate source. 
The documents that set it up can contain a valid bank account or something more than the names 
and address of the lawyer or agent that takes care of setting up the company, the commissioner or 
may be a few shareholders. With no independent assets or their own commercial operations, these 
types of companies are used by owners to develop their businesses or to maintain control over 
companies. They are registered in the country where it started but not posted on the stock market 
and never operate on their own. The most important aspect of a shell company to the launderer, tax 
evader or to terrorism financiers is that a shell company is a legal entity and so easily formed too. 
More so, they are particularly protective of the criminals when they are set up in jurisdictions that 
hold strict legislation in keeping banking secrets and this makes it almost impossible to identify the 
real owners or administrators of the company with a natural consequence being an obliterated trail 
of illegal funds. In China, Mr Cheng Kejie, a former vice chairman of the country‘s National 
People‘s Congress (NPC) was sentenced to death and executed for accepting bribes and for general 
abuse of his position while in power.
68
 Cheng, aged 66 at the time was found guilty along with his 
mistress Li Ping of having taken 41 Million Yuan in bribes when he served as deputy secretary of 
the party committee of Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous region and chairman of people‘s 
Government of Guangxi. The illicit proceeds were deposited in overseas banks by a Hong Kong 
business man used as the middle man who on false pretence of a Hong Kong company transferred 
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them to a shell company registered in Hong Kong in Cheng‘s name. This shell company fabricated 
business operations and forged accounts to launder the proceeds at the cost of paying 25% 
incorporation income tax and 40% individual income tax and then transferred them into a bank 
account appointed by Cheng. The scheme in this case was the establishment of a shell company by 
the criminals in advance of and fabrication of transactions as well as payment of tax in the name 
corporation income, through which the illicit money was legalised. At the integration stage of 
Antar‘s scheme, after successfully placing his dirty cash into the financial system and obliterating 
the movement of the funds with the aid of Israeli and Panamanian banks, he slowly wired the 
money from those accounts to the legitimate Crazie Eddie electronic bank account. The money got 
mixed with legitimate funds afterwards and became documented as revenue.  
The integration stage in a money laundering process is a high order of criminal sophistication 
which is heavily reliant on the complicity of banks. The profits the banks make from laundering 
money for criminals usually is the pull the criminals have over banks that compromise their 
professional responsibilities and standards. However, while the banking system remains an 
important avenue for money launderers, there has been a gradual but noticeable trend away from 
the banks and increasing use of non-financial institutions which not only provide attractive services 
to launderers but also find themselves subjected to less regulatory scrutiny than banks.
69
 The 
‗Hawala‘ banking system is one of such. It is a well-established system used for legitimate 
transactions and involves the transfer of value between countries, but outside the legitimate 
banking system. The broker, which may be set up as a financial institution, or may be an ordinary 
shop selling goods, has an arrangement with a corresponding business in the other country. The 
two businesses have customers that want funds in the other country, and after taking their 
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commission, the two brokers match the amounts wanted by their customers and balance their books 
by transferring an amount between them for the time period e.g. one month.
70
  A good illustration 
of how the system works is thus- an initial transaction can be a remittance from a customer (CA) 
from country A, or a payment arising from some prior obligation, to another customer (CB) in 
country B. A hawaladar from country A (HA) receives funds in one currency from CA and, in 
return, gives CA a code for authentication purposes. He then instructs his country B correspondent 
(HB) to deliver an equivalent amount in the local currency to a designated beneficiary (CB), who 
needs to disclose the code to receive the funds. HA can be remunerated by charging a fee or 
through an exchange rate spread. After the remittance, HA has a liability to HB, and the settlement 
of their positions is made by various means, either financial or goods and services. Their positions 
can also be transferred to other intermediaries, who can assume and consolidate the initial positions 
and settle at wholesale or multilateral levels.
71
 
2.2 The Three Stage Cycle- Not an ‗open-and-shut‘ case. 
These three stages of a money laundering cycle however, do not necessarily constitute a cumulative 
standard preceding the laundering of funds. One or two of the three may suffice on their own. It is 
however improbable that layering or integration could occur without a precession of the placement 
stage. The variabilities and complexities of a money laundering process can result in cases where 
only a number of these stages occur, where they occur simultaneously or they overlap. A lot 
depends on the facilities that avail the launderer, the criminal‘s requirements and on the robustness 
or otherwise of the regulatory and legal requirements linked to the effectiveness of the monitoring 
systems of the financial or regulated sector.
72
 While convenient, a major downside of viewing 
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money laundering through the prisms of the three generally accepted methods of placement, 
integration and layering is that it does not fully reflect what really happens.
73
 A major consequence 
of this by way of regulation is that those with the duty of recognising and arresting money 
laundering activity find themselves having insufficient knowledge of identifying it in all its 
guises.
74
 The identification by the launderer of a perceived adversary could determine the mode of 
operation used, and this means that the structure of the transaction depends on who the likely 
discoverer could be or what they are likely to look out for.
75
 This played out in the Barings bank 
scandal
76
 of the 1990‘s where Nick Leeson despite being caught several times over the course of 
his unauthorised speculative trading, was on each occasion able to talk his way out of discovery 
because the people who had caught him did not understand what he had done.
77
 Another instructive 
case is that of the fraudster, Walter Pavlo who was jailed for wire fraud and money laundering in 
the mid 90‘s. While in the employment of the MCI as a senior manager, Mr. Pavlo was responsible 
for the billing and collection of nearly $1 Billion in monthly revenue for MCI‘s carrier finance 
division. However, in collusion with a fellow member of staff and a business associate outside the 
company, Mr Pavlo perpetrated a fraud involving a few of MCI‘s own customers. At the 
completion of the scheme, seven customers of MCI were defrauded over a six-month period 
resulting in $6 million in payments to the Cayman Islands. Mr Pavlo describes knowing what the 
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auditors would look for, and providing them with distractions to keep them away from what he was 
hiding.
78
 It is important to note therefore, that, be it a tax evader, a spouse seeking to hide parts of a 
marital estate, or a terrorist seeking to camouflage the funds he plans to use in coordinating a next 
attack, the overriding aim is to is to find a mechanism that bears the most minimal of risks in 
achieving that aim.
79
 These methods may or may not conform to the three stage model of 
placement, layering and integration. 
2.3 The Extent of the Crime. 
In order to determine the extent of the crime of money laundering, we should ask the following 
three questions: (i), How much money has been or is being laundered? (ii), what is the source of 
laundered proceeds and illicit funds? And (iii), what is the ultimate destination of the laundered 
proceeds? 
2.3.1 How Much? 
In a digital age where a single click of a button can wire huge sums across vast distances miles, the 
efficiency of a launderer is enhanced and the job of the regulator becomes more difficult and more 
important.  However, an accurate measurement of the extent of phenomenon of money laundering 
is difficult to achieve. Van Duyne
80
 believes that very little is known either of the underground 
economy in general, or indeed of the money management of crime enterprises in particular. Van 
Duyne describes knowledge in this area as akin to that of an archaeologist who has to describe the 
economy of a Stone Age settlement on the basis of a few pottery fragments, a spear point and half a 
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jawbone, which may in the long run, lead to either over or underestimation.
81
 Van Duyne further 
argues that the approach to money laundering has been accompanied more by fact creation than 
fact finding. According to him, no certified fraud examiner would ever accept a yearly report of a 
corporation if its figures had been gleaned and glued together in the way of the first alarmist report 
of the Financial Action Task Force, which figures were obviously intended for stimulating political 
action.
82
 Authors in the field of economics recognise this problem and some have proposed 
methods for estimating the scale of money laundering activity. The pioneer of measuring money 
laundering is the British Australian economist and criminologist John Walker, who in 1994 using 
the ‗Walker Gravity Model‘ did the first global estimate of money laundering by measuring illicit 
flows of money in and out of 220 countries.
83
  John Zdanowicz 
84
 on his part focused on an 
analysis of unusual trade data by observing abnormal prices for trade based money laundering, 
while Bagella et al
85
 proposed a way to measure money laundering by using economic theory to 
determine how much economic rationally acting a launderer would launder.
86
 These efforts 
notwithstanding, all had their shortcomings and did not completely solve the problems associated 
with an accurate estimation of the crime of money laundering.
87
 Van Duyne argues that the 
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difficulty concerning the determination of the scope of the problem lies with the geographical 
delimitation and delimitation in time. For the limitation provided by geography, the argument is 
that the cross-border complexity of the crime trade and the financial handling of the proceeds 
frustrate any attempt at gauging exactly how much is being laundered in a particular jurisdiction.
88
 
This danger is especially acute when a complicated system of banking is being used in splitting up 
the money in small amounts, transferring to foreign front companies, putting the original sum again 
(partly) together (described as layering and integration) in order to obscure the money trail.
89
 As 
regards delimitation of time, Van Duyne‘s argument is that the tendency to relate the extent of 
money laundering to the assumed yearly turnover of crime trade bears no correlation to the nature 
of money laundering activity because money laundering does not need to happen at a particular 
time with any trade. The need for money laundering depends on the time in which one needs to 
enter the legitimate upper world financially for whatever reason.
90
 One can make a distinction 
between the need to report a regular (preferably not too high fiscal) income and the individual large 
transaction for which the declared income is too small. The 'annual income' requires a certain 
amount of money-laundering on a 'yearly basis', for example a moderate salary as a director of a 
little firm on the Isle of Man.
91
 
Nevertheless, it is agreed that there is not a definite figure of the amount of money that is laundered 
globally but rough estimates have been suggested. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) conducted a study to determine the magnitude of illicit funds generated by drug 
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trafficking and organised crimes and to investigate to what extent these funds are laundered. The 
reports estimated that in 2009, criminal proceeds amounted to 3.6% of global GDP, with 2.7% 
being laundered
92
 
2.3.2 Source of Laundered Proceeds and Illicit Funds. 
Crime is the principal source of laundered wealth, and this ranges from financial crimes such as 
fraud, corruption and tax evasion, to violent crimes like heist, burglary, and less violent but equally 
devastating ones such as human trafficking and the illicit drug trade. These sources shall be 
discussed within the context of their contributions to the menace that is money laundering. 
I: Official Corruption and the Politically Exposed Persons (PEP‘s) 
Money laundering is usually a veritable tool for the perpetration of the crime of corruption. 
Corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain, and it can be classified as grand, petty 
and political, depending on the amounts of money lost and the sector where it occurs.
93
 There is 
always a nexus between money laundering schemes and corruption because either the laundered 
assets are proceeds of corruption or the process of laundering is facilitated by corrupting law 
enforcement agencies or officials in the financial institution to place illicit proceeds into the 
system.
94
 Corruption is a financial crime that has gained notoriety for the destruction of lives and 
communities, and for undermining countries and institutions. It generates popular angst that 
threatens to further destabilise societies and exacerbate violent conflicts. Corruption can happen 
everywhere and it mostly occurs when politicians put their own interests above those of the public 
by demanding money and or favours from citizens for services that should be free. It is prevalent in 
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developing world economies and the sad reality of the nature of corruption is that it hits the poor 
hardest. This is because it is usually the underprivileged ones who cannot afford substitute means 
to basic amenities like pipe-borne water, security, electricity and health-care that suffer the 
debilitating consequences of corruption the most. Taken literally, corruption means for instance, a 
Nigerian customs officer overlooking a mandatory check on imported goods in return for a bribe by 
whoever owned those (contraband) goods. For the purpose of this work however, corruption shall 
be treated within the context of the politically exposed persons (PEPs). In recent years, there has 
been an increasing concern about money laundering cases involving high net worth individuals 
who are, or who have been, entrusted with prominent public functions (commonly referred to as 
politically exposed persons) where their wealth has been obtained by illegal means, such as bribery 
and corruption.
95
 Defining Politically Exposed Persons (PEP‘s) has been the subject of much 
conjecture over the years. Numerous definitions have been advanced, each with its own distinct 
features but finding a universally accepted one has been difficult to arrive at. It has been defined as 
‗‗individuals who are/or have been entrusted with prominent public functions, including heads of 
states or of Government, senior politicians, senior Government, judicial or military officials, senior 
executives of publicly owned corporations and important party officials.‘‘96 The European Union 
(EU) third money laundering directive defines PEPs as natural persons who are or have been 
entrusted with prominent public functions and immediate family members, or persons known to be 
close associates of such persons. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 40 recommendations 
(updated October 2004) and nine special recommendations on terrorist financing (updated February 
2006) define PEPs in five component layers: (i) current or former senior official in the executive, 
legislative, administrative, military or judicial branch of a foreign government (elected or not); (ii) 
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a senior official of a major foreign political party; (iii) a senior executive of a foreign government 
owned commercial enterprise, being a corporation, business or other entry formed by or for the 
benefit of any such individual; (iv) an immediate family member of such individual; meaning 
spouse, parents, siblings, children, and spouses parents or siblings; and (v) any individual publicly 
known (or actually known by the relevant institution) to be a close personal or professional 
associate.  
These aforementioned definitions although varying in some aspects, contain very similar themes, 
i.e. they are persons in authority or previously in authority in positions that they could use for the 
diversion of public funds into private and personal use. And although PEPs are not by definition 
corrupt, and the majority of PEPs do not abuse their position, they are vulnerable because they 
have the capacity to control or divert funds and to award or deny large-scale projects for illicit 
gain.
97
 Questions abound however as to the level of seniority that makes a PEP, the factors to be 
considered as to who constitutes a close associate or an immediate family member, and the 
duration (if any) within which it may no longer be necessary to regard an individual as politically 
exposed. The FATF in its definition narrowed PEPs to foreigners, but then how do we treat local 
PEPs?  It is imperative to note at this juncture that the definition of PEPs are more a guideline in 
assisting to understand what PEPs are rather than a one size fits all approach. The rationale 
behind this is that if a global and all-inclusive list of PEPs exist, criminals and terrorists will 
know who, and who not, to seek to corrupt in a bid to avoid the additional scrutiny of enhanced 
due diligence. A universal definition would not be successful, so rather than simply creating a 
checklist based PEP definition and seeking to apply it, a better approach would be for regulated 
entities to undertake a risk based evaluation of the types of PEP monitoring and related strategy 
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(e.g. corruption prevention strategy) that are likely to be most effective in the respective 
jurisdiction and organisation in both the short and long terms.
98
 As an example, regulated entities 
should exercise their judgement when refining their risk criteria in their business dealings with 
PEPs and issues to consider should include (i) The level of seniority to be classified as being 
politically exposed; (ii) Who constitutes an immediate family member or close associate of 
PEPs?; (iii) Whether PEPs monitoring should be extended to domestic PEPs and individuals 
exercising functions not normally considered prominent but having political exposure comparable 
to that of similar positions at a prominent level; (iv) When PEP monitoring should cease for a 
‗former‘ PEP e.g. one year after leaving office or longer for individuals deemed to have a higher 
risk?
99
 The Wolfsberg group charted a way forward with respect to these questions. The 
Wolfsberg Group is an association of thirteen global banks which aims to develop frameworks 
and guidance for the management of financial crime risks, particularly with respect to Know Your 
Customer, Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorist Financing policies. Whilst 
acknowledging the intrinsic difficulties of definitional closure, the Wolfsberg group limited its 
activities to identifying some of the more common features of PEPs, their close family and 
associates. The group set out characteristics of PEPs that should be used as useful indicators of 
seniority, prominence or importance in determining whether or not an individual should be 
considered as politically exposed and those indicators are as follows: (i) Heads of state, heads of 
Government and ministers, (ii) Senior judicial officials, (iii) Heads and other high ranking 
officers holding senior positions in armed forces, (iv) Members of ruling royal families with 
governance responsibilities, (v) Senior executives of state owned enterprises, and (vi) Senior 
officials of major political parties. There were a further two categories of persons which the group 
stated ‗may‘ be considered to fall within the definition but may be excluded in areas where the 
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risk of corruption or abuse is considered to be relatively low as they do not have the same ability 
to control or divert funds. These two excluded categories are heads of supranational bodies e.g. 
the United Nations, World Bank and International Monetary Fund; Members of parliament or 
national legislatures, senior members of the diplomatic Corp e.g. ambassadors, deputy 
ambassadors, or members of boards of central banks. The operative word in this proviso is 
‗‘may‘‘ and rightly so because there have been cases of corruption for instance amongst members 
of parliament and national legislatures. This in essence means the relative low risks proffered by 
the Wolfsberg group for this category of persons isn‘t a water tight condition because attendant 
risks still remain. A case in hand was the expenses claim that broke out in the British parliament 
in the year 2010. Members of parliament in the United Kingdom are entitled to claim expenses, 
including the cost of accommodation, wholly, exclusively and necessarily incurred for the 
performance of their parliamentary duties.
100
 However, this privilege was grossly abused by some 
MPs who filed false expenses claims from the tax payer‘s money. Margaret Morgan, a then 
labour MP fiddled her expenses claims and received more than £53,000 and was charged, 
convicted and sentenced to a two year supervision and treatment order having suffered depression 
in the course of proceedings. Morgan represented Luton south and claimed nearly her entire 
annual allowance sum in one bogus expense entry and forged invoices for more than £20,000 of 
non-existent goods and services.
101
 Also charged with similar irregularities were Labour MPs 
David Chaytor, Elliot Morley and Jim Devine. They were accused of stealing almost £60,000 in 
allowances through false mortgage applications, rent claims and invoices for services. Elliot 
Morley, representing Scunthorpe faced two charges related to £30,000 mortgage claims which he 
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allegedly was not entitled. David Chaytor of Bury North was charged on three counts related to 
fraudulent claims of £1,950 for IT services and £18,000 relating to rent. Morley pleaded guilty 
and was sentenced to 16 months in jail after being found guilty under the theft Act of 1968.
102
 Jim 
Devine on the other hand, allegedly claimed £3,240 for cleaning services and £5,505 for 
stationery using false invoices and was convicted and sentenced to 16 months in prison for, in the 
words of the presiding Justice Saunders, ‗‗setting about defrauding the public purse in a 
calculated and deliberate way.‘‘103 These instances are cogent pointers to the fact that the despite 
the Wolfsberg group classifying Members of parliament as low risk elements to corruption, the 
searchlight must still be beamed on this category of PEPs just as it is on other categories. 
Furthermore, references to ‗low risk‘ elements might well be conflated with areas where 
corruption has not previously been known to be prevalent. On this premise, Nigeria provides an 
example of why no leeway should be accorded any particular group of PEPs because Nigeria is 
classed as a high risk corruption country. In its 2013 global corruption barometer, Transparency 
International rated Nigeria as the eighth most corrupt Nation in the world. Britain on the other 
hand is not renowned for flagrantly corrupt practices- but as the expenses scandal showed, 
corruption amongst PEPs can occur in any department, and anywhere in the world. 
Regarding the identification of close associates and close family members of PEPs, the Wolfsberg 
group sought to navigate the uncertainties by simply describing close family members as spouses, 
children, parents and siblings etc. This again leaves a loose end, because spouses could be divorced 
and children and parents could become estranged, although the group suggests that these factors, 
when they occur should be investigated and recorded. A close associate in the thinking of the group 
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will include a PEPs widely and publicly known close business colleague and/or personal advisor, in 
particular, financial advisors or persons acting in a financial fiduciary capacity. The problem that 
arises out of this is that any PEP that intends to use an associate for any fraudulent purpose would 
be discreet enough not to use anyone ‗widely and publicly‘ known to him as the Wolfsberg group 
contemplates in its definition. The group however states three methods that could be used to 
identify such an associate or family member and they are as follows:- (i) Enquiries should be made 
regarding Potentially Exposed Person status of prospective customers during the account 
establishment process; (ii) Prospective customers to be screened against a data base of such persons 
and these may be developed internally, provided by an external service provider or obtained from a 
reputable source; and (iii) The inclusion of PEP related training to appropriate staff which may be 
part of the regular Anti Money Laundering training. As probing as these investigative methods may 
seem, they tend to target the main actor i.e. the PEP while doing very little to unravel the identity 
of a potentially obscured figure (the close associate and family member). The Financial Action 
Task Force has a more proactive approach to what constitutes a family member by analysing within 
a socio-cultural context taking into cognizance the influence that particular types of family 
members generally have, and how broad the circle of close family and dependants tend to be.
104
 
This is particularly relevant because in some cultures, the number of family members who are 
considered to be close or have influence may be quite small e.g. parents, siblings, spouses/partners 
and children while in other cultures, grandparents and grandchildren may also suffice. In continents 
like Africa and many parts of Asia, cultural traditions ensure that family ties are genealogically 
wide whereas in most European communities, a family is usually a narrowly knit set up where only 
immediate nuclear family members are considered close enough within the context of PEPs. This 
cultural heterogeneity ensures that the meaning of who a close family member is within thinking of 
the FATF represents a more hands on approach than that of the Wolfsberg group. It is more 
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thorough and gives little or no room for problematic interpretations. On close associates, the FATF 
defines them to include known sexual partners outside the family unit e.g. girlfriends, boyfriends 
and mistresses, prominent members of the same political party, civil organisations, labour and 
employee union as the PEP, business partners or associates, especially those that share beneficial 
ownership of legal entities with the PEP or who are otherwise connected (e.g. through joint 
membership of a company board). Again, as it is in the case of the family members, it is the 
thinking of the FATF that social, economic and cultural variations may also play a role in 
determining how close those relationships generally are and it is these links that act as determinants 
to the level of risk. 
Another problem that arises from the concept of PEPs is the question of the propriety or 
otherwise of treating non-foreign PEPs the same as foreign ones. A foreign PEP is one that seeks 
to establish a relationship with a financial institution outside the jurisdictional borders of the 
territory they hold the public position that gave rise to their categorisation in the first place. The 
FATF considers Foreign PEPs high risk and require the application of enhanced due diligence 
measures, as for all higher risk customers as described in Recommendation 10.
105
 This would 
mean a Nigerian PEP who seeks to open a relationship with a financial institution in the United 
Kingdom is a foreign PEP in the same way a British equivalent who does same in Nigeria also 
qualifies as a foreign PEP. This again is a grey area and considering the afore-mentioned cases of 
the English members of parliament in the expenses scandal, both foreign and non-foreign PEPs 
are just basically two sides of the same coin and should not be treated separately. The suggestion 
of the Wolfsberg group is that domestic PEPs may be categorised as PEPs only in instances 
where an institution understands there to be a heightened reputational risk. But as stated earlier 
with Britain not really high on such a reputational risk, the MPs expenses scandal showed that 
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reputation counts for nothing, and this indeed is a lacuna that could be exploited by financial 
institutions either intentionally or innocently. All that is legally required of financial institutions 
prior to going into a relationship with such domestic PEPs is the genuine belief that such PEPs 
have come with clean hands. It is a subjective rather than objective provision which provides a 
dangerous leeway to go into relationships with corrupt PEPs. There is also the question as to how 
long a PEP remains politically exposed, in other words, the span within which PEPs may remain 
categorised as such, whether it is a lifetime status or if the tag extinguishes with the ridding of the 
privileges that earned such a person political exposure in the first place. The FATF definition of 
PEPs in its recommendation 12 of its guidelines (2013) defines PEPs as persons who have been 
(but may no longer be) entrusted with a prominent public function. This is consistent with a 
possible open ended approach (i.e. once PEP, always PEP). The FATF recommends a risk based 
approach in this regard as against a prescribed time limit. The possible risk factors suggested are 
the level of (informal) influence that the individual could exercise, the seniority of the position 
that the individual held as a Politically Exposed Person; or whether the individuals previous 
positions are linked in any way e.g. formally by appointment of the PEPs successor; or informally 
by the fact that the PEP continues to deal with the same substantive matters. The Wolfsberg group 
goes along with this risk based approach by agreeing that risk associated with PEPs are closely 
related to the office or function they held and the influence associated with that post. The group 
opines that the influence of such PEPs may have substantially reduced as soon as they left office 
but they may have been in a position to acquire wealth illicitly, so that a high level of scrutiny 
with regards to such individuals may be warranted even after they have left office. Continued 
treatment as PEPs however, may be unwarranted if there has been no sufficiently adverse or 
derogatory information widely published for a period of time that is long enough to conclude that 
taking into account the susceptibility of the former position to corruption, their source of wealth is 
legitimate and the individual has not abused such remaining influence as he/she may have. The 
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Wolfsberg group believes that any de-categorisation should be subject to an appropriate level of 
senior management review and approval, which should be documented. Conjecturally speaking, 
such de-categorisation should not be encouraged. The position of the FATF that once a Politically 
Exposed Person, always a Politically Exposed Person seems a more definite approach and should 
be absolute with no room for change in status or de-categorisation. Keeping past public office 
holders (hitherto PEPs) as permanent PEPs is the closest step that can be achieved towards having 
a data base of all prospective financial criminals. A former PEP having being de-categorised may 
remain in hibernation for a period of years without displaying any of the qualities that may 
require him being kept as being politically exposed. Such a person may subsequently start the 
process of laundering the wealth he illicitly acquired while in office? At that point, a fresh process 
of establishing the money trail would have to be embarked upon by the financial institution, 
whereas any such move by a former PEP would raise the ‗red flag‘ with the financial institutions 
no matter how long such PEPs laid low if he is permanently kept on a data base as being 
politically exposed. In identifying PEP actors within the context of corruption and money 
laundering, I seek recourse to a well-known American jurist, Justice Potter Stewart who on an 
observation on the nature of pornography said of obscene material that he might not know what it 
was, but ‗‗I know it when I see it.‘‘106  
Nigeria like many African Nations is a developing country, and typical of most developing 
economies, has been plagued by high level corruption and abuse of office by its leaders. Powerful 
and influential studies have shown that corruption constitutes about 70% of Africa‘s problems.107 
With a population of approximately 140 million inhabitants, Nigeria is the most populous country 
in Africa, and it has had its fair number of PEPs who have diverted state funds into personal use, 
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and the case of former totalitarian leader General Sani Abacha is particularly instructive. The 
United Nations office on drugs and crime (UNODC) believes that close to 400 Billion Dollars was 
wasted by Nigerian leaders between 1960 and 1999, an average of almost five thousand dollars per 
Nigerian.
108
 To put these staggering sums into perspective, imagine putting 400 billion Dollar bills 
in a row, it would cover the distance from the earth to the moon 75 times.
109
 General Abacha was 
Nigeria‘s maximum ruler for eight years having assumed in 1993, the office of head of state and 
commander in chief of the Nigerian armed forces. Nigeria had long been plagued by corruption but 
under Abacha, corruption became blatant and systematic. General Abacha‘s reign oversaw a web 
of corruption that plundered billions of dollars from the country as he and his circle of aides and 
business partners allegedly tapped virtually every stage of the oil business- Nigeria‘s most viable 
industry and source of 80% of its Governments revenue. Out of the US$3BN a year Nigeria earned 
through its oil, it is believed that the Abacha family helped themselves to a rate of about one half 
and one billion dollars a year.
110
 Corruption therefore, not only became a part of this Government, 
but its object.
111
 The full extent of the practice and mode of operation of these crimes were only 
revealed at the end of the regime and the investigations that ensued. Following his death, the 
Nigerian Government set up a special investigation panel charged with the task of investigating the 
looting and corruption that took place under the Abacha regime. The workings of this panel led to 
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contact being made with the Government of Switzerland where its federal ministry of Justice (FOJ) 
was able to follow the trail of USD500M of Abacha funds frozen in Swiss bank accounts after 
convincing itself that the greater part of the assets were obviously of criminal origin.
112
 The funds 
were remitted to Nigeria, with questions arising as to how such huge funds found ways into the 
Swiss financial system without notice. Abacha was a classic case of a politically exposed person 
whose activities should have been picked out ab-initio. Investigations by the Swiss Federal banking 
commission revealed that a total of 19 banks in Switzerland were involved in the scheme, out of 
which only five adhered to due diligence requirements set out by the SBFC in its money laundering 
guidelines issued in 1991. The erring banks were issued reprimands of varying degrees for their 
misdemeanours. Away from Switzerland, there were US$540M of Abacha funds located at 
Luxembourg and Liechtenstein as well as some unspecified amounts in British banks. Efforts to 
recover these sums and especially the ones in Britain failed despite evidence to suggest that a lot of 
the money had passed through Barclays Bank accounts.  By way of estimate, it is believed General 
Abacha stole about US$4.3 Billion within the span of his reign at the helm of the Nigerian 
Government. Remittances of his loot are still being repatriated to the Nigerian Government from 
various foreign countries. 
II: The Illicit Drug Trade: 
Organised crime permeates the life of every single society in the 21
st
 century. Its global revenues 
are well above a trillion dollars a year and illicit drugs are a major component of this.
113
 The 
impact the illicit drug trade has/had on money laundering was so prominent that it provided the 
genesis for an international Anti-Money laundering regime. Within the last two decades, the 
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international community in its fight against the escalating drug crisis had come to realise that the 
removal of the profit from drug sales rather than the seizure of such drugs was the only viable 
way to disrupt trafficking operations, hence the 1998 United Nations Convention against the 
illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances otherwise known as the Vienna 
convention. The convention came into force two years after it was concluded (precisely on the 
11
th
 of November, 1990). It is pertinent to note that although the term Money Laundering was not 
used explicitly anywhere in the Convention, Article 3 deals favourably with the concept of money 
laundering because it requires member states to ‗‗criminalise the conversion of property knowing 
that such property is derived from drug trafficking, for the purpose of concealing or disguising 
the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person who is involved in the commission of 
such an offence to evade the legal consequences of his action.‘‘114 The correlation between the 
illicit drug trade and money laundering can therefore not be over-emphasised, as the very nature 
of money laundering affords drug traffickers and other criminals the means to continue their illicit 
acts with impunity because it enables them to conceal the unlawful source of their wealth and 
thus use it to further their illegitimate goals with little or no fear of detection. The FATF in 1990 
came forward with estimates of the sale of cocaine, heroin and cannabis amounting to US$122BN 
per year in the USA and Europe with about 50-70% of this amount or as much as US$85BN 
potentially available for laundering.
115
 The UK office of National statistics estimated the ‗value 
added‘ of criminal activities in the late 1990‘s and got an estimate of the ‗value added‘ of some 
US$10BN-US$17BN in 1996 equivalent to 0.9%-1.5% of GDP. The bulk was drug related. The 
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‗value added‘ of illicit drugs alone was equivalent to between 0.5% and 1.1% of GDP.116 In 1997, 
the FATF mentioned a global turnover figure for the sale of illegal drugs of around US$300BN 
resulting in profits of US$120BN in profits out of which US$85BN could have been relevant for 
money laundering.
117
 As at 1998, it was estimated that the annual turnover from drug trafficking 
stood at US$440BN, profits that were in fact larger than the oil and gas trade as well as the 
chemical and pharmaceuticals business, and indeed twice as profitable as the motor vehicle 
industry.
118
   
The UN General Assembly condemned the laundering of money derived from illicit drug 
trafficking and other serious crimes. It insisted on countermeasures being taken by the 
international community as a whole in order to deny safe havens to criminals and their illicit 
proceeds. Consequently, it committed itself to fulfilling this task by suggesting a comprehensive 
legal framework to provide for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of the 
crime of money laundering. Compliant states were urged to establish an effective financial and 
regulatory regime aimed at refusing criminals and their illicit funds access to National and 
international financial systems through customer identification and verification requirements 
(KYC principle), financial record keeping, mandatory reporting of suspicious activity as well as 
the removal of bank secrecy impediments to efforts at preventing, investigating and punishing 
money laundering. These efforts notwithstanding, the drug trade continued to generate extra 
ordinary revenues, with estimates in South American countries like Colombia reporting drug 
trafficking activities generating between $400-$600M taxes free a year for the FARC guerrillas 
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and 40-70% of the AUC‘s income.119 In 2011 alone, approximately US$6.2BN worth of illegal 
drugs was exported from Mexico to the United States of America.
120
 The drug trade relies on the 
international banking system to launder its billions of dollars each year because the only other 
practical option available when they are unable to infiltrate local banking systems is to resort to 
bulk cash smuggling which often weighs two to three times as much as the drugs that were 
smuggled in. This made the banks and financial institutions the best bet for the criminals and the 
global financial meltdown that hit the global economy only played to their advantage. According 
to Antonio Maria Costa, a former head of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime ‗‗when 
the banks stopped to lend money to one another, drug money was the only liquid investment 
capital available. There is evidence that 238 Million Euros of drug money were laundered during 
the financial crisis.‘‘121 According to Costa, there was a widespread penetration of the financial 
sector by the criminal sector and it would have been right to say that it was the banks rather than 
the criminal organisations that were actively looking for capital (including criminal money) not 
only as deposits, but also as share acquisitions and in some cases a presence on board of 
directors.
122
 The monetary value of the worldwide illicit drug trade is currently estimated by the 
United Nations at $320BN. 
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2.3.3 Destination of Laundered Proceeds 
 It may not be precise to seek to find out the final destination of laundered proceeds because of the 
revolving door that is the life of criminals and money launderers alike. It is an endless cycle where 
the completion of one crime leads to the start of another. As such, attempting to know the final 
outcome of laundered proceeds is bound to be an exercise in futility. The aim of washing dirty 
money is not to line personal bank accounts up, neither is it for personal prestige. A criminal 
syndicate or organisation is a business on its known, and so like all businesses, profit must be 
reinvested to keep the business going. Reinvestment in this regard may mean the acquisition of 
arms to further carry on violent attacks like heists, kidnap for ransom, terrorism etc. Suffice it is to 
state therefore, that laundered moneys are perpetually in transit, a conveyor belt that keeps the 
criminal organisations in business whilst causing considerable damage to human lives, destruction 
of property, insecurities amongst nations, destabilisation of financial institutions and global 
economies as well as hindering development in many countries across the globe.  
2.4 Victims of the Crime 
For all the global attention the crime of money laundering attracts, the seeming invincibility of 
victims of the crime may stand it in good stead to be considered as a victimless crime. A victimless 
crime is a term used to describe criminal offences where there is no complainant and no readily 
recognizable victim. Such crimes include drug abuse and prostitution and this ‗victimless‘ status is 
used by some to support calls for legalisation of these activities: others oppose this view.
123
 It is a 
crime with an infraction of criminal law without any identifiable evidence of an individual that has 
suffered damages in the infraction. It is an offence that lacks an identifiable victim who is the 
object of the crime. Such offences are usually against society itself through norms, values, attitudes 
and beliefs e.g. when a person smokes marijuana or uses cocaine, they violate values about 
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appropriate behaviour without necessarily committing a crime that has a direct victim per se. Other 
examples of such victimless crimes include violation of laws concerning public decency, public 
order, or prostitution. In most of such victimless crimes, the objects and victims if there are any, are 
the perpetrators themselves i.e. the individual who violates appropriate behaviour by smoking 
marijuana or using cocaine does harm to himself and no one else. He is therefore the victim of his 
own act. This is unlike crimes like murder, rape, human trafficking and a host of others where there 
is always a definite identifiable victim(s) on the receiving end of the perpetrator of such acts of 
criminality. Money laundering by its very nature carries subtle elements of what a definition of a 
victimless crime stands for. This is largely due to the surreptitious victimless nature of the crime as 
well as its tenuous link with the violence and fear commonly associated with other crimes. But 
Money laundering is not in any way a victimless crime. Large criminal organisations spanning the 
spectrum of organised crime from drug trafficking to other illicit activities rely on this activity for 
their continued survival. It is the umbilical cord that connects the criminal activity to the 
perpetrators and allows the criminal to continue operating and growing. Victims abound: the crime 
results in increased taxes for those that do not evade tax; increased insurance policy premiums for 
those that do not make fraudulent claims; higher taxes for those who do not make bogus benefit 
claims; higher cost to business as well as the susceptibility of the vulnerable ones such as the 
elderly or the infirm who are at the risk of offences such as doorstep fraud. It means shopping on 
the internet or even at local supermarkets carry huge risks because the trader may be a fraudster 
and it means the money flows in the hands of corrupt politicians as well as dubious men who may 
be involved in the coordination of terrorist acts, trafficking of drugs, arms and people. Dirty money 
is a tax on the global economy and also a threat to the stability of the weaker parts of the global 
system. Money laundering by terrorists and criminal organisations has far reaching consequences 
of world peace and security. Arguments have been advanced that crimes like insider trading are 
victimless crimes because no one is injured by the insider trading, and that insider trading is an 
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appropriate method for compensating the entrepreneurial efforts of corporate management.
124
 
Contrary to this, there are conditions under which injury is sustained as the result of insider 
trading.
125
 The crime of money laundering ensures the cost of living is relatively high, and people 
have less to spend on things they necessarily want to spend money on. From the perspective of the 
developing nations, western financing schemes hollow out the wealth of these poorer countries, 
leaving behind economic deserts and volatile forces bent on political stability. This form of wealth 
transfer by deception benefits a few sharp or crooked entrepreneurs to the detriment of the larger 
economy. These factors dispel the mistaken notion that the crime of money laundering is not 
without victims. It is rather an offence with a limitless range of victims as it permeates every 
stratum of society- from the common man on the street, to the law abiding members of the public 
down to the kids at schools, the victims of the crime of money laundering are in abundance. From 
the foregoing, it is safe to conclude that money laundering is anything but a victimless crime. 
However, who the victims are, and how the crime affects them must also be examined.  
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Chapter 3 
The Effects of the Crime of Money Laundering and Corresponding International Response 
3.0 Introduction  
Having argued against the perception of money laundering being a victimless crime, that the crime 
of money laundering is not without victims, it is pertinent to identify the victims of the crime and 
how much effect the crime has on such victims. Money laundering as a crime is both amoebic and 
stealthy in operation and transcends societal strata, permeating it in more ways than one. From the 
financial sector, to the real sector, to stunting economic development and the breach of 
international peace and coexistence among nations, the effect the crime of money laundering has 
on the international community cannot be overstated. The next leg of this research therefore, is to 
critically analyse the effects the crime of money laundering bears on the social, economic and 
political landscape of the international community and nation states. 
3.1 The Effects of Money Laundering Activities  
1) Economic Distortion and Investment Instability 
Money laundering depresses economic growth by its diversion of resources to less productive 
activity and by facilitating domestic corruption and crime. This diversion and redirection of funds 
from sound to low quality investment or from one economic activity to another (usually with no 
rational economic reasons) are common practice for money launderers and do have far reaching 
consequences. Money launderers naturally have a preference for jurisdictions where regulation is 
lax, and this means that most developing economies with Anti-Money laundering legislations 
either in infancy or defective in operation are an easy target. Economically weak states, which 
basically offer financial services, run the risk of economical (and therewith political) 
62 
 
 
 
dependence.
126
 The resultant effect is the rise in inflation rates which in turn results in the loss of 
control of National economic polices because it impacts financial behaviour and macro-economic 
performance i.e. policy mistakes, volatility in exchange and interest rates as well as monetary 
instability. The large capital inflows or outflows artificially accentuated by the laundering process 
are the reason for the negative effects on the exchange and interest rates. Similarly, the phases of 
money laundering transactions being ‗‘underground‘‘ or in the informal sector of the economy 
means such transaction do not appear in official monetary and financial statistics. This factor 
results in misleading information to policy makers attempting to manage macroeconomic 
variables. Without a proper appreciation and identification of the true causes for these financial 
transactions, poor economic policy decisions are more likely to be made to minimise the potential 
balance of payments problems due to decreasing foreign reserve.
127
 Such a situation eventually 
fundamentally influences the process of particular assets towards which the money is invested, 
such as land and houses because an unhindered fluctuation of exchange rates would result in its 
appreciation and to an expansion of the country‘s money base due to capital inflow.128 The 
ultimate outcome to this is an increase in demand for domestic money which would be satisfied 
by monetary authorities of the affected states. Described as the Dutch disease, an economic 
situation of this nature prompts a country‘s economic policy makers to ‗‗tighten its fiscal policy in 
order to create a budgetary surplus to use to sterilise the money effects of the capital inflows.‘‘129 
These policy decisions may end up negatively affecting the stability of these economies and a 
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country may incur debt or increase its borrowing without being able to repay these debts because 
the potential tax revenues from these artificially inflated industries are not sustainable. As such, 
when money launderers decide to shift these funds out of a particular jurisdiction, the affected 
industries fail to achieve projected growth targets; and tax is therefore collected lower thereby 
increasing by significant proportions, the possibility of a country defaulting on its debt. In Nigeria 
for instance, in the 1980‘s, and late 1990‘s, money laundering and other serious economic and 
financial activities ensured the country suffered serious economic distortions brought about by the 
diversion and redirection of funds.
130
 The consequence of this was the sudden collapse and 
liquidation of hitherto flourishing financial institutions and banks when deposits of illegally 
acquired wealth in these institutions disappeared within a short time ostensibly after the 
integration of the illicit funds into the financial system may have been achieved. The Nigerian 
economic policy at the time was the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) which was 
introduced in June 1986 and was aimed at restructuring the productive base of the economy. It 
also sought to promote non inflammatory economic growth whilst devaluing the Nigerian 
currency as a measure to control the inflation in the nation‘s economy. The policy had many 
pitfalls because it saw an endless devaluation of the Nigerian currency due mainly to speculative 
and fraudulent activities and an increasing gap between demand and supply as foreign currency 
exchanged for more Naira. This resulted in companies becoming cash strapped and no longer 
being able to get enough Naira to exchange for foreign currency. The programme ended up 
unsuccessful as it endured serious economic distortions channelled predominantly by money 
laundering activities and other financial crimes through diversion and redirection of capital from 
sound to low quality investments.
131
 It is imperative to note however, that while Money 
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laundering activities may lead to errors in the interpretation of economic data, and as a 
consequence, poor policy decisions, this does not necessarily imply that a simple causal 
relationship exists between money laundering and poor economic decision making. Rather, an 
argument for better economic models as against holding out for an argument that money 
laundering leads to a loss of control of economic policy seems more tenable. A pertinent point to 
note at this juncture is the difficulty in distinguishing the behaviour of legitimate currency 
speculators compared to money launderers considering the fact that the two are most likely to 
engage in identical activities that lead to vast cash flows into and out of the country. The impact 
this would have on economic policy would vary accordingly depending on the exchange control 
regime in place and would not necessarily be as a result of money laundering. The life of a money 
laundering scheme is centred on the desire to pass dirty money off as genuine and in the process 
also fabricate an explanation to make the source of such money genuine. As such, anytime 
criminals invest in business, profit generation is rarely ever the aim, as the interest is solely on 
any investment which could obliterate the trail of the illicit funds regardless of its low profit yield.  
Money laundering distorts investments through sterile investments by money launderers because 
most money launderers invest their illicit funds in economic activities that are not viable or based 
on economic principles but rather on investments that would make detection of their activities more 
improbable, or where cost of avoidance is lower.
132
 A criminal could for instance invest a large 
amount of his illicit funds on antiques and items of art in a country where those items are not major 
players in the economy. That diversion of scarce resources to less productive domestic assets or 
luxury imports bears a serious detriment on economic growth. The main attraction thus is not 
investments with a higher rate of return, but for those that easily allows the recycling of illicit funds 
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even if it requires accepting a low rate of return.
133
 Aside investing in sterile investments, criminal 
organisations also have the ability to convert hitherto productive enterprises into sterile investments 
by operating them for the purposes of laundering illicit proceeds rather than for profit 
maximization responsive to consumer demand and worthy of legitimate investment capital. 
Commitment of an economy‘s resources to sterile, as opposed to productive investments (or to 
normal consumption expenditures that drive productive investments through higher demand) 
ultimately reduces the productivity of the overall economy. In practical terms, the artificial flow 
and outflow of capital and investments from one country to another would have destabilizing 
effects on the international financial markets due to its integrated nature. A distortion of this nature 
means that financial difficulties arising from one centre can easily spread to other global financial 
markets through the ‗‘contagion‘‘ effect and therefore create global instability. A significant factor 
underlying the contagion effect is the possibility that whatever serious problem sparked a liquidity 
crisis in one financial institution or system may also exist in another financial institution or system. 
There is also the factor of the interrelationships between the problem institution and other 
jurisdictions that will raise the possibility of liquidity problems in the former being spread to the 
latter. Both of these factors could be exacerbated by significant money laundering activity. With 
these distortions comes the reluctance of entrepreneurs to invest in such economies, and in cases 
where investments are made, the attendant risks are debilitating.  
It could be argued at this point that no legal economy should be dependent on where and how a 
criminal invests his ill-gotten wealth, after all, the money may not have even emanated from the 
same economy it is being invested. How then could it be said that such an economy may be 
committing its resources to non-productive investments. The criminal, as it may seem, has even 
added to the economy by inserting his illicit funds into it. As cogent as this standpoint may seem, 
                                           
133
 See Vito Tanzi (1997) ‗‘Macroeconomic Implications of Money Laundering‘‘ in Responding to 
Money Laundering, International Perspectives, edited by Ernest U. Savona, (Malaysia: Harwood 
Academic Publisher) 
66 
 
 
 
the ramifications of sterile investments are that they drive the prices of such assets up, causing 
overpayment for them throughout the economy thus ‗‘crowding‘‘ out productive investment to less 
productive uses and consequently erodes economic growth.
134
 The main tool of destruction for the 
launderer here is the use of front companies. A front company is an entity, be it an individual or 
group or organisation used to inhibit the identification of an owner or a member of another 
company or organisation. It is a cover used to conceal illegal activities and it is almost always used 
to hide another company or individual from liability, scrutiny or negative press. The use of such by 
launderers compromises the legitimate private sector since the overriding motive of the launderer is 
not necessarily to make a profit out of the operations of the front company.
135
 The launderers can 
easily cross subsidise the services or products that are being provided by front companies to co-
mingle the legitimate funds with illicit money in order to obliterate the trail of the dirty money. It is 
a very common means to an end for money launderers, and examples abound, of prominent 
criminals who have used front companies in the course of their illicit trade. A cursory examination 
of this begs the question what effects setting up this front company could have on an economy. The 
answer lays in the fact that money launderers are most likely to support cash industries in a bid to 
disguise and protect the proceeds of their crime which could in turn affect the substantiality of 
these industries in an economy. This is because legitimate businesses are forced out because 
competition with front companies almost borders on impossibility considering the fact that front 
companies are never propelled by economic reasons (profit). This means they could easily place 
their products below the prevailing market rates in what is called cross-subsidisation, and this then 
creates an uneven and unfair competition for legitimate profit-oriented businesses. In Nigeria, 
between 1983 and 1985, Nigerian Money launderers concealed the proceeds of their illicit crime 
through the mass importation of goods ranging from automobile spare parts, baby wears, 
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pharmaceutical products and industrial chemicals etc. which were sold quickly at very low prices to 
recoup the illicit proceeds in the disguised nature of legitimate funds. This deliberate reduction in 
prices of products had an undermining impact on genuine local entrepreneurships because local 
products found themselves in a direct but unfair competition with imported goods that were higher 
in quality and lower in price. This ultimately resulted in local manufacturing industries suffering 
serious price crashes and a massive loss in investment resulting from large stock of unsold goods 
and products due to consumers‘ preference for imported goods of better quality. The effect of this 
was the collapse of many local industries and the retrenchment of large numbers of workers. 
Employees in private industries participating with Nigerian gangs in drug conspiracies were 
exposed and they included airline and bank personnel. Investigations also revealed a host of 
privately owned companies affiliated to the Nigerian drug cartels who assisted the drug cartels in 
laundering the illicit money.
136
 
11) Reputational Risks 
This factor uniquely relates to the integrity of financial institutions and markets. A financial 
institution is defined to include banks, body corporates, associations or groups of persons, whether 
corporate or incorporate which carries on business of investment and securities, a discount house, 
insurance institution, debt factorization and conversion firm, bureau de change, finance company, 
money brokerage firm whose principal business includes factoring, project financing, equipment 
leasing, debt administration, fund management, local purchase order financing, export finance, 
project consultancy, financial consultancy, pension funds management and as such other businesses 
as the central bank or other appropriate regulatory authorities may from time to time designate.
137
 
Money launderers often abuse financial institutions, including banks and non-banking institutions 
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for their operations, and the fraudulent activities conducted by money launderers or corrupt 
individuals within these institutions may result in the increase of operational reputational risk.
138
 
The importance of sound financial institutions to economic development cannot be 
overemphasised, and a sound financial institution needs a credible reputation to thrive. One false 
step can cost a company‘s ‗face.‘139 Reputation risk means more for financial companies than 
temporary embarrassment.
140
 Although an intangible asset, banks that manage their reputation 
actively hold a better chance to generate more value than those that do not.
141
 Reputational 
outlooks are so important to institutions and that it is the reason most institutions publicize 
activities like their corporate social responsibility efforts in order to highlight their contributions to 
the greater good and show they care about more than generating revenues. Public confidence in 
banks, and hence their stability, can be undermined by adverse publicity as a result of inadvertent 
association by banks with criminals. In addition, banks may lay themselves open to direct losses 
from fraud, either through negligence in screening undesirable customers or where the integrity of 
their own officers has been undermined through association with criminals.
142
 Hancock Bank 
which has over 90 branches on the gulf coast for instance, provides a potent example of what 
influence reputation building can have on revenues. After hurricane Katrina in 2005, with many 
residents lacking access to money due to power outages, Hancock set up makeshift branches to 
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serve its customers. They also distributed money to non-customers, a strong signal of its 
commitment to serving the community. As a result, the bank won thousands of new customers and 
grew $1.6BN in the four months following Katrina, exceeding its total growth in the previous 95 
years of the bank‘s existence.143 So important is the value that financial institutions place on 
reputational image that some institutions go to somewhat unethical lengths to project attractive 
images of themselves. The 2012 case of Swiss Banking giants UBS suffices in this regard. The 
bank attempted to manipulate the London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR), an interest banks 
charge each other for one month, three months, six months and one year loans. It is the rate that is 
charged by London banks, and is then used as a benchmark for bank rates all over the world to 
calculate payments under hundreds of trillions of dollars-worth of financial contracts, including 
mortgages and loans. LIBOR is set every day by the British Bankers' Association, based on 
estimates submitted by a panel of a dozen or so banks of their borrowing costs. Banks have been 
accused of lying about their real borrowing costs, in order to manipulate LIBOR for profit, and to 
make themselves look stronger during the financial crisis. The UBS instructed its staff to submit 
inappropriately low estimated borrowing costs for the bank during the financial crisis in order to 
give a false impression of the bank‘s ability to borrow cheaply as well as maintaining market 
confidence in the bank. The overriding aim here is premised on the fact that the misrepresentation 
could make the bank higher profits, because a low LIBOR rate is seen as an indicator to the 
soundness of a bank as against one with a higher one because a low LIBOR rate translates to a 
lower interest rate on many adjustable-rate loans. The bank was ordered to pay $1.2BN (£740M) in 
combined fines to the US Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Commodities Futures Trading 
Commission, £160m to the UK's Financial Services Authority (FSA) as well as 59M Swiss Francs 
(£40M) to the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FMSA) as punishment for its 
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attempted manipulation of the LIBOR rates in what was at the time the second largest sets of fines 
imposed on any bank.
144
 How reputational risks classify as an effect of money laundering activities 
is based on the fact that the fruits of money laundering find the most fertile ground where 
corruption is rife.
145
 Economic systems rely on the integrity of those who administer and regulate 
them and when these key roles are shown to have been suborned by bankers in smart suits, crooks 
and conmen, all participants in the economic system are weakened. However it comes about, when 
dirty money is moved, the bank or financial institution participates in a theft, even if it has been 
duped by a criminal who is skilled at hiding the sources of his funds. The maker of the corrupt or 
fraudulent money and the financial institution who help move it are equally complicit in a process 
where both parties are conspirators in both parts of the activity. This corrupts an apparently lawful 
process and the result is that the trusts placed by customers in the financial institutions are abused.  
Financial institutions have a duty to deliver honest and reliable services to the general public and 
be scrupulous with staff and customers alike. This however is not always the case as individuals 
within financial institutions have overtime been found to act otherwise, thereby putting innocent 
customers at the risk of fraud. The negative effect of a damaged reputation on the viability of a 
bank is more than theoretical, as such, any business whether a financial institution, professional 
service, industrial enterprise, charitable NGO, or otherwise, caught in the web of money laundering 
could have its reputation irreparably damaged. Its Directors, management and staff could be 
subjects of private and public investigations out of which indictments and prosecutions could arise. 
At best, it would be a public relations nightmare. It only takes one unethical person who has the 
discretion to make decisions to jeopardize an entire organization. A reputation for integrity takes 
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many years to build, and only a few moments to damage, debase, decimate and destroy.
146
 This 
was apparent in the scandal that hit the Bank of New York (BONY) in the late 1990‘s. Revered as 
one of the largest banks in the world at the time, the bank was renowned for its integrity, but its 
reputation was however put to test when allegations of laundering Russian funds were raised 
against the bank.
147
 Reputational risk is particularly damaging for banks since the nature of their 
business requires maintaining the confidence of depositors, creditors and the general market place. 
The BONY case highlighted the consequences money laundering within an institution could have 
on its reputational assessment by the public who may become wary that the bank as a whole has 
been taken over and being used as a criminal enterprise. The confidence of existing customers is 
certain to be shaken while the attraction of potential ones is definite to wane as a result of such a 
scandal, and this is ultimately bound to have negative consequences on the profitability of the 
business of the bank. The evidence is clear that the announcement that a firm has allegedly been 
involved in corrupt activities is typically associated with materially negative equity return at the 
time of announcement, indicating that investors are less likely to hold shares in the firm.
148
 Since 
the market calculates the value of businesses based on anticipated future earnings, a poor reputation 
is usually a pointer to systemic problems which could in turn have adverse effects on revenue. 
Investors for this reason, increasingly analyse metrics able to provide a more accurate picture of a 
company‘s performance. The reputational problems can exist on a whole new level. Even if retail 
investors are unaware or unconcerned with a financial institutions reputation, other financial 
entities such as those with potential correspondent banking relationship with disreputable 
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institution will be reluctant to do business with that institution for fear that its own valuable 
reputation will be contaminated. Scandals that lead to heightened regulatory scrutiny can also draw 
the ire of bank shareholders, and this was exemplified when Barclays bank had to pay a $450M 
fine to settle LIBOR-manipulating allegations, with the bank‘s Chief Executive Officer also forced 
out as a result of an effort to rebuild regulators trust.
149
  
Another area apart from the financial institutions where a reputational risk of the crime of Money 
laundering prevails is within the context of destinations for legitimate business investments. 
Competing countries may find it difficult to do so if there is a perception that such a country has a 
poor track record of dealing with Money Laundering or is seen to be a centre for money laundering 
activity because legitimate investors are naturally wary of associating with any country that has a 
negative reputation.
150
 Even though such investors have legitimate dealings, the overriding fear is 
the tendency that investing in such countries known as money laundering centres may attract more 
scrutiny from regulators in their own country which may prompt additional compliance measures 
taken by such countries with the resultant effect being the introduction of further costs that 
ultimately affects the profitability of any venture. It will therefore make a lot of financial sense to 
such investors to move their investments elsewhere. When the integrity of Nigeria‘s financial 
system and financial institutions were at its lowest state of abatement in the 1980‘s and late 1990‘s 
due to the negative impact of economic and financial crimes for instance, investors thought it wise 
to invest elsewhere than the Nigerian economy. The Nigerian economy at the time was not 
considered investment friendly hence the boycott and this had far reaching consequences leading to 
the collapse of hitherto viable financial institutions. The negative image of Nigeria as a hub for 
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Money laundering activities reached its nadir when the country was blacklisted by the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF) as a non-cooperative country. As a result, western financial markets 
grew increasingly reluctant dealing with Nigeria, Nigerian banks had trouble dealing with foreign 
counterparts, and the investors stayed away. The negative impact this had on the country was not 
restricted to Nigeria as an entity because even Nigerian business men who harboured plans to do 
business outside the shores of the country were viewed with suspicion and therefore faced extra 
hurdles their counterparts from FATF approved jurisdictions would not necessarily have faced.  
111) Corruption, Organised Crime and Social Costs 
This factor is directly linked with political corruption and all the predicate offences of the crime of 
money laundering. Corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. It hurts everyone 
whose life, livelihood or happiness depends on the integrity of people in a position of authority. 
Corruption holds back economic development, prevents a free market operating for businesses and 
consumers, and further exploits already marginalised groups. It is a complex social, political and 
economic phenomenon that affects all countries. The United Nations Office on Drug and Crime 
holds that corruption attacks the foundation of democratic institutions by distorting electoral 
processes, perverting the rule of law and creating bureaucratic quagmires whose only reason for 
existing is the soliciting of bribes.
151
 Money laundering requires an underlying, primary, profit-
making crime (such as corruption, drug trafficking, market manipulation, fraud, tax evasion), along 
with the intent to conceal the proceeds of the crime or to further the criminal enterprise.
152
 There 
has been varying literature on the nexus between corruption and money laundering with arguments 
that money laundering does not necessarily precede corruption, which in essence means that there 
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would still be corruption without money laundering.
153
 While this argument has its merits, (not all 
proceeds gained from corrupt practices such as kickbacks and briberies necessarily have to be 
laundered, as they could be diverted into personal use), it fails to acknowledge that money 
laundering is an ever ready rostrum available to those who engage in corrupt practices to extirpate 
the trail of such proceeds. Money laundering and corruption occur habitually, with the presence of 
one underlining the other, thereby allowing money launderers to enjoy their corrupt earnings 
without fear of exposing the original source of funds.
154
 Corruption and organised crime plays a 
major role in the political instability and underdevelopment that persists in such countries. 
Organised crime always attempts to acquire political influence and to provide room for or remove 
blockages to their illicit activities. Political corruption is an essential element of organised crime; it 
is not just about election rigging. In broad terms, political corruption is the abuse or misuse of 
public or governmental power for illegitimate private advantage, an effort to secure wealth or 
power through illegal means for private benefit at public expense.
155
 It can lead politicians in office 
to steer away from good government. Their decisions can benefit those who fund them, the public 
interest comes second. Forms of political corruption include bribery, extortion, influence peddling, 
fraud, embezzlement, and nepotism. Crime groups need legitimate state structures to sustain and 
expand their activities and this is particularly evident in many developing countries where the vast 
wealth accumulated by criminal activities empowers criminals with influence on the political 
structure of such countries. They go about this either by directly bribing political office holders or 
by financial donations to political campaigns and to strategic aspirants with the overriding aim 
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being the gaining of influence over elected public office holders. Such was the case in Colombia 
when the then President of the country, Ernesto Samper was accused of funding his campaign 
during the country‘s 1994 elections with approximately US$6M donated ostensibly by the Cali 
cocaine cartel.
156
 Such gratuitous donations especially, when from criminal organisations usually 
have an ulterior motive and are not just done out of goodwill.  
There are usually three motives for providing political funds: 1) ideological or idealistic, 2) social, 
aiming at social honours or access, and 3) financial, striving for material benefits.
157
 The third of 
the listed motives is particularly relevant to the purview of this work because it is a factor that 
festers corruption- one of the most notable predicate offences to the crime of money laundering. 
When political donations are made for financial and material benefits, those benefits could come in 
the form of political appointments into incumbent governments as a show of appreciation or a pay 
back, or in the form of supporting the illicit operations of criminal organisations. In the case of the 
Cali cartel, it was for the protection of the Government in their illegal cocaine trade. This kind of 
influence of criminal organisations can weaken the social fabric, collective ethical standards and 
ultimately, the democratic institutions of a society. Just like the organised crime groups, individuals 
also seek the political refuge of Governments by financially supporting aspirants at the polls. Very 
little or no attention at all is paid to the trail of such moneys. Investment in electoral politics can 
present a safe haven for corrupt persons in dire need of protection. Such individuals may invest 
their spoils in order to make profits of power and the purse; for protection, to dispense influence 
and to steal more. After success at the polls, such financial donors are usually rewarded by 
appointments into lucrative portfolios of the Government, awarded huge contracts or given 
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protection, whatever the motive may have been. It also serves as a subtle way to clean his illicit 
money because by investing in the election of a candidate, and by getting appointed or awarded 
contracts, he recoups the dirty invested money albeit in washed and legitimate fashion. This 
practice is prevalent in most developing countries, and in Nigeria, the illicit and illegitimate use of 
money for political influence is a marked feature of the country‘s body politics. It is important to 
note however, that financial funding is an issue that varies according to jurisdiction because certain 
funding practices that are legal in one jurisdiction may not be so in another. The Nigerian Anti-
Corruption Law (the corrupt practices and other related offences Act of 2000) identified a long list 
of practices that constitute corruption and they include the use of pecuniary advantage, 
gratification, influence peddling, insincerity in advice with a view to gaining advantage etc.
158
  
Another facet of political corruption in Nigerian politics is the high cost of seeking public offices. 
Many politicians involve in bribing delegates and voters in the vote buying game to either get back 
into office or to get in for the first time. Talking from personal experience, I have seen an 
incumbent Nigerian Chief Executive of a state in his motorcade during electioneering campaign 
throw out wads of bill into the air to children and adults who were lined on the streets to catch a 
glimpse of him. Money was splattered all over the street as people scrambled to pick as much as 
they could. Foodstuff is distributed to households, token sums of money in envelopes doled out to 
voters with a message as to who they should vote for. The amount of resources deployed to capture 
elective offices means it is not difficult to see the correlation between politics and the potential for 
official corruption. The greatest losers are the ordinary people, those voters whose faith and 
investment in the system are hijacked and subverted because money, not their will is the 
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determining factor in elections.
159
 Private rather than public interests dictate policy, and these 
factors all weigh heavily on the social costs because corruption predicates the abuse of 
Governments resources by diverting them from sectors of critical importance such as health, 
education and development thereby depriving the common man of economic growth and 
developmental opportunities. This drives up the cost of government due to the need for increased 
law enforcement and health care expenditures (for example, for treatment of drug addicts) to 
combat the serious consequences that result. Corruption is a vice which weighs more on the poor 
than anyone else because they are the least to absorb its cost and depend most on the very public 
services that corruption destroys. Economic development is stolen from them and they suffer from 
decaying infrastructure and greedy Government agencies which instead of serving them, seek to 
further empty their pockets.
160
 The average citizen may barely afford the substandard medical 
facilities available, while Government/Public officials get access to first class medical treatments 
by flying abroad to developed countries for attention. Nigeria, despite its huge agricultural resource 
base being the world‘s largest producer of cassava, yam and cowpea- all staple foods in sub-
Saharan Africa as well as a major producer of fish, still classifies as a food deficient nation and 
imports large amounts of grain, livestock products and fish. The neglect of rural infrastructural 
development adversely affects the profitability of agricultural production. This is most prevalent in 
the rural areas where up to 80 per cent of the population live below the poverty line with limited 
social services and infrastructures because most of such are usually concentrated in the cities.
161
 
The lack of rural roads impedes the marketing of agricultural commodities, prevents farmers from 
selling their produce at reasonable prices, and leads to spoilage. Limited accessibility cuts small-
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scale farmers off from sources of inputs, equipment and new technology, and this keeps yields low. 
As the population swells and puts pressure on diminishing resources, escalating environmental 
problems further threaten food production. Land degradation as a result of extensive agriculture, 
deforestation and overgrazing are already severe in many parts of the country. Drought has become 
common in the north, and erosion caused by heavy rains, floods and oil pollution is a major 
problem in the south and south-east.
162
 In addition to its agricultural wealth, Nigeria happens to be 
Africa‘s largest producer of oil and the seventh largest in the world. However, approximately 70 
percent of Nigerians still live on less than US$1.25 a day.
163
 The consequence of this corruption 
induced lack of development is social inequalities and a widening gap between the rich and the 
poor which may trigger vices such as violence, armed robbery and large scale theft. The oil rich 
Niger Delta region of Nigeria which harbours the oil has seen major bouts of violence with 
tensions high as oil spills continue to crush the farming and fishing industries. Most people in this 
region live in abject poverty despite residing in a region that has the largest oil output in Africa. 
The decades of oil exploitation, environmental degradation and neglect leaves in its wake, an 
impoverished, marginalised and exploited citizenry which ultimately produced a resistance in the 
form of the formation of militant groups who resorted to self-help by carrying out acts of sabotage 
like oil pipeline bombings as well as the very well documented cases of kidnap for ransom. 
Expatriate workers of the multinational companies are frequently kidnapped and only released on 
conditions favourable to the militants, and in this case, mostly a substantial amount of money by 
way of ransom. This is a clear reaction to what the locals perceive as marginalisation by the 
relevant bodies that are meant to look after their welfare. Violent conflicts tend to occur when 
citizens who are aggrieved over long standing incidences of inequality and poor governance begin 
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to make demands for change and challenge the authority of the state.
164
 There are theories in 
literature however, that dispel this notion and one of such is the ‗political economy of war.‘ This 
theory is to the effect that people rebel not because of the existence of historical and social 
grievances but because of the opportunities available to them to do well out of war.
165
  Using this 
perspective in the context of the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra-Leone, David Keen argued that 
there was some rationality that soldiers and rebels colluded to profit from war.
166
 Keen also argued 
that the objective of warfare is never to win, but to create conditions where plundering can proceed 
without the requirements of accountability. There are less assertive arguments however, of the 
causal link between economic incentives and outbreak of insurgency of civil wars, that the 
‗economy of war thesis‘ may actually be a by-product and not a cause of conflict. This means 
quintessentially that the economy of conflict merely results from entrepreneurs and commercial 
interests making the most profit from and capitalizing on uncertainty and disorder in conflict 
environments.
167
  These arguments all have merits, but whatever the inspiration may be for people 
to indulge in violent resistance, the causes of conflict are context specific and differ from one case 
to another but most conflicts especially in Africa are generally rooted in perceptions of political 
and economic marginalisation, social exclusion and crises of identity and citizenship.
168
 The vice of 
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corruption is what creates the avenue for the resistance aggrieved people put up and/or the 
opportunistic exploitation of the situations of civil unrest.   
IV) Terrorism 
Terrorism as an effect of the crime of money laundering operates in ways different to how 
corruption does. While corruption operates like a revolving door (in that it is both a pre-cursor to 
a Money laundering activity as well as a consequence of it), terrorism can only apply as a 
consequence. To put it in context, terrorist organisations do not engage in acts of terror in order to 
launder funds, but rather launder funds in order to fund their acts of terror. The cardinal aim is to 
maim, to destroy, and cause grief, hence money laundering is just a means to an end for terrorists. 
The Al-Qaeda led terrorist attack of September 2011(9/11) provides a water-shed moment in 
strict monitoring of banking transactions in order for every monetary transaction to have an 
identity i.e. the source and origin of any bank transaction. It provides a perfect example of the 
correlation between money laundering and terrorism. The 9/11 attack is believed to have cost Al 
Qaeda about a half million dollars to organize and execute, according to the US 9/11 Commission 
report.
169
 Getting the funds into use by the financiers and executors of the attack represented a 
high degree of knowledge and exploitation of the anonymity provided by the huge international 
and domestic financial system to move and store their money through a series of unremarkable 
transactions. The operation could rank as one of the most sophisticated cases of scrambling the 
source and movement of funds because despite thorough investigation by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), till date; there is no evidence as to the source of the funds used to carry the 
attack out. The sophistication with which the facilitators of the attack operated was described 
vividly by the FBI in the following terms- ‗‗We will never know the exact amount of funds the 
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hijackers deposited into their accounts, as they made transactions which made it difficult to trace 
the money. For example, at times they made substantial cash withdrawals, followed by 
substantial cash deposits. It is impossible to tell if the deposit reflected new funds or merely the 
return of funds previously withdrawn but not spent. Nor is a complete analysis of their 
expenditures possible. They conducted many transactions in cash. Although the FBI has obtained 
evidence of many these transactions, there surely were many others of which no record exists. 
Additionally, gaps remain in our understanding of what exactly the hijackers did in U.S., so it is 
possible that they spent funds on activities of which we have no knowledge. Because the 
hijackers‘ activities and expenses are not fully known, we cannot say with certainty that every 
dollar has been accounted for. We believe, however, that the identified funding was sufficient to 
cover their known expenses and the other expenses they surely incurred in connection with their 
known activities. Investigations reveal where the funds were dispatched from but no trace of how 
the funds were generated.‘‘170 Investigations further revealed that ‗‗Al Qaeda funded the hijackers 
in the United States by three primary and unexceptional means: (1) wire or bank-to-bank 
transfers from overseas to the United States, (2) the physical transportation of cash or traveller‘s 
checks into the United States, and (3) the use of debit or credit cards to access funds held in 
foreign financial institutions. Once the funds were in the United States of America, all the 
hijackers used the U.S. banking system to store their funds and facilitate their transactions.‘‘171 
The best available evidence indicates that approximately $300,000 was deposited into the 
hijackers‘ bank accounts in the United States by a variety of means. Just prior to the flights, the 
hijackers returned about $26,000 to one of their Al Qaeda facilitators and attempted to return 
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another $10,000, which was intercepted by the FBI after 9/11.
172
 The existing mechanisms to 
prevent abuse of the financial system did not fail, they were never designed to detect or disrupt 
transactions of the type that financed 9/11.
173
 The effects of the events of 9/11 on the United 
States of America and the world at large are enormous, and although it may have cost Al Qaeda 
just over half a million dollars to organize and execute, the property damage in New York and 
Washington alone cost about $100 billion. The cumulative economic cost to the global economy 
cannot also be overstated, the attack led directly to the war in Afghanistan and indirectly to the 
war in Iraq with an estimated cost (of those two wars) at $4 trillion. So 9/11 was not only 
traumatic, it was a cheap investment that cost America dearly in lives and treasure.
174
 It therefore 
suffices that money laundering and the financing of terrorism are financial crimes with economic 
effects which can threaten the stability of a country's financial sector or its external stability more 
generally. Effective anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism regimes are 
essential to protect the integrity of markets and of the global financial framework as they help 
mitigate the factors that facilitate financial abuse. Action to prevent and combat money 
laundering and the financing of terrorism thus responds not only to a moral imperative, but also to 
an economic need.‘‘175 
3.2 International Response- (Anti-Money Laundering)  
Having identified and analysed the negative effects the crime of money laundering carries, it is 
germane to the thematic preoccupation of this work to appraise the international response to its 
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challenge. The phrase ‗pecunia non olet‘ (money does not stink) is attributed to Roman Emperor 
Vespasian (AD69-AD79) as regards a tax levied for the use of public toilets which had been 
imposed in Rome. However, this expression may currently be substituted for a new one of ‗pecunia 
nunc olet‘ (money smells now).176 Laundered money is dirty money and dirty money does indeed 
smell, hence the efforts of various international bodies to mitigate the effects of the crime of money 
laundering through efforts that shall be analysed here-within. The perspicacity of those who 
involve in financially motivated crime means that they understand the need to scramble their 
money trails by creating a perception of legitimacy of the source of ownership of the ill-gotten 
wealth. As already been discussed in earlier parts of this work, right from the prohibition era, 
mobsters realised the need to keep the trail of dirty money as far away as possible from their name 
and person by the use of shell corporations and the loan back concept of lending money. The 
efforts to counter these shrewd practices however, are of fairly recent origin and do not date back 
to the time of inception of the crime. Incipient propulsion for a harmonised international action 
against money laundering arose in the 1980‘s within the context of efforts to combat the problem 
of drug trafficking, hence a high priority being afforded to law enforcement strategies designed to 
disrupt the organisation and management and break the economic power of major trafficking 
networks.
177
 The problems of drug abuse and illicit trafficking were recognised as needing global 
action long before this period and it led to instruments like The Hague International Opium 
Convention of 1912 which contained many elements of a comprehensive drug control treaty, and 
the 1931 Convention for limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic 
Drugs. Both instruments were however, considered ineffective in dealing with the range of 
complex issues raised by international drug trafficking which meant there was a need for more 
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encompassing instruments. This in a way had a bearing on initiatives against money laundering 
since the traffickers had to clean the proceeds of the illicit drug trade thereby indulging in money 
laundering practices. 
3.2.1 The Council of Europe 
 In 1980 the Council of Europe adopted the first International instrument against money 
laundering.
178
 Established in 1949 ‗to promote European unity, foster social and economic progress 
and protect human rights‘, it was the first international organisation which emphasised the 
importance of taking measures to be used for combating the dangers of money laundering with 
respect to democracy and the rule of law. Concerns over the growing number of criminal acts 
prompted the council to examine the problems that had arisen in European countries as a result of 
Money Laundering. This led it to establish a select committee in 1977 to examine the issue through 
a process of deliberations which culminated in the 1980 adoption of a formal recommendation 
entitled ‗Measures against the Transfer and Safe-keeping of funds of Criminal Origin‘. The 
thinking behind the recommendation was the consideration by the Council that the transfer of funds 
of criminal origin from one country to another and the process by which they were laundered 
through insertion in the economic system gave rise to serious problems. It also encouraged the 
perpetration of further criminal acts which caused the phenomenon to spread nationally and 
internationally. The recommendation called on member states to establish close National and 
International cooperation between banks and appropriate authorities in exchanging information 
about the circulation of bank notes which have been used in connection with criminal offences. 
Banks were also required to conduct identity checks on customers whenever an account or security 
deposit is opened, safe deposits are rented, cash transactions involving sums of a certain magnitude 
are made, and in all cases bearing in mind the possibility of transactions in several parts. It also 
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recommended staff training to enable employees to control the identity of clients and, also, to 
identify the alleged criminal activities. These recommendations were however, not generally 
implemented and this led to criticism in certain parts that the Council of Europe was probably 
‗ahead of its time.‘179 This does not however, pass-over the significance of the recommendation 
and in particular, the recommendation highlighted the critical impact of the ‗‘know your customer‘‘ 
procedure on a financial institutions ability to insulate its facilities from criminal infiltration, and to 
cooperate with investigative authorities. These concepts would be further refined and elaborated in 
subsequent initiatives that garnered widespread acceptance.
180
 The right time for a comprehensive 
action against Money Laundering under the auspices of the Council of Europe came in 1986 when 
in line with the concerns of the United Nations at the time, the European ministers of Justice 
requested that the European Committee on crime problems develop international norms and 
standards to guarantee effective international cooperation between judicial (and where necessary 
police) authorities as regards the detection, freezing and forfeiture of the proceeds of illicit drug 
trading.
181
 This led to the selection of experts in these fields whose terms of reference were the 
examination of the applicability of the European Penal Law Conventions to search, seizure and 
confiscation of proceeds of crime and consider this question in light of the works of the United 
Nations as regards the financial assets of drug traffickers and for the committee to prepare an 
appropriate European legal instrument in this field if it deemed it necessary. The United Nations 
had at this point adopted the Convention against Illicit Drugs in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
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Substances which addressed the threat posed by International narcotics trafficking,
182
and the 
experts tried to use the terminology and the systematic approach of that convention unless changes 
were felt necessary for improving different solutions.  
The workings of the select committee resulted in the 1990 Council of Europe Convention on 
laundering, search, seizure and confiscation of the proceeds from crime. The aims were to provide 
a complete set of rules applicable to all stages in proceedings, starting with the initial enquiries into 
a laundering offence and continuing until enforcement of a confiscation decision given abroad. 
Unlike the 1980 equivalent, the 1990 Convention is an International law agreement governing 
investigative conduct and does not embrace ways of enhancing the role of financial institutions in 
preventing and detecting money laundering. The aim of this Convention is to facilitate international 
co-operation and mutual assistance in investigating crime and tracking down, seizing and 
confiscating the proceeds thereof. The Convention is intended to assist States in attaining a similar 
degree of efficiency even in the absence of full legislative harmony. This Convention has been 
ratified by all Council of Europe member states, which makes it a particularly useful tool for 
international cooperation due to its various provisions on mutual assistance. Furthermore, it is 
opened also to countries which are not members of the organisation. The Convention
183
 remains a 
landmark treaty which forms an important cornerstone of anti-money laundering standards, and is 
widely ratified.
184
A comprehensive perusal of the workings of the Council of Europe is beyond the 
scope of this work. 
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3.2.2 The 1988 United Nations Convention (Convention against Illicit Drugs in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances.
185
  
This sought to address the threat posed by international narcotics trafficking.  Although not the first 
of such initiatives,
186
the perception was that focus on the legal tools and law enforcement strategies 
to combat drug trafficking were insufficient because despite those earlier agreements contributing 
significantly to the anti-narcotics movement, they only emphasised on the control of production of 
drugs and their diversion into the market place. It therefore suffices that the inadequacies of the 
earlier instruments necessitated the advent of the Vienna Convention. This Convention was the 
heart of an effective strategy to counter modern international drug trafficking, and it sought to 
ensure vigorous enforcement of the law in order to reduce illicit availability of drugs, deter drug 
related crime, and contribute to drug abuse prevention by creating an environment favourable to 
efforts for reducing illicit supply and demand. This was articulated in the Comprehensive 
Multidisciplinary Outline of Future Activities in Drug Abuse Control adopted by the 1987 UN 
Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking.
187
 The UN General Assembly had in 1984, 
unanimously adopted a resolution expressing the conviction that ‗the wide scope of illicit traffic in 
narcotic drugs and its consequences made it necessary to prepare a convention which considers the 
various aspects of the problem as a whole, and in particular, those not envisaged in existing 
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international agreements.‘188A draft convention was therefore requested of the UN Economic and 
Social Council at the behest of the General Assembly to be prepared as a matter of priority. 
Pursuant to this fiat, the commission adopted a resolution identifying 14 elements for inclusion in a 
draft convention which in turn began a lengthy process of negotiation. This resulted in the 1988 
conference for the adoption of a Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances in Vienna
189
where a detailed treaty consisting of 34 articles and an annex 
was adopted.
190
 A novel provision of the treaty was that undermining the financial strength of drug 
traffickers by the provision of tools to the law enforcement community akin to the realities of 
international cooperation is vital to an effective way to combat such illicit activity. Although as the 
name implies, the treaty was basically against illicit narcotic trade, it provided the first time further 
attention was given to the concept of money laundering after the afore-mentioned Council of 
Europe recommendation of 1980. It placed a strict obligation on participating countries to 
criminalise a comprehensive list of activities connected to drug trafficking as well as the 
requirement that a drug related money laundering should be a criminal offence.
191
 There is also an 
obligation placed on each party to, subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of 
its legal system criminalise the acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of 
receipt, that such property was derived from an offence or any of the offences criminalised by each 
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state under the directives of the treaty.
192
 This provision is based on the fact that any Anti-drug 
strategy must criminalise money laundering and deprive drug traffickers of their illicit profits. 
Although the term Money Laundering is not explicitly mentioned in the instrument, it provided an 
extensive definition of the crime.
193
 The Convention was couched to ensure that money laundering 
and narcotic related activities were accorded the requisite level of seriousness by the judicial and 
prosecutorial authorities of each participating state.
194
 It required the criminalising by each party of 
money laundering and drug trafficking predicate offences such as conspiracy, aiding and abetting. 
The Convention requires that parties ensure that their courts and other competent authorities having 
jurisdiction take into account factual circumstances which make the commission of a 
comprehensive list of factors which renders these offences particularly serious.
195
 Amongst the 
factors cited relevant to money laundering includes offences committed by public office holders 
(Politically Exposed Persons) and whether the offence is connected to that office, involvement of 
organised criminal groups, and whether violence was used.
196
 Party states are also required to enact 
far reaching domestic laws providing for the confiscation of all forms of property, proceeds or 
instrumentalities used in or are derived from covered offences, and this property includes not only 
the narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, materials and equipment, and other 
instrumentalities, but the proceeds of the offence as well.
197
 This measure has been described as a 
‗‘major breakthrough‘‘ in attacking the benefits derived from drug trafficking activities and [they] 
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are a forceful endorsement of the notion that attacking the profit motive is essential if the struggle 
against drug trafficking is to be effective.
198
  
An integral part of criminal justice system is its ability to deprive criminals of their illegal earnings. 
By dismantling their organisations financially, criminals must be hit at their supposedly more 
vulnerable spot: their assets.
199
 There is also requisite obligation on parties to take steps to enable 
authorities to identify, trace, freeze or seize property, proceeds, instrumentalities or any other 
objects as preliminary steps to eventual confiscation. This includes the freezing, seizing and/or 
forfeiture of such property.
200
 Courts and other competent authorities are also required to compel 
the production or seizure of bank, financial or commercial records necessary to trace, identify, 
seize and forfeit proceeds and instrumentalities of drug trafficking.
201
 This requirement is 
irrespective of the existence of bank secrecy laws as they do not constitute a valid defence. The 
convention is explicit that no party shall decline to act on the grounds of bank secrecy.
202
 This 
provision has been hailed as one of the most important provisions in terms of the prosecution of 
international drug-trafficking and money laundering offences.
203
 There is therefore an affirmative 
compulsion upon states not to shield materials which are needed in forfeiture proceedings from 
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discovery.
204
 International cooperation is of imperative importance as regards forfeiture 
proceedings and party states are required to, upon the request of another, assist in taking measures 
to identify, trace, freeze or seize proceeds, property, instrumentalities or any other objects for the 
purposes of eventual confiscation either by the requesting party or its own authorities.
205
 This is of 
particular importance and must be aggressively pursued on an international scale because without 
cooperation amongst all nations affected by illegal drug activity, the drug traffickers could easily 
defeat domestic forfeiture laws by simply removing their illicit wealth from the jurisdiction in 
which it is generated.
206
 The convention entered into force on the 11
th
 of November, 1990 and is 
signed by major drug consumer Nations in North America and Western Europe as well as key 
transit states in the Caribbean and Central America. It has a widespread acceptance so much so that 
it is regarded as the ‗foundation of the International legal regime‘ in the anti-money laundering 
field because it set the path for more concerted efforts to address the problem of Money 
laundering.
207
 The major deficiency within the wordings of the Vienna convention as far as money 
laundering is concerned however, was the fact that it was specific in scope and application, i.e. 
drug related money laundering. This meant that moneys generated from other offences fell within 
the convention‘s blind spot and as such were free to be laundered without encroaching on any 
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instruments against money laundering. This lacuna led to the criminalisation measures initiated by 
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime.
208
 
3.2.3 The Palermo Convention 
This was the first legally binding United Nations instrument in the field of organised and serious 
crime and thereby extended the criminalisation measures proffered by the Vienna Convention to 
include the proceeds of serious crime. It was adopted by the UN General Assembly at its 
millennium meeting in November 2000 and was opened for signature at a high level conference in 
Palermo, Italy in December 2002. Countries were required to apply the offence of money 
laundering to a broad range of predicate offences, including all serious offences as well as offences 
of participation in an organised criminal group, corruption and for obstruction of justice.
209
 The 
convention applies to the prevention, investigation and prosecution of stipulated offences and other 
serious crime and this was supplemented by three protocols with regard to people trafficking, 
migrant smuggling, and the illegal manufacture and tracking of firearms.
210
 The powers of 
Governments were also strengthened in order to combat serious crimes by the provision of a more 
rounded common action against money laundering through harmonised national laws. This was 
aimed at expunging the uncertainties of a crime in one country being or not being a crime in 
another.
211
 There were further efforts by the United Nations such as the Convention against 
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Corruption which extended the definition of money laundering to include the ‗concealment and 
laundering of the proceeds of acts of corruption.‘212  
3.2.4 The Merida Convention  
Whilst aligning with the Palermo Convention in requiring that nations criminalise money 
laundering, the Merida Convention goes a step further with regards to its definition of predicate 
offences by requiring countries to apply money laundering to the widest range of offences.
213
 There 
was also the Global programme against Money Laundering by the United Nations Office on Drug 
Crime and Control (UNODC) in 1997 in response to the mandate given to UNODC through the 
United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 
1988. The broad objective of the Global Programme is to strengthen the ability of Member States 
to implement measures against money-laundering and the financing of terrorism and to assist them 
in detecting, seizing and confiscating illicit proceeds, as required pursuant to United Nations 
instruments and other globally accepted standards, by providing relevant and appropriate technical 
assistance upon request.
214
 Its benefits cannot be overemphasised, and there has been an increased 
level of awareness among both the private and public sector, 
215
and an increase in the number of 
countries that have introduced the necessary anti-money laundering methods that meet the 
international standards.
216
 The GPML also bears a positive impact on the global AML policy; it is 
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therefore safe to conclude at this juncture that the birth of the International community‘s anti-
money laundering efforts can be found in the UN narcotic substance policy.
217
 
3.2.5 The Basel Committee Statement on Banking Supervision  
This is another major instrument against the threat of money laundering. Established by the central 
bank governors of the Group of Ten countries (G10) in 1974, it was designed as a forum for regular 
cooperation between its member countries on banking supervisory matters. Its aim was to enhance 
financial stability by improving supervisory knowhow and the quality of banking supervision 
worldwide. The Committee seeks to achieve its aims by setting minimum supervisory standards; by 
improving the effectiveness of techniques for supervising international banking business; and by 
exchanging information on national supervisory arrangements. And, to engage with the challenges 
presented by diversified financial conglomerates, the Committee also works with other standard-
setting bodies, including those of the securities and insurance industries. The committee adopted a 
concordat in 1975 that sought to encourage the exchange of information between home and host 
country regulatory authorities in the supervision of banking institutions and to ensure that banking 
organisations operating on a transnational basis are properly supervised. It adopted its statement of 
principles on money laundering in 1988 in what was the first time the committee prescribed ethical 
standards of professional conduct to which banks were expected to adhere. The committee felt the 
need to mitigate the reputational risk of banks inadvertent associations with criminals or criminal 
proceeds.
218
 While absolving bank supervisors of primary responsibility in the event of illegitimate 
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transactions, the committee nevertheless held that ensuring that money launderers do not exploit 
the financial institutions still falls within their remit and as such cannot be indifferent to that threat. 
The committee implored banks to verify the true identity of all customers (know Your Customer) 
and to initiate effective procedures of obtaining the requisite identification from new customers, 
with failure to provide such information by the customers being a valid ground for banks to refuse 
services requested. Bank cooperation with national enforcement authorities to the extent permitted 
by specific local regulations relating to customer confidentiality is also another important 
recommendation of the committee. The committee believes that there is no justifiable reason why 
local legislation should impede the transfer of customer information from a host bank branch or 
subsidiary to its head office or parent bank in the home jurisdiction for risk management 
purposes.
219
When banks become aware that deposits made by customers are of a criminal origin or 
bear any semblance to such, the committee advises that banks severe ties with such customers or 
take other necessary steps such as freezing such accounts and/or denying assistance. The Basel 
statement however, has no binding effect on the G10 countries but serves rather just as a soft law in 
what has been referred to as ‗best practices.‘220 This buttresses the supposition introduced by the 
Council of Europe recommendation of 1988 to the effect that financial institutions are the lynchpin 
to effective anti-money laundering detection and prevention. One major flaw however is that the 
statement does not prescribe any mechanism to promote compliance with its provisions.  
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3.2.6 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF)  
This is an inter-governmental body established in 1989 by the Ministers of its Member 
jurisdictions.  Established by the G-7 summit that was held in Paris in 1989, the formation of the 
FATF was a direct reaction to the growing threat of money laundering as well as the growing 
concern of the effects money laundering activities could have on the banking system and to 
financial institutions. Specifically, the objectives of the FATF are to set standards and promote 
effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures for combating money 
laundering, terrorist financing and other related threats to the integrity of the international financial 
system.  The FATF is therefore a policy-making body which works to generate the necessary 
political will to bring about national legislative and regulatory reforms in these areas.
221 To achieve 
this aim, the FATF has since 1990, developed a series of Recommendations which form the basis 
for a co-ordinated response to these threats to the integrity of the financial system and help ensure a 
level playing field. These recommendations are recognised as the international standard for 
combating of money laundering and the financing of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction. The recommendations are intended to be of universal application, and to ensure 
that they remain up to date and relevant; they have been reviewed seven times, with the latest 
review being in 2012.
222
 These revisions are intended to strengthen global safeguards and further 
protect the integrity of the financial system by providing governments with stronger tools to take 
action against financial crime. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in 
America, the FATF issued the Eight Special Recommendations to deal with the issue of terrorist 
financing.  The continued evolution of money laundering techniques led the FATF to revise the 
FATF standards comprehensively in June 2003.  In October 2004 the FATF published a Ninth 
Special Recommendation, further strengthening the agreed international standards for combating 
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money laundering and terrorist financing - the 40+9 Recommendations. The 2012 review saw to 
the completion of a thorough review of the FATF standards and recommendations by an expansion 
to deal with new threats such as the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and 
to be clearer on transparency and tougher on corruption.  The nine Special Recommendations on 
terrorist financing have been fully integrated with the measures against money laundering. Whilst 
the FATF Recommendations are not international law instruments, there are substantial linkages in 
the substance and underlying policies of these recommendations and the UN conventions and UN 
Security Council resolutions.
223
 The FATF monitors the progress of its members in implementing 
necessary measures, reviews money laundering and terrorist financing techniques and counter-
measures, and promotes the adoption and implementation of appropriate measures globally.  In 
collaboration with other international stakeholders, the FATF works to identify national-level 
vulnerabilities with the aim of protecting the international financial system from misuse. The 
implementation of the FATF Recommendations have been enhanced through their endorsement as 
AML/CFT international standards by the Executive Boards of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank, and the undertaking of mutual evaluations by the FATF and its 
associated bodies and assessments by the IMF and the World Bank.
224
Approximately 118 countries 
around the world have been assessed on their level of compliance with the international standards 
on anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) since 2004. 
Conclusion 
There have been very commendable efforts in the fight against the crime of money laundering at 
the international level which should naturally transmit to national bodies. Nevertheless, questions 
still abound if these instruments have, ipso facto proved ample enough to stifle the menace of 
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money laundering. Relating this to Nigeria, questions abound whether the international instruments 
suit the complexities of the Nigerian society both in terms of reception and adoption. 
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Chapter 4 
Nigerian Reception and Implementation of International Anti-Money Laundering Instruments 
The previous chapter revealed encompassing international efforts towards tackling the crime of 
money laundering. However, of paramount importance is the proper incorporation of these 
international instruments into national and domestic laws of member states. From a Nigerian 
perspective, questions need to be asked whether these laws have been implemented, and how 
effective they are. The transnational nature of the crime of money laundering and the transient 
nature of launderer‘s provides the likelihood of procedural difficulties in implementation especially 
as it relates to jurisdictional issues. This however is supposed to be negated by international 
cooperation between states through the process of Mutual Legal Assistance. This is a process by 
which states seek and provide assistance in gathering evidence for the use in the investigation and 
prosecution of criminal cases. Nigeria being a signatory to a number of such treaties will not be 
availed the excuse of procedural bottlenecks as an impediment to proper implementation/execution 
of international AML standards. Taking this into consideration, it will not be preposterous to 
conclude that the International Anti Money Laundering instruments should come in handy to the 
Nigerian state. This however, is far from the actual reality. Money laundering in Nigeria takes 
varying forms, including but not limited to investment in real estate; wire transfers to offshore 
banks; political party and campaign financing; deposits into foreign bank accounts; abuse of 
professional services (lawyers, accountants and investment advisers); bulk cash smuggling etc. 
These proceeds come from crimes such as official corruption, drug trafficking, illegal oil 
bunkering, bribery, embezzlement, contraband smuggling, theft, financial crimes, advance fee 
fraud known as ‗419‘225 all generate hundreds of millions of dollars annually.  Of all the 
aforementioned crimes, none typifies the Nigerian society as much as corruption does. Only in the 
                                           
225
 Named after the fraud section in Nigeria‘s Criminal Code 
 
100 
 
 
 
realms of mythology should one seek appropriate representations of the heights and depths of 
corruption that defines the society.
226
 This chapter aims to (i) analyse the reception of International 
Anti-Money Laundering standards into Nigerian Laws; (ii) identify and analyse the Nigerian Anti-
Money Laundering instruments; and (iii) Examine the efficiency of International standards to curb 
money laundering within the Nigerian context 
4.1 The Nigerian Anti-Money laundering Regime; A Historical Evolution 
The international initiatives which ultimately led to the formation of the Financial Action Task 
Force brought about proactive measures against money laundering on an international level. Nation 
states complied by enacting laws aimed at addressing the problem within the distinct precincts of 
their individual jurisdictions. Nigeria being a signatory to those instruments, took steps towards 
aligning with the crusade against Money Laundering and it authorizes four legislative Acts of 
money laundering. They are: the Money Laundering Act (2011) which broadens the scope of the 
law to cover the proceeds of all crimes; an amendment to the 1991 Banking and Other Financial 
Institutions Act (BOFIA) that extends coverage of the law to stock brokerage firms and foreign 
currency exchange facilities; the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) which serves as the banking 
regulator in Nigeria with the power to approve or revoke bank licenses, power to freeze suspicious 
accounts and promote monetary stability with a sound financial environment; and lastly the 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) Act that coordinates the Anti-Money 
Laundering (AML) investigations, information sharing and making illegal the financing and 
participation in terrorism.  
4.1.1 Nigerian Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) Decree 48 of 1989 
This was the first significant piece of money laundering legislation in Nigeria and its 
promulgation was particularly a welcome development within the Nigerian context. Nigeria had 
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at that time developed large-scale drug trafficking activities and was identified as second only to 
China in the exportation of heroin into the United States.
227
 This was facilitated by drug lords 
being able to operate from a relatively safe home base, characterized by a lack of law 
enforcement capacity, a certain political instability, indications of corruption and few resources to 
devote to fight against organised crime.
228
 This made Nigeria an attractive proposition to money-
launderers and active participation in international fraud and drugs ensured that there was always 
a regular stream of dirty money heading for the country. Established to enforce laws against the 
cultivation, processing, sale, trafficking and use of hard drugs, the agency was empowered to 
investigate persons suspected to have dealings in drugs and other related matters. This Decree 
brought Nigeria in line with the provisions of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Drugs 
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances but it was homogenously silent on the term 
money laundering. However, it was rather unequivocal in its adoption of the provisions of the 
Vienna Convention by stating that the Agency was ‗‗reinforcing and supplementing the measures 
provided in the convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961, as amended by the 1972 Protocol, the 1971 
Convention on Psychotropic Substances and the United Nations Convention Against illicit traffic 
in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and its grave consequences.‘‘229 In the spirit of the 
Vienna Convention also, the Decree sought to undermine the financial strength of drug-traffickers 
by ‗‗adoption of measures to eradicate illicit cultivation of narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
substances with a view to reducing human suffering and eliminating financial incentives for illicit 
traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.‘‘230 The provisions for seizure,231 
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forfeiture
232
and criminalisation of offences
233
as articulated by the Vienna Convention were also 
covered by the wordings of the Act. Jurisdiction was placed exclusively in the Federal High Court 
of Nigeria to try any of the offences stipulated under the Act.  
The narrow scope of the Decree with regards to money laundering predictably caught up with this 
Decree and by 1995, Nigeria enacted a new Money Laundering Act.
234
This statute featured the 
fundamental flaw of the NDLEA Decree 48 of 1989, to wit: it restricted money laundering offences 
to the laundering of proceeds of illicit drug trafficking; hence its scope of operation and effect were 
limited.
235
 It limited predicate offences to drugs related crimes, trafficking, possession and 
distribution. The aim was to make certain that a documentary trail is left in all money laundering 
transactions through banks and to create a closer link between banks and the NDLEA. This new 
law however, did not stand the test of time as a series of loopholes which militated against its 
effectiveness were discovered. Amongst such defects were the ambiguity in the definition of 
money-laundering; the provisions of forfeiture for assets not being far reaching, and the failure of 
the Act to take account of the practice of evading mandatory reporting requirements by the 
customers of financial institutions. Conversely, the Act also failed to provide a ‗safe harbour‘ for 
financial institutions in respect of the mandatory reporting requirements which was seriously 
impacting on compliance. Other notable deficiencies with the 1995 Act were discretionary powers 
it conferred on financial institutions whether or not to report a suspicious transaction. The penalties 
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prescribed under the Act were aimed only at employees and directors whilst leaving out the 
financial institutions concerned. These factors were obvious loopholes for non-compliance. Within 
the context of Nigeria, this was not surprising, considering the usual pattern of legislation in the 
country hardly taking cognizance of all the circumstances before laws were passed. This was 
apparent during the military regimes where decrees were rolled out after meetings of the military-
dominated ruling councils without legislative debate.
236
 These deficiencies will prove costly to 
Nigeria and were exposed in the year 2001 when the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
blacklisted Nigeria as a non-cooperative country due to the body‘s perception that the country‘s 
political administration was unwilling or incapable of getting to grips with the perilous scourge of 
money laundering. This was occasioned by the task force‘s review of the laws and regulations in 47 
countries selected on the basis of FATF members‘ experience which pitted rules and practices in 
these countries against 25 criteria. Of the 47 countries under review, 23 were found to be severely 
lacking and as such declared non-cooperative. Nigeria fell within this list hence the black-list. 
However, there is another narrative as to how/why Nigeria found itself blacklisted, and this was to 
the effect that Nigeria only discovered it was declared uncooperative when the country‘s then 
special adviser to the President (on budget monitoring and governance) travelled to Paris in 2001 to 
attend a meeting of transparency International.
237
 Investigations into the matter subsequently 
revealed that the international body did in fact contact the Nigerian administration through the 
office of the Nigerian Minister for finance but the correspondence trickled down the bureaucratic 
echelons until it landed on the desk of a junior civil servant who was said to have sent a half-
hearted response to the FATF. There were further missives from the FATF seeking to organise a 
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fact finding trip which were ignored.
238
 The narrative is that this Kafkaesque led to the declaration 
of non-cooperation and subsequent blacklist of Nigeria by the FATF without the country‘s 
leadership even being aware.
239
 This begs the question whether the suspension would have been 
avoided were it not for the administrative lapses that brought about the communication gap 
between Nigeria and the body, or if it was an unavoidable consequence. Either way, Nigeria got 
blacklisted and the FATF demanded improvement regarding Anti-Money laundering laws. 
Concerted efforts were made by the Government of Nigeria to improve the image of the country 
and it was de-listed from the black-list in June 2006. However, while it is impossible at this point 
to ascertain whether Nigeria would have been blacklisted/suspended if the aforementioned 
bureaucratic anomalies that plagued communication between the FATF and the country had not 
happened, the Nigerian Government nevertheless immediately sought to address the country‘s 
AML deficiencies by the propagation of an improved cooperation with the FATF by enacting the 
Money Laundering (Amendment) Act of 2002. The Act extended the scope of the offence of 
money-laundering by expanding the realm of its predicate offences from drugs to any crime/ illegal 
act. It also extended AML obligations to non-bank financial institutions and enhanced customer 
due diligence requirements. After reviews, defects were still apparent and these lacunas led to the 
enactment of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2004 which repealed the 2002 Act and made 
far reaching provisions as far as money laundering in Nigeria was concerned. The Act limited the 
amount of cash that private individuals and corporate entities could hold for the purpose of making 
any payments to Five Hundred Thousand Naira(500,000,00) and One Million Naira(1,000,000,00) 
respectively.
240
 It also provided that any transactions involving sums of money above these 
stipulated maximums required being done through a financial institution. In an economy as cash 
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based as Nigeria‘s, this provision sought not only to minimise reliance on such, but to also 
circumvent the consequences of the inability of regulatory agencies formulating and implementing 
forward looking monetary and fiscal policies. Furthermore, a limit of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10, 
000, 00) with regards to amounts which could be transferred to or from a foreign country was 
placed, which also entailed that any sum exceeding this amount (or its equivalent in Naira, 
securities or any other form) be reported to the Central Bank of Nigeria or to the Securities And 
Exchange Commission in the case of a public corporation.
241
 Such a report was required to indicate 
the nature and amount of the transfer, the names and addresses of the sender and receiver of the 
funds.
242
 The thinking behind this provision was to aggrandize the monitoring process by keeping 
track of financial transactions. It prohibited the laundering of the proceeds of crime or any illegal 
act; incorporated and defined designated Non-Financial Institutions and vested the regulatory 
responsibility of same on the Federal Ministry of Commerce. Provisions were also made for 
appropriate penalties for all violations.
243
 Besides the successive Acts, there were other statutory 
measures undertaken by the Nigerian authorities in the fight against money-laundering.  
4.1.2 The Independent and Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC)
244
 
This is an important Nigerian body in the Nigeria‘s Anti-money laundering efforts, and it seeks to 
prohibit and prescribe punishment for corrupt practices and other related offences.
245
 Corruption is 
an ill that has eaten deep into every facet of the society as several years of military rule saw it rise 
to almost institutionalised levels. Corruption enthroned duplicity, crass selfishness, avarice as well 
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as indolence and it appeared everyone became frenzied to take the short-cut to achievement. 
Economically, corruption rendered Nigeria a classic study in paradox of grinding poverty in the 
midst of God-given abundance.
246
 It made transparent accountability in governance at all levels 
extremely difficult.
247
 In order to curb the tide, the then newly elected President of Nigeria declared 
a war against corruption hence the establishment of the commission.
248
 It is worthy of note at this 
juncture however, that previous regimes had successively instituted Legal instruments, measures 
and policies designed to combat corruption in the country. Paradoxically, rather than achieve the 
desired results, there were anomalies in the implementation of these remedial measures that 
engendered a culture of impunity and rendered the malaise more chronic.
249
 The ICPC Act brought 
a fresh and decisive perspective to the fight against corruption by adopting a holistic approach 
encompassing enforcement, prevention and educational measures. It captures in a single document, 
a host of corrupt offences in their old and sophisticated guises. It sets up the Independent Corrupt 
Practices and Other Related Offences Commission with wide-ranging powers. The Act brings 
under its purview, all Nigerians in the private and public sectors, and even those public officers 
with constitutional immunity.
250
 
The Independent Corrupt Practices Commission was thus established charged with duties
251
 as 
delineated in Section 6 (a-f) of the Act summarized as follows; (i) to receive and investigate reports 
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of corrupt offences as created by the Act and in appropriate cases prosecute the offender(s) – 
Enforcement duties; (ii) to examine, review and enforce the correction of corruption-prone systems 
and procedures of public bodies, with a view to eliminating or minimizing corruption in public life- 
prevention duties; and (iii) to educate and enlighten the public on/against corruption with a view to 
enlisting and fostering public support for the fight against it. A cursory look at these duties show 
that the functions transcend mere investigations, arrests and prosecution of people who are guilty of 
corruption but rather, extends to corrective, preventive and educational responsibilities. The ICPC 
however, like other anti-corruption agencies before it, despite fleeting successes, has not recorded 
strides commensurate with the aims of its creation.  
4.1.3 The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) 
The commission was established in 2003 mainly in response to the pressure from the Financial 
Action Task Force which named Nigeria as non-cooperative in the fight against money-
laundering due to the severe negative perceptions of the country as a money-laundering heaven 
and other forms of economic and financial crimes. Established by the EFCC (Establishment) Act 
2002 and (repealed and re-enacted by EFCC) Act 2004, the law made the EFCC the overall 
coordinating agency for anti–money laundering activities in Nigeria, with powers of prevention, 
enforcement and recovery of assets. The EFCC is responsible for the investigation of all financial 
crimes, including money laundering, but also, among other things, bribery, fraud, drug and human 
trafficking, illegal arms dealing, smuggling, oil bunkering, illegal mining, tax evasion, 
counterfeiting, and piracy.
252
 The commission is also authorized to seize assets and require banks 
to freeze bank accounts and share all required information. It may initiate investigations into the 
financial affairs of anyone suspected to enjoy a lifestyle or own assets that seem out of line with 
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their legitimate income.
253
 The powers of investigation and prosecution
254
 are also within the 
exclusive remit of the commission and this is particularly important in circumventing instances 
whereby separate agencies indulge in petty bickering and point fingers at each other while neither 
takes responsibility for failure. Also domiciled within the EFCC is the Nigerian Financial 
Intelligence Unit (NFIU) which is the Nigerian arm of the global financial intelligence units. It 
operates as an autonomous unit in the African region and seeks to comply with international 
standards on combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism and proliferation. The 
NFIU largely draws its powers from the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2011 as amended in 
2012 and the Economic & Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) establishment Act, 2004. The 
core mandate of the NFIU as required by international standard is to serve as the ―national centre 
for the receipt and analysis of: (a) suspicious transaction reports; and (b) other information 
relevant to money laundering, associated predicate offences and terrorist financing, and for the 
dissemination of the results of the analysis to law enforcement and anti-corruption agencies.
255
 
The EFCC started on a very bright note by giving ordinary Nigerians, jaded by endemic 
corruption, and overwhelmed by cynicism, a glimmer of hope when the commission made high 
profile arrests and secured convictions. The commission also secured the repatriation of funds 
stolen and stashed in foreign accounts by corrupt politicians, with the United Kingdom and 
Switzerland. The commission however, just like the ICPC has toiled as regards its effectiveness 
due to factors that shall be discussed later in this work. 
4.1.4 The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN); and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
On the spectrum of regulatory bodies, the CBN and SEC hold forth. The CBN- the apex bank of 
the country, acts as a financial sector surveillance body, identifying trends and patterns of 
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corruption in banks and other monetary institutions. There is also the responsibility to coordinate 
efforts among financial organisations to increase efficiency in regulatory oversight through the 
Financial Services Regulation Coordinating Committee, representing a framework for coordination 
of regulatory and supervisory activities in the Nigerian financial sector. The Securities and 
Exchange Commission on its part is a government agency mandated to regulate and develop the 
Nigerian capital market.
256
 In regulating the market, the Commission undertakes the registration of 
securities and market intermediaries to ensure that only fit and proper persons / institutions are 
allowed to operate in the market. It inspects capital market operators, surveillance and investigation 
of alleged breaches of the laws and regulations governing the capital market and enforcement of 
sanctions where appropriate. The commission also has powers of enforcement taken against market 
operators who are found wanting.  
4.2 Money laundering (Amendment) Prohibition Act 2011 
Despite efforts to get itself off the FATF blacklist, Nigeria found it tough to satisfy the regulatory 
body of its readiness for consideration as a fully compliant country in the war against money 
laundering. During this period, the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in 
West Africa (GIABA) bore the task of checking Nigeria‘s intentions regarding the enactment of 
AML/CTF Laws. This group was established by the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) Authority of Heads of State and Government in the year 2000 as a major response and 
contribution of the ECOWAS to the fight against money laundering. It is a specialized institution of 
ECOWAS responsible for strengthening the capacity of member states towards the prevention and 
control of money laundering and terrorist financing in the region. Apart from member states, 
GIABA grants Observer Status to African and non-African States, as well as Inter-Governmental 
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Organizations that support its objectives and actions and which have applied for observer status.
257
 
In this observer status, the organisation sought to analyse and gauge Nigeria‘s levels of compliance 
with the FATF 40 + 9 Recommendations in what it called the Mutual Evaluation Report. In its 
adopted report dated May 2008, in a summary of the AML/CFT measures in Nigeria as of 
September 24 to October 5, 2007 (the days of the on‐site visit), Nigeria was rated Partially-
Compliant (PC) or Non-Compliant in 13 out of the 16 core and key recommendations of the FATF. 
This was not considered good enough to take the country off the blacklist. However, in the year 
2010, Nigeria made a political commitment to address its deficiencies within a year, and this 
eventually led to the enactment of the Money Laundering (Amendment) Prohibition Act of 2011. 
This 2011 Act made for the comprehensive prohibition of terrorism, the laundering of the proceeds 
of crime, or any illegal act. It also provided appropriate penalties and expanded the scope of 
supervisory and regulatory authorities so as to address the challenges faced in the implementation 
of the anti-money laundering regime in Nigeria. In line with the FATF recommendations, the Act 
placed specific duties on banks and financial institutions as follows:- 
1) The duty to establish the identity of customers (Know Your Customer) 
2) The duty to report an international transfer of funds 
3) The duty to report suspicious transactions 
4) The duty to preserve records of a customer‘s transaction 
5) The duty to disclose a customer‘s transactions 
6) The duty to develop anti-money laundering programmes  
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4.2.1 The KYC Principle. 
This is a principle hinged on the essential need for financial institutions to know who exactly they 
are engaging in business with in order to prevent themselves from inadvertent involvement in 
money laundering in any shape or form. While organisations harbour the hope that the occurrence 
of criminals in their customer and supply data bases and among their business associates is 
minimal, there is increasing evidence of growing financial undoing. The UNODC estimated in 
2009 that criminal proceeds amounted to 3.6% of global GDP. The estimated amount of money 
laundered globally in one year is 2-5% of global GDP, or $800M-$2 Trillion Dollars. What this 
means in essence is that criminals are very much involved in day to day activities with financial 
institutions, hence the need for identification and verification of customers as contained in the 
FATF 40 recommendations on money laundering and nine special recommendations on terrorist 
financing(FATF 40+9). However, contrary to the general view held in many quarters that the 
emergence of verification of the identity of customers was a brain child of the FATF 
recommendations; it has always been practiced in England and some other commonwealth 
countries. It was traditionally regarded as a matter of necessity for a bank to both check the identity 
of a new client and to ascertain whether they were suitable to hold an account. Failure to do so 
ultimately left such a bank open to an action in conversion by a party who suffered loss as a result 
of failure to do so.
258
 Nevertheless, the FATF recommendations provides a complete set of counter-
measures against money laundering covering the criminal justice system and law enforcement, the 
financial system and its regulation, and international co-operation. They are the 
universal/international standards in this field and have been recognised, endorsed, or adopted by 
many international bodies including Nigeria. Not knowing who you are doing business with can be 
costly to banks and financial institutions generally. The need for the KYC principle cannot be 
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overemphasised. It is absolutely essential at the time of applying for business. The sinister motives 
of terrorists and their financiers are at times fuelled by an increasingly false confidence that liberal 
democratic governments will not closely scrutinize most financial transactions.
259
 The gathering 
and amalgamation of customer information such as source of funds, type of business activity etc., 
places banks in a better stead to anticipate the level of customer account activity. This in turn opens 
the possibilities to offering improved services to the customers and serves as a form of protection 
to investment advisors by knowing exactly what and what not to include in their clients portfolio. 
By submitting the required information, customers actually not only help the bank to discharge its 
statutory/regulatory obligation but also safeguard their own interest. Knowing and understanding 
customers is an overriding rule of exceptional companies. Award winning business builders know 
their customers as well as their own families, perhaps even more so.  
In establishing the identity of customers, the Nigerian Money Laundering Act explicitly states 
that ‗‗a financial institution and a designated Non-Financial Institution shall verify its customers 
identity and update all relevant information on the customer before opening an account for, 
issuing a passbook to, entering into a fiduciary transaction….during the course of the 
relationship with the customer, as well as to scrutinize all on-going transactions undertaken 
throughout the duration of the relationship in order to ensure that the customer‘s transaction is 
consistent with the business and the risk profile.‘‘260 Where the customer is an individual, such a 
customer shall be required to provide ‗‗proof of his identity, by presenting to the Financial 
Institution or Designated Non-Financial Institution a valid original copy of an official document 
bearing his names and photograph or any other identification documents as the relevant 
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regulators may from time to time approve.‘‘261 The determination of proof of address is a 
necessity, and in this case, originals of receipts issued within the previous three months by public 
utilities suffice. Other documents as the relevant regulatory authorities may from time to time 
approve also satisfy this requirement.
262
 In the case of a corporate body, such a customer shall be 
required to provide proof of its identity by providing its certificate of incorporation and other 
valid official documents attesting to the existence of the body corporate. Additionally, the 
manager, employee or assignee delegated by such a body corporate to open an account shall be 
required, in addition to all the identification documents an individual customer is required to 
produce, but also an accompanying power of attorney granted him in that behalf.
263
 The Act also 
makes reference to a casual customer where-in its states that such customers are to comply with 
the identification requirements stipulated for regular customers prior to engaging in business 
transactions with financial institutions or designated non-financial ones. This is specifically when 
and only if the transaction in question involves any number or manner of transactions including 
wire transfers involving a sum exceeding US$1,000 or its total equivalent if the amount is known 
at the commencement of the transaction or as soon as it is known to exceed the sum of US$1,000 
or its equivalent.
264
 The Act is not explicit as to what constitutes a casual customer but a ‗casual 
customer‘ may be described as a customer who transacts with a bank without having an account 
in the said bank.
265
 However, considering the mandatory requirements of S.3 (1) which makes it 
paramount that the identity of potential customers be ascertained before any form of relationship 
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is entered into with such a customer by the bank, it is difficult to see the possibility of such a 
relationship in the first place. This notwithstanding, it is worthy of note that Nigerian banks have 
taken the approach of identifying all potential customers irrespective of the amount involved in 
the transactions they intend to make.
266
 On a conclusive note, the KYC principle aims to prevent 
banks from being used by unscrupulous or criminal elements for their criminal activities 
including money laundering, prevent frauds and risk, the protection of bank‘s reputation, and the 
avoidance of opening of accounts with fictitious name and address as well as the elimination of 
bad customers and protection of good ones. 
4.2.2 Duty to report suspicious transactions. 
This duty mandates the reporting of any transaction that a bank deems as irregular and/or 
surrounded by conditions of unusual activity. The main issue is to determine what could be 
regarded as ‗unusual and suspicious‘. Going by the customer profiling requirement as discussed 
under the KYC rule, any transaction that falls out of the routine of the customers previous 
transactions should fall in the category of being unusual. Although there is no set prior period 
within which banks may refer to in determining what is regular or not, the spirit of this provision 
presupposes that such banks know their customers enough to realise and spot a red flag 
immediately such arises. Suspicion on the other hand provides a trickier scenario. What appears 
suspicious may in fact not be anything sinister. Such is the difficulty of pinpointing what exactly 
constitutes suspicious transaction. All one can say is that the suspicious transactions will often be 
characterised as being inconsistent with a customer‘s known legitimate business objectives. 
Therefore, a useful method in identifying suspicious transactions is first to identify unusual 
transactions before examining these further to access whether they are suspicious and therefore 
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require reporting.
267
 Also, a transaction which appears unusual is not necessarily suspicious. Even 
customers with stable and predictable transactions profile will have periodic transactions that are 
unusual for them. Many customers will, for perfectly good reasons, have an erratic pattern of 
transactions or account activity. So the unusual is, in the first instance, only a basis for further 
enquiry, which may in turn require judgement as to whether it is suspicious. A transaction or 
activity may not be suspicious at the time, but if suspicions are raised later, an obligation to report 
then arises. It is a possibility which is more fanciful that the relevant factor exists. As such, a vague 
feeling of unease would not suffice.
268 
Under the Nigerian Act, ‗‗where a transaction in the opinion of a financial institution or 
designated non-financial institution involves terrorist financing or is inconsistent with the known 
transaction pattern of the account or business relationship…‘‘269 Where legal or regulatory 
requirements mandate the reporting of a suspicious activity, once a suspicion has been formed, a 
report must be made.
270
 As a corollary to this, the Nigerian Act requires financial institutions and 
designated non-financial institutions to within seven days of a transaction it considers as 
suspicious, draw up a written report containing all relevant information on such a transaction 
including the identity of the principal and, where applicable, of the beneficiary or beneficiaries.
271
 
Furthermore, such an institution must take appropriate action to prevent the laundering of the 
proceeds of a crime or illegal act and at the same time, send a copy of the report and action taken 
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to the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission.
272
 There is a degree of ambiguity here in that 
the Act does not specifically define what an ‗appropriate action‘ means, but reading through the 
provisions of S.6 (4-7) of the MLA, it can be ascertained that it means the prevention of 
laundering of funds pending an initial investigation of the transaction that brought about the 
suspicion. The reporting of such a suspicious transaction to the commission is usually followed 
by an acknowledgement of receipt by the commission which shall be sent to the financial 
institution within the time allowed for the transaction. The commission may by a notice, defer 
such a period for a maximum of 72 hours by placing a stop order on the account if it is discovered 
that such an account or transaction is suspected to be involved in any crime. At the expiration of 
such a stop notice, or where the initial acknowledgement of receipt to the bank was not 
accompanied by a notice, the bank or financial institution may carry out the transaction.
273
 The 
bank is free of any liabilities if it proceeds with the transaction even if the commission has sent 
out a notice to block the transaction in so far as such notice has on the expiration of 72 hours not 
reached the bank. Computation of time here does not start from when the notice was sent out, but 
when it was received. By the provisions of S.6(7), the Federal High Court may at the request of 
the commission, or other persons or authority duly authorized in that behalf, order that the funds, 
accounts or securities referred to in a report be blocked. This is when it has proved impossible to 
ascertain the origin of funds, hence a suspicious transaction. The adherences to the suspicious 
requirements are mandatory on banks and a failure to comply is deemed an offence liable on 
conviction to a fine of N1.000.00 for each day during which the offence continues.
274
 
Notwithstanding this provision also, the Central Bank of Nigeria may also impose a penalty of 
not less than One Million Naira or the suspension of any license issued to the financial institution 
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or designated non-financial institution for failure to comply with the suspicious reporting 
requirements.
275
 It is important to note at this juncture, that possibilities exist where accounts may 
get blocked or transactions declined based on the aforementioned factors, which may not 
necessarily be proceeds of any crime. Under previous laws, such a customer could successfully 
maintain an action for damages against a bank because there was no form of protection for the 
banks. However, specifically under the current Nigerian Act, the directors, officers and 
employees of financial institutions and designated non-financial institutions who carry out these 
duties in good faith are not liable to any civil or criminal proceedings brought against them by 
customers.
276
 Statements made by those making a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) that they 
have a suspicion suffices, and it will be exceptional for courts to require those that report a 
suspicion to provide a justification for having a suspicion. The English Court of Appeal has held 
that Suspicion need not be proved at all, and there is no mechanism where an officer of a bank 
can be required to be cross examined as to the existence of their suspicion.
277
 This was premised 
on the ground that any cross examination of a bank employee who had confirmed he had 
suspicion would be pointless and tantamount to a court investigating such a suspicion. In reality, 
it will be for those challenging the making of an SAR to prove that no suspicion existed.
278
 There 
have been arguments against this position on the grounds that where banks do not produce 
evidence of suspicion; it will be too easy for banks to assert a suspicion that was baseless.
279
 As 
valid as this argument may seem, it is decided that ‗‗the existence of suspicion is a subjective fact, 
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and there is no legal requirement that there should be reasonable grounds for the suspicion. The 
relevant bank employee either suspects or he does not.‘‘280  
An interesting point to note under the Nigerian Act is that while it explicitly mentions directors, 
officers and employees of a financial institution as being exempted from any civil or criminal 
liability in the event of an action by an aggrieved customer, it is silent on the liabilities of the same 
group of people in the event of a failure to report a transaction that should have raised a red flag 
and has ultimately led to the laundering of funds. The Act rather imposes liability and penalty on 
the bank or financial institution as an entity. This is rather flawed because the banks do not form 
the suspicions; they are formed by employees and officers of the bank on the frontline of the Anti-
Money Laundering departments. If the Act has specifically exempted such people from liability, 
the same Act should hold the individuals accountable for their actions too. This is no way 
suggesting that the banks or financial institutions should escape punishment, but rather a reactive 
opinion to the inconsistency of the punitive measures of the Nigerian Act in this regard. 
4.2.3 Duty to Disclose Customer‘s Transactions 
There is a mandatory duty imposed upon Nigerian banks to disclose customer transactions that 
exceed a stipulated threshold. As a consequence, banks are required to (within seven days) report 
any single transaction, lodgement or transfer of funds in the excess of N5,000,000 or its 
equivalent in the case of an individual; or N10,000,000 or its equivalent in the case of a body 
corporate.
281
 This provision circumvents (in part) the SAR provisions in that suspicion does not 
play any part in initiating disclosure. The transaction must be reported once it goes beyond the 
stipulated threshold if and only when done in a single transaction. Many money launderers are 
familiar with these thresholds however, and in order to remain anonymous and avoid the 
detection of law enforcement officials, they ―structure‖ their transactions so that the 
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recordkeeping or reporting requirements will not be triggered. This intentional structuring of 
lodgements below the stipulated threshold (Structuring/smurfing) by the letter of the Nigerian law 
is not an offence because there is no explicit provision prohibiting such transactions. It is 
important to note too that not all multiple transactions constitute structuring. Today however, with 
the CTR requirements in place, customers could argue that the fiduciary duty of confidentiality a 
bank owes its service users is being breached if details of transactions are revealed as required by 
law? After all, confidentiality is the cornerstone of the bank-customer relationship and banks 
usually have a strict duty to protect the confidentiality of all Customers and former Customers 
affairs. This is couched on the common law duty of secrecy (confidentiality) imposed upon banks 
which implies that ‗‗banks should not as matter of course disclose their customer's affairs, but 
only when reasonably necessary.‘‘ This is a qualified duty, and a leading common law authority 
is the British Court of Appeal decision in Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of 
England where-in, specifically, Bankes L. J. stated: ―On principle I think the qualifications can 
be classified under four heads: (a) Where disclosure is under compulsion of law; (b) Where there 
is a duty to the public to disclose; (c) Where the interests of the bank require disclosure; and (d) 
Where the disclosure is made by the express or implied consent of the customer.‖282 
Going by this dictum from the learned Judge, banks and financial institutions alike should be 
protected by the compulsion as well as the duty imposed on them by law to reveal any transactions 
that fall within the realms of suspicion as stipulated by the law. The Nigerian Act follows this lead 
by stating explicitly that directors, officers and employees of financial institutions and designated 
non-financial institutions who carry out their duties under the Act in good faith shall not be liable 
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to any civil or criminal liability nor have any criminal liability or civil proceedings brought against 
them by their customers.
283
  
4.2.4 Duty to preserve records of a customer transactions 
The preservation of customer records is sacrosanct to any attempt at the regulation of money 
laundering because the lack of it hinders such regulatory measures which will then result in law 
enforcement bodies not being able to trace and investigate acts of money-laundering. As such, 
financial institutions and designated non-financial institutions are required to preserve a record of a 
customer‘s identification for a period of at least 5 years after the closure of the account or the 
severance of relations with the customer as the case may be.
284
 This will also include records and 
other related information of a transaction carried out by a customer as well as any suspicious 
transaction reports the financial institution may have previously made on such a customer‘s 
transactions within the preceding 5 years of severance of relationship or closure of the account.
285
 
The aforementioned records shall be preserved at the disposal of regulatory authorities and shall be 
communicated on demand to such bodies.
286
 
4.2.5 Duty to develop Anti-Money Laundering Programmes 
The development of programmes aimed at combatting money laundering is prevailed upon 
Nigerian Financial institutions and Non-Financial institutions alike. This duty is sought to be 
achieved by the designation of compliance officers at management level, at its headquarters, at 
every branch and local office. There are also regular training programmes for employees, the 
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centralization of the information collected and then the establishment of an internal audit unit to 
ensure compliance.
287
 
4.3 The Current Law 
The current Anti-Money Laundering law in Nigeria is the Money Laundering (Prohibition) 
(Amendment), 2012 and it was passed into law as an amendment of the principal Act specifically 
to expand the scope of Money Laundering offences and enhance customer due diligence measures 
and allied matters.
288
 
The amendment Act has 12 new provisions- 
1. Amendment of section 2 (5) 
2. Amendment of section 3  
3. Amendment of section 6  
4. Amendment of section 9  
5. Amendment of section 10 
6. Amendment of section 11 
7. Amendment of section 12 
8. Substitution for section 15 
9. Amendment of section 16 
10. Substitution for section 20 
11. Substitution for section 23 
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12. Amendment of section 25 
Under the principal Act, a false declaration to the Nigerian Customs Service or failure to declare at 
all pursuant to S.12 of the Foreign Exchange (Monitoring and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
amounted to an offence and liable on conviction to a forfeiture of not less than 25% of the 
undeclared funds or negotiable instrument. This was amended to a complete forfeiture of such 
undeclared funds by the Amendment Act.
289
 More is also demanded of Financial and Non-
Financial Institutions as regards customer identity in that the identity of such customers must be 
ascertained, whether permanent or occasional, natural or legal person or any other form of legal 
arrangements, using identification documents as may be prescribed in any relevant regulation.
290
 
This ensured that the nature of customer transactions is most likely to be determined from the start 
of the business relationship rather than later. The provisions of the Principal Act only demanded a 
verification of such identity without particularly seeking to know the nature. The identity of the 
beneficial owner must also be determined and reasonable measures taken to verify the identity of 
such a beneficial owner using relevant information or data obtained from a reliable source such that 
the Financial Institution or the Designated Non-Financial Institution is satisfied that it knows who 
the beneficial owner is.
291
 Also under the amended Act, the wordings of the Principal Act were 
altered from ―Special Surveillance on Certain Transactions‖ to a new marginal note ―Suspicious 
Transaction Reporting‖. The time lapse under the Principal Act which was 7 days within which a 
report had to be made in the event of a suspicious transaction was expunged by the new Act which 
compels an immediate report once the suspicion is formed by the relevant authority.
292
 This ensures 
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that a dubious transaction is not given any time to manifest before action is taken. Such a report is 
to be made to the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission only and only the Chairman of the 
commission may place an order stopping a transaction that bears suspicions.
293
 The Principal Act 
had such powers shared by the Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria. The failure to comply 
with internal procedures, policies and control attracted a penalty to be imposed by the Central 
Bank, the Securities and Exchange Commission, National Insurance Commission or any other 
relevant regulatory authority.
294
 This was a departure from the provisions of the principal Act 
where only the central Bank commanded such powers. 
Shell banks are expressly prohibited and no person is allowed to establish and own one in Nigeria 
and financial institutions are precluded from entering into or continue correspondent banking 
relationships with shell banks. They must also satisfy themselves that a respondent financial 
institution in a foreign country does not permit its accounts to be used by shell banks.
295
 The 
Principal Act only made reference to numbered and anonymous accounts.
296
 The offence of Money 
laundering is expressly defined and prohibited by the amendment Act.
297
 The Principal Act had an 
ambiguity about it as regards this as there was no express mention of the crime to tally with the 
offences stipulated. The only mention was in the marginal notes. The amended Act however clearly 
states ―any person or body corporate, in or outside Nigeria, who directly or indirectly conceals or 
disguises the origin of converts or transfers; removes from the jurisdiction; or acquires, uses, 
retains or takes possession or control of any fund or property, knowingly or reasonably ought to 
                                           
293
 S.4(D) 
 
294
 S.5(2)(A-B) 
 
295
 S.7(2)(3) 
 
296
 S.11 MLPA Act 2011 
 
297
 S.15(1)(2) 
 
124 
 
 
 
have known that such fund or property is, or forms part of the proceeds of an unlawful act; 
commits an offence of money laundering.
298
 Any person who is found to commit the offence is 
liable on conviction to a term of not less than 7 years but not more than 14 years imprisonment.
299
 
This was unlike under the Principal Act where the punishment on conviction was for a prison term 
not less than 5 years but not more than 10 years.
300
 Body corporate were also included in the list of 
possible Money Laundering offences under the amendment and liable on conviction to a fine of not 
less than 100% of the funds and properties acquired as a result of the offence committed as well as 
a withdrawal of licence.
301
 Like the Principal Act, jurisdiction is exclusively reserved to the Federal 
High Court to ―try offences under this Act or any other related enactment...‖302 The addendum also 
addresses the issue of delays by conferring on the same court, the powers to adopt all legal 
measures necessary to avoid unnecessary delays and abuse in the conduct of matters.
303
 An 
application for stay of proceedings in respect of any criminal matter brought under this Act shall 
not be entertained as a matter of course.
304
 This of course, is subject the provisions of the 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The Act gives powers to the Attorney General of 
the Federation who is the Chief Law Officer of the country to make orders, rules, guidelines or 
regulations as are necessary for the efficient implementation of the provisions of the Act.
305
 These 
may include the method of custody of video and other electronic recordings of suspects 
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apprehended under the Act; method of compliance with directives issued by relevant international 
institutions on money laundering and terrorism financing counter measures; procedure for freezing, 
unfreezing and providing access to frozen funds or other assets; procedure for the prosecution of all 
money laundering cases in line with international human rights standards; and any other matter the 
Attorney - General may consider necessary or expedient for the purpose of the implementation of 
the Act.
306
 
On another note, Nigeria made strides towards aligning itself with terrorism laws as regards 
terrorist financing by the passing into law of the Terrorism (Prevention) Act No. 10, 2011 which 
was amended by the current Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act, 2013. The enactment of the 
Anti-Terrorism Act was a turning point in the implementation of a robust counter terrorism 
measures in the country because it is a major requirement for an effective AML/CFT system. It is 
very important to the terrorists to conceal the use of the funds so that the financial activity goes 
undetected, and for such reasons, the FATF recommends that each country criminalises the 
financing of terrorism, terrorist acts and terrorist organisations.
307
 Such offences are also to be 
made predicate offences to the crime of money laundering. Nigeria did follow this lead by the 
promulgation of the terrorism Act. The amended Act makes provision for extra-territorial 
application and strengthens terrorist financing offences. Efforts to combat the financing of 
terrorism requires countries to consider explaining the scope of the AML framework to include 
non-profit organisations particularly charities, to make sure such organisations are not used directly 
or indirectly to finance or support terrorism.
308
 The Nigerian Act holds that anyone found to be a 
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financier to terror is liable on conviction to a life prison term.
309
 A prison term of not less than 
twenty years is imposed on anyone found liable to dealing with terrorist property 
4.4 The FATF All-Clear  
After being de-listed from the black list in June 2006, Nigeria remained under the monitoring 
process of FATF/GIABA. IN 2010, the FATF identified the key areas of deficiency and by June 
2013, conducted an on-site visit to the country having noted the improvements with regard to the 
highlighted deficiencies. In the aftermath of this visit, the FATF identified Nigeria‘s significant 
progress in improving its AML/CFT regime and noted the establishment of a legal and regulatory 
framework to meet its commitments in its Action Plan regarding the strategic deficiencies that the 
FATF had identified in February 2010. Nigeria therefore ceased to be subject to FATF‘s 
monitoring process under its on-going global AML/CFT compliance process.‘‘310 Considering that 
classification as a high risk jurisdiction comes with trepidations of many financial institutions from 
other jurisdictions to transact any form of business with their Nigerian counterparts, the efforts of 
Nigeria towards aligning with the model Anti-Money Laundering standards can only be admired. 
The country was now free from the repercussions of being labelled non-cooperative and ―it is 
expected that there will be great reduction in the costs and time line of financial transactions 
between individuals and institutions between Nigeria and other countries. Besides the guarantee of 
improved global rating for the country‘s financial system, the amended laws and regulations will 
strengthen the enforcement and regulatory capacities of relevant institutions in Nigeria.‘‘311 
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Conclusion  
Admirable strides have been made by Nigeria since the events that culminated in the blacklist over 
a decade ago but the practicalities of these strides are yet to stand the test of time. The FATF 
recognises the fact that countries have diverse legal, administrative and operational framework and 
different financial institutions. This means they cannot take all identical measures to counter the 
threats of money laundering. Whether Nigeria took cognisance of this while framing its Anti-
Money Laundering Standards remains to be seen. However for reasons that shall be advanced in 
subsequent chapters of this work, I hold the firm ground that the FATF only sanctioned an 
academic progress rather than a practicable one suited to the complex peculiarities of the Nigerian 
Nation. 
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5.0 The FATF Recommendations; (Application and Practicalities) 
5.1 Introduction 
The legal and regulatory improvements Nigeria made to its Anti-Money Laundering outlook in the 
last decade was a direct reaction to the force and pressure of the FATF, and this ultimately brought 
a new order by aligning Nigeria with International standards regarding Money Laundering laws. 
However, it is important to note that Nigeria could easily have declined compliance and remained 
on the blacklist if it desired. This probability makes it necessary to examine the possible scenario 
and the punitive measures that would have availed the FATF had compliance been 
discountenanced by Nigeria. The effects of being blacklisted as non-compliant have been discussed 
in previous chapters, but the effect of laws goes beyond mere passage and sanction. They must be 
implemented with the intended effect and in order to achieve the desired intention that necessitated 
its creation in the first place. The Nigerian Money Laundering Act 2012 satisfied the requirements 
required of the International regulatory body, but how this law holds up within the context of the 
Nigerian economy and society in general is equally worthy of a considered examination. The 
previous chapter discussed the strides Nigeria made in its reception of International AML 
standards, and concluded by questioning whether the strides were more academic than practicable. 
This chapter aims to (i) appraise the legal force of the FATF recommendations; (ii) analyse the 
efficiency of these international Standards to curb money laundering within the context of the 
Nigerian society; and (iii) analyse the propriety or otherwise of the FATF endorsement of Nigeria 
as a fully compliant AML jurisdiction within the contemporary aftermath of the endorsement. 
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5.2 The legal Force of the FATF Recommendations; (Law and Culture: The Letter, Spirit and 
Performance of Law) 
Laws, in their most general signification, are the necessary relations arising from the nature of 
things.
312
 They carry distinct features- the letter of the law; the spirit of the law; sanctions; cost; 
side effects; performance and fallibility. Without necessarily referring to the FATF 
recommendations as laws, they shall be tested against these features to determine the force they 
ultimately carry. The letter of the law (the litera legis) equates to its literal meaning, and it 
appears to signify the formal boundary between legal and illegal actions, which tend to 
dichotomize our judgments of culpability and punishment in ―legal‖ versus ―illegal‖ terms.313 By 
letter of the law, it is meant a written order, a set of instructions or software that provides 
directions for human behaviour. The entire written content of a law is the ‗letter of the law‘, but it 
presumes to convey the spirit of the law. The ‗spirit‘ of the law represents its general meaning or 
purpose, and what is assumed to be a rational understanding of the intention of the law.
314
 It thus 
averts to the social and ethical values assumed to be codified by the letter of the law.
315 The spirit 
of the law can be contained only within the letter of the law, and this spirit or purposeful intent is 
‗‗what the law ought to be.‘‘316 In other words, laws are tools that are intended to be useful. Since 
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the spirit of the law is the reason for its existence, the letter of the law is subordinate to the 
problem-solving intent of the law. To realise the intent of the law there must be a mechanism of 
coercion in place: sanctions, restrictions, prohibitions, or commands for action that attempt to 
regulate or change the behaviour or status of those individuals and institutions that are subject to 
the law. A mechanism for enforcement or authorized sanction must be present to encourage 
individuals and institutions to comply with the law, and in this case, subsidies, fines, and 
imprisonment are examples. The promulgation of laws also bears cost effects brought about by its 
consumption and diversion of resources. These costs are borne by the people through the 
imposition by the authorities of revenue generating sanctions like taxes, fines and fees. Laws have 
their side effects too which though unintended, are a possibility, just like all other human 
creations. The indices used to measure these side effects are human rights, living standards and 
quality of life of the people- any or all of which may be intentionally degraded when a law is in 
enforced. The performance of a law is also an important feature generally, and this means the 
measure of the problem solving benefit minus the measured sum of its burdens (restriction cost 
side effects). If the net benefit is zero, the law is useless, if the net benefits are negative, the law is 
detrimental. Laws are also fallible being that they are a product of human creation and may fail in 
their objectives due to a combination of factors.  The FATF recommendations despite not 
necessarily being referred to as law; bear all these features. However, what weights they carry in 
the eye of the law must be ascertained. 
5.2.1 Soft Law 
International financial regulation is mainly a system of soft law. This means they are standards, 
guidelines, interpretations and other statements that are not directly binding and enforceable in 
accordance with formal techniques of international law but nevertheless capable of exerting 
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powerful influence over the behaviour of countries, public entities and private parties.
317
 They are 
rules of conduct that are laid down in instruments which have not been attributed legally binding 
force as such, but nevertheless may have certain indirect legal effects, that are aimed at and may 
produce practical effects.
318
 The FATF recommendations are regarded as extremely persuasive 
‗soft law‘ by OECD countries and by OECD non-members.319 Soft law including in the 
international law context, is succinctly explained as ‗‗collectively, rules that are neither strictly 
binding nor completely lacking in legal significance…guidelines, policy declarations, or codes of 
conduct that set standards of conduct but are not legally binding.‘‘320 A general view of soft law 
is summarised as follows: ‗‗soft law is not truly law at all but rather a category of potentially 
significant legal developments or materials. To the extent such developments or materials achieve 
legally binding status, they only do so through one or more of the formal law-creating 
processes.‘‘321 Soft law in the glossary of terms in that same text reads: ‗‗soft law‘: Non-binding 
or emerging norms which may or may not eventually harden into binding law: rules not yet 
grounded in a recognised, formal source of law.‘‘322 Another international law text from Canada 
explains soft law in part as: ‗‗an understanding between states how they might be expected to 
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behave.‘‘323 And further explains as follows: ‗‗….called soft law because they are not directly 
enforced in domestic courts or international tribunals.‘‘324 Soft law is often used as an 
overreaching term to describe the informal law making power of the international financial 
regulators and central bankers in the world who participate in the negotiation and approval of 
legally non-binding international financial rules.
325
 They may, however, be very influential.  
The questions that arise now revolve around the effectiveness and use of soft laws, and why they 
are utilised at all.  The tendency for most soft law instruments is to leave a considerable leeway for 
adaptations to fit to local circumstances, thereby not encroaching too far on sovereign legislative 
autonomy is one of the advantages of the soft law concept. It can both facilitate consensus in the 
initial standard-setting process and avoid implementation misfits.
326
 The flexible nature of the 
decision making structures of soft law bodies which usually comprise of a limited number of 
participants makes it possible for a quick reaction to changing circumstances. This forms another 
advantage of the soft law concept, namely that it is a mechanism that can be superior to hard law 
making process in meeting the need for regulation that can be changed and adapted in response to 
the ever evolving, high complex interactions of the modern world.
327
 This capacity for soft law to 
change easily can foster willingness to try out regulatory innovations in circumstances of 
uncertainty, and if the experiment works, could in turn lead to a stabilisation of expectations in the 
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area. The benefit of the soft law model lies in its consensus drawing ability which transcends 
national boundaries and political differences. The soft law model invites participation from 
multiple countries, multiple levels of policy makers, and multiple market players, sidestepping 
concerns about the feasibility and legitimacy of a world government. Moreover, soft law 
instruments benefit from collective knowledge of industry experts.
328
 They could be highly 
influential too by serving as ‗best practice‘ market norms to which industry players adhere for a 
range of motives from positive appreciation of the benefits of international standardisation through 
to a defensive urge to demonstrate that they can be trusted to self-regulate. The International 
Organization of Securities Commission‘s code of conduct fundamentals for credit rating agencies 
is an example of international code aimed at influencing industry practice.
329
 As a result of these 
kinds of incentive-related reasons, banks and other regulated firms may adopt international 
standards, even when the country in which they are based has not implemented them, because they 
will want to signal to the global market that they adhere to the latest and most sophisticated models 
that have received the approval of international bodies.
330
 Another positive aspect of soft law is that 
it provides for options that expand the international regulatory kit.
331
 Unlike hard law which 
ordinarily gives rise to enforceable obligations and therefore has to be reasonably certain and 
predictable to determine what is expected of them, soft law by its very nature of not being directly 
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enforceable, can be more open textured. This means that international standards may be articulated 
at too high a level of generality to be immediately operational and will need to be supplemented by 
more detailed rules enacted at national or supranational level to make the position more concrete 
and to ensure practical effectiveness.  
These advantages of soft laws notwithstanding, they are not entirely benign. From an 
implementation point of view, there is a contention that soft law measures are often experimental 
and may harden in due course with the requirement being its codification within national laws so as 
to make them legally binding, without which enforcement will be difficult.
332
 Similarly, soft laws 
deprive member states of the individual ability to opt out of commitments because the laws are not 
subject to ratification by the parties.
333
 From the perspective of the Financial Action Task Force 
and its recommendations, being soft law, and with no direct punishment for countries failing to 
comply, implementation was always going to be an issue. There had to be a way to induce 
unwilling compliance from reluctant states and this was achieved by pressurising states into 
regulatory reform by publicly blacklisting those adjudged to be non-compliant with new standards. 
But how effective is blacklisting a country in achieving compliance if they are not supported by 
sanctions or binding legal decisions? The general assumption will be that they will be ineffectual 
because such actions usually carry no legal authority and only issue recommendations.
334
 There are 
precedents however which shows that blacklists actually do provide an effective medium with 
which international organisations can coerce states into effecting policy change. Blacklisting has 
been seen to generate compliance by one or two related causal mechanisms namely the reactive 
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compliance or the pre-emptive compliance.
335
 In the case of the former, it is argued that decision 
makers in targeted jurisdictions may observe and then react to material loses resulting from 
reputational damage caused by blacklisting, while the latter is tied to an anticipation of material 
economic loses from being blacklisted and thus action is taken in order to forestall such damage. 
Both reactions are two sides of the same coin in that although there may be distinct variations in 
pathways, the results are one and the same since the reforms mandated by the international 
organisations eventually get implemented.
336
 Different intervening variables distinguish the two 
paths to the dependent variable (compliance); the experience of actual material loss for reactive 
compliance, and the anticipation of such for pre-emptive compliance.
337
 The nature of a financial 
institution of a jurisdiction usually explains the path which such a country follows. As such, when 
financial institutions in targeted jurisdictions are heavily reliant on high profile, institutional 
business particularly sensitive to reputation, they always opted for a pre-emptive compliance 
approach. Such countries usually cultivated their image as secure and stable investment 
destinations in order to attract lucrative business deals. The Cayman Islands for instance suffered 
no noticeable decline in the volume of investment in the year it was on the NCC list; rather there 
was a steady growth in the creation of mutual funds, trust companies, banks, insurance companies 
and off balance sheet vehicles.
338
 Despite this, the Caymans acted by complying swiftly with the 
FATF standards because it was a jurisdiction whose selling point was reputation as its most 
important asset. Similar to the Caymans in this regard was the Isle of Man which made an early 
commitment to the OECD despite evidence that the country‘s financial services industry continued 
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to grow rather than suffer any damages within the period it was blacklisted.
339
 The same cannot be 
said of jurisdictions couched on secretive private client banking, trusts and companies who are less 
concerned about issues of reputation, as those jurisdictions complied only as a reaction to 
disinvestment and material economic losses.
340
 
5.2.2 Opposition to the Blacklisting Technique 
This NCCT initiative encountered varying degrees of resistance from the very beginning. 
Blacklisted jurisdictions opposed the idea for obvious reasons, but the most formidable opposition 
came from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) who felt strongly opposed to the coercive 
force the blacklisting model brought about. The IMF had on its own in the year 2001 also 
initiated efforts in the area of AML and it saw the NCCT list as a complete variant to the IMF‘s 
more cooperative working methods. As such, several IMF board members especially those from 
developing countries strongly opposed blacklisting because there was a feeling that the FATF was 
punishing poor states while letting its rich members off the hook. For example, a representative of 
Antigua, who was also the deputy chair of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force stated that 
the FATF was ‗‗the creation of a handful of rich nations, ‘and declared it unacceptable ‗‘that a 
handful of states, however powerful, should usurp the right to dictate standards to the rest of the 
world under the threat or imposition of sanctions.‘‘341 The Government of St Kitts and Nevis 
when blacklisted by the FATF in June 2000 described the initiative as a ‗‗sinister plot‘ which it 
would oppose.‘‘342 There were concerns about the legitimacy or otherwise of the blacklisting 
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technique because arguments were advanced that the blacklist violated international norms and 
the AML regime‘s own principles which holds that participation is voluntary and 
recommendations non-binding.
343
 Similarly, the politicised practice of blacklisting was viewed as 
contradictory to the technocratic and apolitical character of the FATF as an expert body.
344
 The 
NCCT list and in particular the imposition of economic sanctions on non-cooperative countries 
was regarded as a breach of the sovereignty norm.
345 The Cook Islands for instance, categorically 
stated through its Prime Minister in 2001 that the Island would refuse to cave into multilateral 
initiatives that ‗‗infringed its sovereign right to develop and implement policies.‘‘346 Likewise, 
there were reservations on the part of some developing countries as to the real motives behind the 
blacklisting technique. Such countries viewed the blacklist with suspicion and felt there was a 
hidden agenda on the part of the FATF. The Caribbean countries in particular, accused the FATF 
countries of using money laundering as a pretext for fighting tax havens, and more generally for 
protecting their own financial centres from the competitive pressures from the offshore 
countries.
347
 The seeming lack of transparency with the procedures of the NCCT process was also 
another issue where aggrieved countries felt the legitimacy of the blacklist was to be called into 
question. There was also a perception that the FATF applied double standards; only non-FATF 
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members ran the risk of being blacklisted despite the fact that a number of FATF members also 
fell short of a full implementation of the FATF recommendations.
348
 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) weighed in on the FATF regarding the blacklisting policy, 
with the FATF finally agreeing to suspend the policy in the year 2002. Blacklisting by the FATF 
according to the IMF damaged reputations because it reverberated at each level and threatened the 
free flow of new investment, and generally caused a decline in Government revenue and general 
economic activity. The importance of reputation to jurisdictions was reflected in an IMF report 
which stated that ‗‘most likely, the major competitive factor in the current international 
environment is a country‘s established reputation.349 The Cook Island for instance initially defied 
the blacklist because it miscalculated costs of resistance compared to cost of reform. Experience 
would later reveal this mistake as the country‘s reputation was tarnished due to the initial listing, 
followed by the knock-on blacklisting by governments and firms, and reputational damage began 
to translate into material damage.
350 St Kitts and Nevis on its part felt it could afford to ride out the 
OECD and FATF campaigns, rather than suffer the direct and indirect costs reform demanded. 
However, the emerging glare of the economic damage caused by blacklisting compelled the 
Government to comply as it revealed that compliance was indeed the cheaper option.
351 In the case 
of Nigeria, being an economy heavily reliant on International trade and with reputation sacrosanct 
to the sustainability of the country‘s economy, the blacklist forced it to act pre-emptively to avoid 
the damage that comes with a tainted reputation. This eventually led to Nigeria being de-listed and 
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subsequently declared fully compliant and safe to international business dealings. The FATF‘s 
desire to cooperate more closely with International Financial Institutions (IFIs) paved the way for 
the IMF to successfully persuade the FATF to abandon the blacklisting method of coercion. The 
IFIs strongly opposed the NCCT practice and the IMF viewed it as being against the nature of the 
fund.
352
 There was thus a clash of philosophies between confrontation and coercion on the one side, 
and consensus and voluntarism on the other.
353
 In November 2002, the FATF and the IMF reached 
an agreement whereby the FATF agreed not to undertake another round of NCCT initiative for at 
least another 12 months. The International Financial Institutions effectively made the end of the 
blacklist technique a precondition for their engagement and the FATF obliged.  The blacklist was 
abandoned altogether in the year 2006. A range of other reasons have been advanced as to why the 
FATF gave the blacklisting stance up. There are arguments that it was an effect of a policy shift in 
the United States of America.
354
 Another explanation holds that the suspension was necessitated by 
administrative reasons because the FATF secretariat given its small size and budget was unable to 
cope with additional workload that came with the NCCT practice.
355
 There is also the perception 
that the blacklist was called off because it had achieved its goal since all the countries on the list 
had implemented AML Regulations, theoretically at least. This particular argument has however 
been derided as weak because the suspension of the NCCT list truncated an ongoing and unfinished 
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process.
356
 At the time, the FATF had only assessed a total of 47 countries, and the perception is 
that it was quite certain that some others would potentially have shown up on the blacklist.
357
  
5.3 The Application of the International AML Standards within Nigeria‘s Socio-Political and Legal 
Frame-work. 
The process of implementing normative AML/CFT regimes is dictated by varying dynamics of 
development in the majority of less developed economies who face a range of problems in 
adopting global international Anti-Money laundering regulations. On this score, the ministerial 
conclusions of the Conference on Countering the Financing of Terrorism held in Hague in March 
2006 noted that all countries faced certain challenges in fully implementing the FATF 40+9 
Recommendations. The capacity and resource constraint of low-income countries makes the 
simultaneous implementation of all necessary measures difficult. The UN Human Development 
Index (1996) defines less developed economies as those where each citizen survives on $1 or less 
a day on average. They are the countries which face the challenge of absolute systemic failure and 
deficiency in the necessary level of infrastructural development.
358
 Nigeria by its very nature 
comfortably falls within the ambits of such a description, and such jurisdictions require education, 
judicial reforms and the creation of robust anti-money laundering institutions as a prerequisite for 
the transposition of desired market changes.
359
 Such factors will ease the ability of states to 
assimilate global AML/CFT standards into domestic society. This is because without them, it will 
be unrealistic for states subject to different dynamics of development to adopt the same regulatory 
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framework at the same time in the interest of the market and not of the individual state concerned. 
As a result, the deficiency on the part of some states requisite incapacity to implement such a 
framework effectively therefore makes it less likely for them to be expected to harness normative 
anti-money laundering regimes.
360
 Notwithstanding these complexities, Nigeria was found worthy 
of being fully compliant with global AML laws and as discussed in earlier parts of this work, 
struck off the blacklist it found itself previously. However, compliance on paper and compliance 
in practical terms constitutes two distinct things. Is the Nigerian compliance merely an academic 
exercise or a truly realistic one? How suited to the Nigerian societal norms these 
recommendations were/are remains to be seen. A societies norm are ―the language a society 
speaks, the embodiment of its values and collective desires, the secure guide in the uncertain 
lands we all traverse, the common practices that hold human groups together.‘‘361 In this sense, 
social norms act like roadside guardrails on life‘s highway, guiding human behaviour through 
various circumstances.
362 Whether the FATF recommendations bore cognisance of these factors 
is a matter that goes beyond conjecture. 
While in a strict legal parlance, the compliance can be deemed sufficient, the same may not be said 
within a socio-political context? Reasons abound as to why compliance on paper may not 
necessarily translate to an effective practical compliance. From a strict perspective of less 
developed states without necessarily being exclusively a Nigerian problem(s), the efforts towards 
harnessing indigenous laws with global AML laws are laden with challenges. Many Nation states 
or jurisdictions in developing countries are deficient in terms of infrastructural development, hence 
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slow in transposing the envisaged global AML standards into domestic law. Simple as they may 
seem, these infrastructural problems affect the effective administration of basic procedures set out 
by the FATF regarding requirements such as book and records of transaction for prudential 
keeping, supervision, statistics and tax records. Many developing countries also face the problem 
of a lack or want of a limited database which tends to inhibit the ability of local AML institutions 
or agencies in internalizing the experiences of money laundering and its attendant predicate threats. 
Similarly, small states are always reluctant to prosecute money laundering offences for fear that the 
negative publicity generated by such prosecutions could jeopardize the economy in terms of the 
flow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).
363
 A perfect example of this particular hindrance was 
played out in Zambia when the Government of then President Frederick Chiluba threatened to 
imprison journalists who reported the prevalence of the HIV/AIDS scourge in the country. 
Although this example does not particularly resonate with the theme of this work, it highlights the 
fears developing countries hold as regards a negative reputation which they feel will scare the 
limited foreign investors who may be ready to look their way away. As such some states choose to 
operate in secrecy by disguising the definition of certain crimes or in the case of Uganda, operate 
on the fringes of the envisaged global AML framework by delaying the creation of any distinct 
AML legislation.
364
Another major challenge to the global harmonisation of Anti-Money laundering 
regulations within the less developed economies is the fragmented global economy which is 
fraught with inequalities. This means the regulation of financial markets should in essence, reflect 
the diversity and complexity of the world.
365
 A model to follow will be the doctrine of mutual 
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recognition as enunciated by the Cassis de Dijon case
366
 used in commercial sphere to overcome 
the hindrance of international movement of natural and juristic persons, goods and services that 
may be posed by the co-existence of multiple jurisdictions. The case involved a French liqueur that 
had an alcohol level above that prescribed by the German alcohol control specifications. In what 
was later to be known as the Cassis de Dijon principle, the court upheld the principle of mutual 
recognition by denying admissibility of such a limitation which then meant that a product 
manufactured according to regulations and permitted in one EU member state must be permitted in 
other EU member states.
367
 Mutual recognition is thus utilised in commercial circles to circumvent 
the problems of international movement of natural and juristic persons, goods and services inherent 
in different EU member countries.
368
 With the globalisation of markets yet to constitute itself as a 
viable global system with a set of rules, and further compounded by multiple rules engendered by 
different regulatory regimes, the global system is rendered complex as far as transposing the 
engendered norms into substantive national laws are concerned hence the mutual recognition 
principle. This mutual recognition principle is hinged on the realization that the integration of 
financial markets in Europe did not necessarily mean a ‗one-size-fits-all‘ approach, but unity in 
diversity and proposes the recognition by supervisory authorities of systems operated by other 
member states subject to the fulfilment of certain basic conditions, rather than the an emphasis on 
the convergence of the system.
369
 The importance of inter-state cooperation cannot be over-
emphasised, as it is necessary to avoid the adverse effects of the ‗prisoner‘s dilemma‘ in which 
each participant is unsure of whether others will cooperate or engage in behaviour detrimental to 
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the stability of the global economy.  The lack of a common framework encourages both regulatory 
arbitrage and failure. A regulatory arbitrage indicates a phenomenon whereby regulated entities 
migrate to jurisdictions imposing lower regulatory burdens thereby exerting a downward pressure 
on those jurisdictions that want to retain the regulated activity within their borders.
370
 Just like 
regulatory failures, it is a common feature of an uncoordinated international system.  
Talking exclusively from a Nigerian standpoint however, the issues go beyond these factors. 
Money laundering being the derivative crime it is usually gets triggered by the commission of other 
crimes ranging from heists, drug dealings and the likes. In Nigeria however, and purposely for this 
work, corruption is treated as the primary predicate offence for the crime of money laundering, and 
as such, the main factor militating against a proper reception, implementation and application of 
global Anti-Money Laundering (AML) standards. 
5.3.1 Corruption:  
Nigeria is consistently rated as one of the most corrupt nations in the world, and money laundering 
is accurately regarded as a veritable companion of the corruption virus which has permeated every 
segment of the Nigerian society.
371
 Money laundering and corruption are endemic problems in 
Nigeria and the two go hand in hand.
372
 From a less specific standpoint, it must be stated that any 
attempt to analyze the concept of corruption must contend with the fact that in English and other 
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languages the word ‗corruption‘ has a history of vastly different meanings and connotations.373 
Corrupt practices, for example, can be systemic, pervasive, and routine or they can be petty, 
sporadic, trivial and rare. As such, questions have been asked as to how to theorize a phenomenon 
so diffuse?
374
 Corruption inhibits the proper implementation of global AML regulations within the 
Nigerian society; therefore, if the country is to be successful in tackling money laundering, it is 
imperative that it simultaneously tackles corruption. Legislation to combat money laundering in 
Nigeria as discussed previously in this work, are for a few flaws, well grounded. However, the 
foremost obstacle to success lies within the realm of enforcement.
375
 Corruption is both a precursor 
and facilitator to money laundering whilst frustrating efforts to combat it. Those individuals and 
officials who have been charged with the responsibility of providing good governance and policing 
the system are unfortunately the very individuals abusing the system and exploiting it.
376
At this 
juncture, it is important to identify the evolution of corruption into the Nigerian society, analyzing 
the form it takes and identifying the reasons for its entrenchment within the fabric of the Nigerian 
society.  
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5.3.2: Corruption within the Nigerian Body Polity (A Cultural Problem) 
Corruption is neither culture specific nor system bound and to state that corruption abounds in 
Nigeria is only restating the obvious.
377
 However, while corruption is prevalent in some degree in 
all societies, some societies are clearly more vulnerable to abusive political and economic 
opportunism than others. There is a historical perspective to this within the wider context of 
African states dating back to the colonial era with the seeming un-readiness of most African 
countries for independence culminating in post-independence opportunism. Post-independence 
social, political, and economic (mal) formations are identified to be a direct consequence of the 
state-building and economic integration processes begun under colonial rule.
378
 This argument 
suggests that the colonies were built on economically faulty foundations. African leaders held the 
suspicious belief that the sole aim of colonialism was to extort resources from the colonies in order 
to profit the metropolitan economies hence institutions that improved the colonizers ability to 
exploit Africans and their resources were legitimized.
379
 As a result, a vast majority of African 
constitutions were based on European models and were not quite sufficiently adjusted to reflect 
African realities to meet the needs of the people. Nevertheless, eager to gain independence, 
Africans were willing to forego effective constitutional discourse in an effort to accelerate the 
process and pace of decolonization. It has been argued that the constitutions most African countries 
adopted at independence were only products of political exigency.
380
 The struggle for 
independence may therefore be seen as an effort by Africans to overthrow and rid their societies of 
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the exploitative and oppressive colonial system; to establish more accountable, transparent, and 
participatory governance structures; and to provide economic infrastructures that maximize the 
participation of the indigenous people in national development. It may also have been a way to 
develop within each country, governance structures to allow for peaceful coexistence of all ethnic 
cleavages; ameliorate living conditions among the deprived and marginalized groups and 
communities.
381
 At independence, many indigenous leaders argued that the institutions which their 
countries had inherited from Europeans were ill-suited for their new countries and as such 
subsequently adopted political and economic systems which they believed will allow the state to 
more effectively deal with the issues of poverty and deprivation.  
The model of development intended to move the continent to greater heights following 
independence was Statism, a development model that emphasized government control of resource 
allocation, minimized the functions of the market, and granted the state significant power to 
intervene in private exchange. Government was also to own and control productive resources.
382
 
Such a development model was expected to (1) enhance the ability of the state to create the wealth 
that it needed to deal effectively mass poverty and deprivation; (2) provide the state with the tools 
to promote economic growth and development; (3) provide the state with the discretion it needed to 
advance critical societal goals; (4) assist the government in its efforts to eliminate economic 
dependence; and (5) significantly improve the governments legacy of discrimination and 
marginalization of certain groups.
383
 However, this framework of development failed to improve 
standards of living for a greater number of the population or foster and boost the economy. Statism, 
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rather than enhance development and alleviate poverty in many African countries, actually 
exacerbated many of the problems that plagued the continent since colonialism.
384 And as the years 
have shown, very few African countries have succeeded in significantly improving national 
standards of living. Instead, many countries are today pervaded by high levels of poverty and 
material deprivation, bureaucratic corruption, nepotism and political violence with few individuals 
enriching themselves and perpetrating themselves in power.
385
 These state custodians occupied 
themselves primarily with private capital accumulation, subverting the national will, suffocating 
civil society, and generally impoverishing the people. Thus, what statism achieved in Africa was to 
enhance the ability of politicians and civil servants to turn governance structures into instruments 
of plunder and enrich themselves at the expense of society.
386
 This is typical of contemporary 
Nigeria, and provides the linkage between corruption and the thematic underpinning of this 
particular research. Corruption in Nigeria does not end with public office holders diverting public 
funds to personal use. They utilize corrupt means in the laundering of such funds. It is therefore 
important to analyze the whole concept of corruption on a wider range, and then more specifically 
within the socio-cultural precincts of the Nigerian society. 
5.4 Corruption Typologies  
Political scientists have sought to understand the concept of corruption by suggesting typologies 
which indicate linkages between the incidences of corruption and other specific stages of political, 
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economic and social development.
387
 Here, a categorization of corruption into three frameworks of 
incidental corruption, systematic corruption, and systemic corruption suffice for a proper 
understanding of the workings of every stage of the process. Under incidental corruption, the 
particeps criminis are petty/ interested officials and opportunistic individuals who engage in small 
size embezzlement, misappropriation, bribes, favoritism and discrimination. Corruption here is the 
exception rather than the rule, and the high level private sector actors seldom bother with such 
theft.
388
 Systematic corruption on the other hand, whilst not necessarily institutionalized or 
pervasive, is recurrent. Here, the transgressors are public officials, politicians, representatives of 
donor and recipient countries, bureaucratic elites, business men and middle men who engage in 
bribery and kickbacks, collusion to defraud the public, large scale embezzlement and 
misappropriation of through public tender and disposal of public property, economic privileges 
accorded to special interests, large political donations and bribes. Usually involving high gains 
which are often subject to popular scandals, it originates from high level civil servants that 
recognize and exploit illegal ventures and opportunities in Government department and agencies 
whilst being entrenched within the system. This practice is a direct violation of the rule of law.
389
 
Systemic corruption on its part is pervasive, institutionalized and built into the economic and 
political institutions. This institutionalization does not necessarily connote acceptance or approval, 
but nevertheless signifies an occurrence and flourish in situations where public sector wages fall 
below a living wage. In contrast to systematic corruption, it involves all levels of employment. The 
transgressors here consist of bureaucratic elites, politicians, business men and white collar workers 
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whose modes of operation include large scale embezzlement through ‗‘ghost workers‘‘ on 
Government payroll, embezzling Government funds through false procurement and payment of 
non-existent goods, large scale disbursement of public property to special and privileged interest 
under the pretext of ‗national interest‘, favoritism and discrimination exercised in favor of ruling 
parties in exchange for political contributions. Ultimately, corruption if left unchecked, eventually 
results in a softness of state, comprising all manner of social indiscipline that prevents effective 
government and impedes national development.
390
 Nigeria highlights a perfect example, as 
corruption is deep seated, institutionalized, and chiefly militate against proper implementation of 
the well thought out AML laws in place. This is due amongst other factors, to the lack of 
transparency, probity, justice and fair play within the system. A natural consequence of such 
deficiencies is a prevalent decay in societal strata occasioning things such as a lack of social 
security for citizens and inaccessibility to facilities that are needed to guarantee a decent livelihood. 
The relevance of these factors to money laundering activities is that dissipating illicit funds goes 
through a chain of processes dependent on the launderers preferred method. To smuggle a stash of 
cash out of the country for instance, will mean going through airport security manned by agents 
who are a product of incidental corruption, affected by the ills brought upon the society by 
systematic corruption, and living with the consequences of systemic corruption. The same is true 
for a bank staff that may be approached with bribes to turn a blind eye on accounts which should 
raise red flags due to the nature of activities on the accounts. There is agreement within researchers 
that individuals subjected to such conditions are quite vulnerable to corruption and are likely to 
actively engage in corrupt practices in order to secure the resources they need to meet their basic 
needs.
391 Far too often, even the most ethical public servants in Nigeria readily mortgage their 
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consciences and succumb to the pull to do whatever it takes to avoid the almost certain life of 
misery.
392
 These instances are reactionary examples of the possible role corruption plays in money 
laundering activity. However, corruption plays a more deep seated role than being a mere 
reactionary vice. Without illicit funds, there would be no need for cleaning or obliterating the trail 
of funds, and in the context of this work, official Government corruption has been identified as the 
primary source of illicit funds. The task now is to determine why Nigerian public officials divert 
public funds into personal use.  
Prevailing cultures and settings make African leaders more corrupt than their counterparts in 
mature democracies. This is traced to the cultural norms in many African societies where the rights 
of individuals are usually subordinated to those of the ethnic group or extended family.
393
 Family 
and loyalty to it are considered more important than individual rights or personal accountability.
394
 
The African civil servant thus may become engaged in corrupt activities to generate the additional 
resources he needs to meet his obligations to members of his immediate and extended family. In 
Nigeria, loyalty to one‘s ethnic group is celebrated and is often far more important than legal rules 
in shaping behaviors.
395
 The obligation to an ethnic group often overrides obligations of public 
office and this causes civil servants to deviate from established rules proscribing corruption.  This 
cultural pull means that everyone has obligations towards his community, and the higher one 
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ascends the social ladder, the more one is expected of him from his people. A highly placed 
Government official or politician is constantly under pressure from his people for gifts of money, 
for jobs, and for securing the provision of amenities for his area.
396
 The culture condones 
corruption so much so, it encourages it. No Nigerian official would be irreparably ashamed, let 
alone condemned by his people because he or she is accused of corruption or corrupt practices. The 
same applies to outright stealing of government or public money or property, and any government 
official or politician who in a position to enrich himself corruptly but fails to do so may, in fact, be 
ostracized by his people upon leaving office. He would be regarded as a fool, or selfish, or 
both.‘‘397  
5.4.1 The Theory of Two Publics 
Over time, various theories have been developed that has helped in understanding the 
predicament of corruption in Africa and more importantly, the issue of endemic corruption. The 
theory of two publics argues that one of the most striking impacts of colonialism was the 
emergence of two public realms, the primordial and civic public realms which related differently 
with the private realm in terms of morality.
398
 This ‗acme of dialectics‘ suggests that most 
educated Africans are citizens of two publics in the same society. On the one hand, they belong to 
a civic public from which they gain materially but to which they give only grudgingly, whilst on 
the other hand they belong to a primordial public from which they derive little or no material 
benefits but to which they are expected to give generously and do give materially. To make 
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matters more complicated, their relationship to the primordial public is moral, while that to the 
civic public is amoral.
399
 This amoral conception of the duties of the government means 
‗everybody expects the government to provide modern social amenities (but few) expect the 
Government to provide sound moral leadership.
400
 Two forms of corruption are associated with 
the dialectics. The first is what is regarded as embezzlement of funds from the civic public, (from 
the Government, to be more specific), while the second is the solicitation and acceptance of 
bribes from individuals seeking services provided by the civic public by those who administer 
these services. Both carry little moral sanction and may well receive great moral approbation 
from members of one's primordial public.
401
 The result is that as the same actors operate in two 
realms, the state apparatus is employed to fatten the nest of the primordial public, thereby making 
corruption, nepotism and ethnicity a hallmark of the civic public.
402
 Cheating the public is thus 
considered a patriotic duty.
403
 On the other hand however, these forms of corruption are 
completely absent in the primordial public. Strange is the Nigerian who demands bribes from 
individuals or who engages in embezzlement in the performance of his duties to his primordial 
public. On the other hand, he may risk serious sanctions from members of his own primordial 
public if he seeks to extend the honesty and integrity with which he performs his duties in the 
primordial public to his duties in the civic public by employing universalistic criteria of 
impartiality. This somewhat describes the Nigerian society and this is further elucidated upon by 
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Wraith
404
who contrasts the integrity with which Nigerians handled matters of primordial ethnic 
character with 'the dragging footsteps and exiguous achievements of the local [government] 
authorities'. Wraith notes that, while the local government authorities, with their civic structure, 
have 'a sad record of muddle, corruption and strife', the 'ethnic unions are handling sums of 
money comparable to those of many local authorities; that they are spending it constructively, and 
that they are handling it honestly'. What this means in essence is that ‗‗to put your fingers in the 
till of the local authority will not unduly burden your conscience, and people may well think you 
are a smart fellow and envy you your opportunities, but to steal the funds of the union would 
offend the public conscience and ostracize you from society.‘‘405 The ‗two public‘ thesis despite 
both providing a sound frame work for understanding the impact of colonialism in Africa and the 
endemic corruption permeating the fabric of the African continent, has its shortcomings. The 
robbery in the civic public was not, neither is it currently employed to strengthen the primordial 
public but rather to further pauperize it.
406
 The primordial sentiment could in fact be viewed as 
nothing but an instrument of political deception by the privileged political elite for personal 
aggrandizement and less for group benefits.
407
 This argument is further backed up by the fact that 
most of the stolen wealth has been siphoned abroad by the political class to developed countries, 
and even if some of it were to trickle down to the primordial public, such will be of little 
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significance to strengthen the public especially talking from a social, political or economic 
developmental perspective.
408
  
5.4.2 Prebendalism 
According to the theory of prebendalism popularized by Richard Joseph,
409
 state offices are 
regarded as prebends that can be appropriated by officeholders, who use them to generate material 
benefits for themselves and their constituents and kin groups.‖410 Prebendalisation reflects the 
shared expectations about the appropriation of state offices and the use of revenues accruing to 
them. In specifically adapting it to the concept of Nigerian politics, Joseph linked corruption to the 
fall of the Nigerian second republic and uses the term prebendal to refer to political behavior which 
reflect as their justifying principle that the offices of the existing state may be competed for and 
then utilized for the benefit of office-holders and that of their reference or support group. To a 
significant extent, the ‗state‘ in such a context is perceived as a congeries of offices susceptible to 
individual cum communal appropriation. The statutory purposes of such offices become a matter of 
secondary concern, however much that purpose might have been codified in law or other 
regulations or even periodically cited during competitions to fill them.
411
 Prebendal relations are 
usually characterized by widespread appropriation of nominally 'public' resources for personal or 
parochial gain; allocations patterned by ethnically-delineated patron-client networks; and a 
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distributive arena that is largely decentralized and in which clientelist relations are diffuse.
412
This 
theory of prebendalism has related terms of patrimonialism and predation (sultanism). 
Patrimonialism means that the distinctions between the public and private domains have become 
blurred and power, which has become a major source of wealth, has become personalized.
413
 In 
patrimonial political systems, an individual rules by dint of personal prestige and power; ordinary 
folk are treated as extensions of the 'big man's' household, with no rights or privileges other than 
those bestowed by the ruler. Authority is entirely personalized, shaped by the ruler's preferences 
rather than any codified system of laws. The ruler ensures the political stability of the regime and 
personal political survival by providing a zone of security in an uncertain environment and by 
selectively distributing favors and material benefits to loyal followers who are not citizens of the 
polity so much as the ruler's clients.
414
 The Nigerian state has very glaring traits of patrimonialism 
and neopatrimonialism (a related term to prebendalism and a new form of patrimonialism). It is 
used to describe and explain state failures in Africa describing patrons using state resources in 
order to secure the loyalty of clients in the general population. It is indicative of informal patron-
client relationships that can reach from the very high up in the state structures down to individuals 
in the lower levels.
415
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Predation
416
 on the other hand is a special form of political and economic domination where state 
economic tutelage moves from a pattern of diffuse clientelism
417
under comparatively stable 
(though weak) institutional auspices, to more arbitrary and debilitating control by a single ruler.
418
 
Peter Lewis coined the term ‗predation‘ as he sought to eschew the word ‗sultanism‘ used 
previously by Max Weber to characterize the personalized and predatory form of patrimonial rule 
because within a Nigerian context, this raises the particular connotation of Northern sultans or 
emirs.
419
 Predatory rule in the sense used by Lewis denotes a personalist regime ruling through 
coercion and material inducement. This type of regime tends to degrade the institutional 
foundations of the state, as well as the economy. Since predatory rule as an analytic category is 
not associated with any particular region, ethnic group or religion, Weber‘s original usage will be 
misleading.
420
 Lewis‘ term was thus used to describe the leadership of Nigeria post-second 
republic and specifically the military regime of General Ibrahim Babangida which highlighted the 
shift from prebendalism, or decentralized patrimonial rule towards predation, the consolidation of 
avaricious dictatorship.  This predatory order had three essential features: (1) concentration of 
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power under coercive auspices; (2) the augmenting of repression by material inducement, 
requiring close discretion over public resources and (3) an enormous diversion of public resources 
for discretionary use by an elite stratum of loyalist officers, civilian cronies, and acquiescent 
politicians."
421
 Post-second republic Nigeria depicted a regime of a predatory control of state and 
this reflected developments in other peripheral capitalist nations but suffice it is to ask at this 
juncture if predatory rule is in itself a distinctive political system, and in the case of Nigeria, if its 
consolidation in Nigeria had ended the salience of prebendalism. The contention is that predation 
has always been a feature of Nigerian prebendalism, and this is despite a succession of 
Governments even under democratic dispensations that had the opportunity of moving Nigeria 
towards a modern political system in which states would gradually cease to be prebends exploited 
to generate material resources for office holders, their sectional clients, and their cronies. Rather, 
the Nigerian Federal system operates almost exclusively as a mechanism for intergovernmental 
distribution and ethno-political appropriation of centrally collected oil revenues. Predation in 
Nigeria is undiminished, but prebendal mechanisms keep the system going because there is 
always a queue of political aspirants for whom the path to personal wealth goes through the 
temporary control of state resources. There is also the politicization of primordial rivalries which 
gives the political class a safe sanctuary to embezzle and squander state resources. Thus, the 
problem of corruption has an inextricable link with the problem of identity and the problem of 
citizenship in Nigeria. This deep rooted psycho-political perception of Nigeria by the average 
Nigerian is deep rooted in history and was clearly outlined by two of Nigeria‘s pre-independence 
founding fathers. Speaking in 1947, Chief Obafemi Awolowo stated that ‗‗Nigeria is not a nation. 
It is a mere geographical expression. There are no Nigerians as there are English, Welsh or 
French. The word Nigeria is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within 
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the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not.‘‘422 Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa on his part 
speaking in similar lines said ‗‗since 1914, the British Government has been trying to make 
Nigeria into one country, but the Nigerian people themselves are historically different in their 
backgrounds, in their religious beliefs and customs and do not show themselves any signs of 
willingness to unite. Nigerian unity is only a British intention for the country.‘‘423 These lines of 
thought points towards an absence of a genuine nationalistic sentiment and may have contributed 
largely to the idea of the Federal Character principle enshrined in the Nigerian constitution where 
it is explicitly stated that ‗‗the composition of the Government of the Federation or any of its 
agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the 
federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote unity, and also to command National 
loyalty, thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or 
from a few ethnic or sectional groups in that Government or in any of its agencies.‘‘424 There is a 
similar provision as regards each state of the Federation.
425
 It seeks to ensure the appointment to 
public service institutions fairly reflect the linguistic, ethnic, religious and geographical diversity 
of the country. As well intended as it may be, its application in the Federal Civil Service usually 
amounts to a confused balancing of the merit principle which in turn has an adverse consequence 
on such institutions in terms of discipline, morale and overall effectiveness as well as efficiency. 
The Federal Character provisions are both a confirmation of the pessimism of the aforementioned 
Nigerian founding fathers and a reaction towards fixing those fears. It is a principle that aims to 
engender a sense of belonging and national integration within citizens from all parts of the 
country. The good intentions of the federal character principle notwithstanding, issues of the 
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cultural, ethnic and religious dichotomy of the Nigerian nation remain apparent within its 
workings and it is this insistence on equal representation and individual rights that further rocks 
the boat of national integration.
426
 To those from the Northern parts of the country federal 
character is synonymous with quota system and means therefore a proportional absorption into 
federal institutions, while to those from the southern parts of the country, it means an attempt by 
the ―North‖ to infiltrate into areas which they hitherto regarded as ―theirs‖ by right.427 The crux of 
the matter is that the principle was not genuinely invoked in the first place, and there are 
arguments that it was designed to differentiate rather than integrate because it was an ideology of 
the minority ruling class aimed at protecting their interest.
428
 Whilst emphasizing the need for 
ethnic balancing, the Federal Character principle invariably enthrones ethnicity and deemphasizes 
the nation.
429
 As a consequence, in Nigeria today, the success of an ethnic group or a politician is 
synonymous with the level of access of such group to state resources, therefore to steal from the 
commonwealth becomes an acceptable norm.
430
 This ethnic and religious card has been used by 
the elites to exploit the Nigerian public to damaging extents, and when various acts of corruption 
are under probe, it is common place in Nigeria to hear agitations from a group against a perceived 
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vendetta against one of their own and vice-versa. To them, the Federal Character Principle opens 
up the treasury for equal looting without repercussions. 
Contextually, ‗‗in Nigeria there is no accountability at all, and that is why Nigerian corruption is 
worse than corruption in many parts of the world, because it is the worst type of corruption, it is 
stealing.‘‘431 With Nigeria being consistently rated as one of the most corrupt nations in the 
world, and money laundering accurately regarded as its veritable companion, the two are endemic 
problems in Nigeria and go hand in hand.
432
  How transparent is the Government of Nigeria‘s 
fight against the ills of corruption, and by implication, Money Laundering? This question is 
fundamental, as it is somewhat rhetorical. To tackle money laundering, it is imperative to 
simultaneously tackle corruption. The suspension and subsequent sack of the immediate past 
Governor of Nigeria‘s apex bank the Central Bank of Nigeria provides a peek into the intrigues 
associated with fighting corruption in Nigeria. Appointed in 2009 in the midst of a debt crisis, the 
Governor is credited with cleaning up a banking industry near collapse, kept interest rates at a 
record in the face of calls from businesses for lower borrowing costs, and brought inflation down 
below 10%. The Governor was sacked by the Nigerian Government of the day for ‗financial 
recklessness and misconduct,‘ and although well within the rights of the Nigerian President to 
carry out such a suspension, preceding events somewhat depicts a more sinister plot than the 
official reason given. The Governor‘s problems started with a letter he wrote to the President 
asking for a probe into the finances of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation. This was not 
taken lightly by the President who was reportedly very angry and even asked the Governor to 
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resign over the letter.
433
 The Governor contended that as the Federal Government‘s Chief 
Economic Adviser, mandatorily required to bring issues of critical economic importance to the 
attention of the president, he had done a patriotic duty to his country. The Governor alleged that 
Nigeria lost about a Billion Dollars a month on a consistent basis under the immediate past 
Nigerian Government. The NNPC on its part vehemently denied the allegations and went further 
to accuse the CBN governor of not only playing politics but also of being ignorant of the 
operations of the oil and gas sector. Subsequent deliberations between the members of the 
Nigerian economic team revealed that it was not $49.8 billion that had not been repatriated to the 
Federation Account but $10.8 billion. Notwithstanding the disparity between the sums, $10.8 
billion is still a huge sum by any stretch of the imagination and a proper investigation into the 
Governor‘s claims should have sufficed. However, there was no known official investigation by 
the Government, just an outright outrage against the Governor and this fueled speculations in 
large parts that the Government were either complicit in the scandal or shielded political allies 
who were fingered out in the allegations. The Governor subsequently made a submission to the 
Nigerian senate, a report detailing the failure of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
(NNPC) to transfer US$20BN to the Nigerian Government. It is pertinent to note that most of 
Nigeria‘s roughly $30BN annual budget comes from oil revenue that filters through the somewhat 
opaque NNPC and anyone who challenges the oil sector is striking at the heart of vested interests 
that control the Nigerian state and should be ready to face the consequences. It may seem that the 
Governor did face these consequences, and his suspension/sack drew a lot of criticisms to the 
Nigerian Government and depicted an insolent attitude towards the fight against Money 
Laundering and allied offences. It also betrayed a seeming complicity of the Government with the 
impunity of corruption. It was described as ‗‗a disruptive move, which indicated that the Central 
                                           
433
 See ‗Nigeria bank chief Sanusi told to resign by Goodluck Jonathan‘ 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-25670614> Accessed January 23, 2015 
 
163 
 
 
 
Bank of Nigeria had de facto lost much of its independence, as well as being driven by political 
motives given the governor‘s vocal criticism of oil revenue leakages and the opaque fiscal system 
in Nigeria.‘‘434 The sack came with its attendant costs because the Governor was held in high 
esteem by foreign investors who admired his solid track record fighting corruption and 
safeguarding financial stability, and were as a result, understandably unnerved by the dismissal. It 
led to increased market volatility within the country with the Naira while trading in the domestic 
bond market was halted and the benchmark stock index fell to its lowest level in three months. At 
this point in time too, the spill-over effects of the tapering of the United States Federal Reserve 
were already an issue to contend with, and as such the CBN faced additional pressure on its 
currency. It halted bond trading and sent the Naira to a record low. The Naira weakened as much 
as 3 to 168.90 per dollar.
435
 Nigeria‘s benchmark equities gauge slid 1.5 percent and yields on the 
nation‘s Eurobonds due July 2023 jumped 11 basis points to 6.32 percent, the highest since 
September 11.
436
 The Government through its Finance minister did assure Nigerians that the 
effects will be short-lived, but the main problem here was the failure on the part of the Nigerian 
Government to realize that a Central Bank not subordinated to political demands is a key tool in 
establishing strong economic fundamentals. An independent central bank can help fight inflation 
effectively, ensure predictability, anchor investors‘ expectations, and, in bad times, resist printing 
money to fund the budget. Moreover, if Nigeria is to play a leading role in fostering regional 
economic integration, it has to continue leading the way in building an effective monetary 
institution.
437
 The official Government line regarding the sack was financial recklessness but at 
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the end of it all, neither was the Governor prosecuted for this allegation nor his claim against the 
NNPC officially investigated. By providence however, Nigeria found itself in ‗new hands‘ in no 
time with the ascension to power of a new President who was elected into office at the expense of 
the incumbent riding on the wave of a tough anti-corruption stance. And true to those beliefs, and 
in a move that may ultimately vindicate the erstwhile Governor of the Central bank, the new 
Nigerian President in liaison with the British metropolitan police got the former Minister for 
petroleum Mrs. Diezani Alison Madueke arrested in London in October 2015 on charges of 
corruption, money laundering and embezzlement of funds.
438
 
Another clear pointer as to the level of unchecked corruption that goes on in Nigeria is the ongoing 
case of the National Security Adviser to the immediate past Nigerian Government who is alleged to 
have diverted $2BN meant to purchase arms for the military to aid the fight against insurgency.
439
 
The money has been traced to several top officials of that Government and the then ruling party‘s 
chieftains most of whom have been charged to court by the Economic and Financial crimes 
Commission. This was revealed after the new Nigerian administration set up a committee auditing 
the procurement of arms and equipment from 2007-date. The committee noted that contracts 
awarded at huge sums of money were actually failed contracts and that there were payments worth 
millions of Nigerian Naira made to companies by the former National Security Adviser without 
documentary evidence of contractual agreements or fulfilment of tax obligations to the Federal 
Government of Nigeria. Further findings revealed that between March 2012 and March 2015, the 
erstwhile National Security Adviser awarded fictitious and phantom contracts and allegedly 
directed the Central Bank of Nigeria to transfer huge sums of money to various bank accounts in 
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West Africa, United Kingdom and United States of America without any form of documentation. 
Further investigations also allege amongst others, that a former chairman of the ruling party under 
the past administration received 300 Million Naira from the National Security Adviser‘s account at 
the Central Bank through BAM‘s account at Sterling bank. Also, 2.1 BN Naira was allegedly paid 
into the account of DAAR Investment and holding company for the funding of media activities, a 
further 1.45 BN Naira to Acacia Holdings Ltd and 750 Million Naira to Reliance Hospital Ltd. The 
erstwhile NSA also admitted to handing 10 BN Naira to the delegates of the former ruling party 
and varying other sums to different other individuals for varying reasons.  According to a report by 
American news channel, PBS News Hour, $47M was taken out in cash from the Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN) in one night.
440
 According to the report, a Nigerian official says the money left the 
Central Bank in cash at night in armored vans. Charges have since been filed by EFCC (the 
Nigerian Anti-Graft agency) over these aforementioned cases. However, considering Nigeria‘s 
internationally accepted Anti-Money laundering regulations, it is difficult to understand how these 
transactions were made without detection. This juxtaposes the question if Nigeria was indeed 
worthy of the all-clear the FATF gave it in the year 2013?  
While arguments may be advanced that the country satisfied the requirements asked of it, it could 
also be argued that the practicalities of the everyday Nigerian society were not properly 
contextually examined before the conclusion was made. The uniqueness of Money laundering is its 
derivative pull from other crimes or to some other transgression. Without the commission of a 
predicate offence (and in the case of Nigeria, corruption) there will be no funds to launder. Nigeria 
having not rid itself of that practice should never have been viewed as capable of putting a stop to 
the crime of money laundering. Corruption has been embedded in the Nigerian state and has 
always been. The current investigations are a direct result of the hitherto opposition party defeating 
the incumbent party at the 2015 General elections because all the alleged offences were committed 
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directly under the supervision of the former Government who definitely were not going to turn 
around to prosecute itself had they emerged victorious in the elections. The moneys would have 
dissolved into their personal bank accounts and subsequently moved abroad through various 
means. While it has also been argued that the laws governing money laundering regulation in 
Nigeria are generally satisfactory, the core problems subsist within the area of implementation and 
enforcement in Nigeria, as well as the political will and the inability of foreign nation‘s financial 
institutions to detect the laundering of these funds within their jurisdiction.
441
 As has been stated 
earlier, corruption is the main predicate offence in Nigeria as far as money laundering is concerned, 
and as such, how the country has dealt with the scourge is directly linked to the success or 
otherwise of its Anti-Money laundering policies. The societies that have been able to move ahead 
are those that put the statutes in place to criminalize corruption and ensure that the enforcement 
mechanisms are proper and ready for action.
442
 Unfortunately, Nigeria‘s enforcement mechanism 
has grossly failed to propel it to this level. This is not to adjudge that any one country has 
completely eradicated corruption, rather some have taken concrete action and obvious steps to 
ensure that the effects of corruption have become increasingly limited.
443
  
Beyond this however, the Anti-Money laundering regulations in place in Nigeria may not have 
taken cognizance of contemporary Nigerian issues. Nigeria operates cash based economy- ‗‗an 
economy in which more than 50 percent of the economic transactions in all sectors are conducted 
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in cash, and in which the majority of the population are un-bankable.‘‘444 Juxtaposing this with 
the provisions of the Nigerian Money Laundering Act, and specifically as it relates to the concept 
of limits to financial transactions reveals an almost unrealistic scenario. The Act states that ‗‘No 
person or body corporate shall, except in a transaction through a financial institution, make or 
accept cash payment of a sum exceeding N5,000,000.00 or its equivalent, in the case of an 
individual; or N10,000,000.00 or its equivalent in the case of a body corporate.
445
 Despite being a 
very important provision due to the fact that it seeks to check the activities of money launderers 
by encouraging businesses to be suspicious of people dealing with huge sums, it is somewhat 
unrealistic for a country where many citizens do not hold bank accounts, and with a less than a 
fifth of the population keeping their money in banks.
446
 Speaking in the year 2004 at a Special 
Meeting of the Bankers‘ Committee, the erstwhile Governor of Nigeria‘s Central Bank did state 
that an estimated 400 Million Naira was being held outside the banking system.
447
 A major 
criticism of this section of the Act previously was that the triggering sum was set too low 
considering the cash based nature of the Nigerian economy where the use of other forms of 
transactions such as debit cards and credit cards were practically non-existent.
448
 The amended 
Act clearly sought to eliminate this weakness and the triggering sum was increased subsequently. 
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However, the current sum, considering the points previously stated, still does not necessarily 
achieve the main purport of the Act. Transactions such as those for cattle and livestock go into 
millions of Naira, and those farmers are predominantly in the rural areas of Nigeria with little 
access to banking facilities and an even less desire to use banking facilities. This then means that 
the provision of the Act regarding transactions over the threshold is negated since it is common 
place to see transactions as those cited here. Furthermore, many businesses view the process of 
deferring customers to financial institutions instead of receiving cash as cumbersome and 
burdensome.
449
 Talking of financial institutions and banks in particular, the importance of their 
role in combatting the scourge of money laundering cannot be overstated, but their input in 
Nigeria leaves a lot to be desired. Corruption is not just done by the dictator who has control of 
revenues. He needs a willing bank to process the money.
450
 Banks are usually the first point of 
contact for intending launderers due to the safety and ease of transaction the banking facilities 
offer. These attractions are why strict regulations are in place to guide banks and at the same time 
guard against those who wish to transform the dirty variety of their illicit gains. However, the 
exact opposite seems to be the case as the aforementioned case involving the illegal disbursement 
of moneys meant for arms by the immediate past Nigerian Government depicts. How moneys 
were clearly above the reporting thresholds and yet wired through banks without those banks 
making the requisite suspicious transaction reports clearly mandated by the Nigerian Money 
laundering Act clearly shows the failings of the country‘s Anti Money laundering laws. Similarly, 
some of the sums being reported in the ongoing investigation into the arms deal reveals figures 
that banks should have deemed as irregular and/or unusual which should hence have been 
reported. Under the KYC rule, customers are to be profiled as a requirement and any transaction 
that falls out of a regular routine of a customer‘s previous transactions is deemed unusual.  In one 
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of the cases currently being investigated- that involving the spokesman of the former ruling party, 
the Economic and Financial Crimes have charged him to court over allegations that the sum of 
N1.4 BN transferred from the office of the former National Security Adviser was traced to a 
company linked to him. From the US$2.1 BN missing arms fund being investigated, it was learnt 
that N400M was transferred to the company in November 2014 which previously had a balance 
of N6, 676,576.06. While the accused remains innocent till proven guilty in this case, this sudden 
plunge in balance certainly should have qualified as both a suspicious transaction as well as an 
irregular one and should have been reported by whichever bank that was involved. The law is 
explicit under the suspicious transaction reporting requirement over the powers it grants the 
Chairman of the Economic and Financial crimes Commission and the Governor of the Central 
Bank of Nigeria over bank accounts which have been reported as suspicious.
451
 This is 
consequent upon a report by the financial institution in question who in turn face the punishment 
of a fine on conviction for failure to comply with the requirements.
452
 Did the banks turn a blind 
eye to the humongous transactions or did they actually file the reports with the regulatory 
authorities who failed to act? Either way, there seems to be more incentives for non-compliance 
than there are repercussions for non-compliance. These failings are all intrinsically linked to the 
anathema that is corruption. No matter how cogent the AML laws are, the absence of a strong 
desire to eliminate corrupt practices is bound to have a nullifying effect. It is the absence of this 
will that accounts for why the moneys are stolen successfully in the first place, and without 
repercussions, the chances are they will be laundered with success without any repercussions too 
because the same way the transgressors have gone about corrupting the system to enable them 
steal public funds is the same way they will navigate ways round Anti Money laundering 
measures too. Without the illicit funds there would be no money to launder, and with the illicit 
                                           
451
 S.6 MLA 
 
452
 S.6 (9) MLA 
 
170 
 
 
 
funds, ways must be found to launder them, and in a society as condoning to the vice as Nigeria, 
it has proved as easy as it could get. The lack of proper or non-implementation of the laws in 
place is the main issue here and particularly instructive in this regard is the theory of the soft state 
thesis propounded by Gurnal Mydral.  
5.4.4 The Soft State Thesis 
This theory was propounded by Mydral within the context of development in his monumental 
work on post-independence South Asia
453
which highlights the paradox of the post-colonial state 
and its predicaments most precisely as it relates to the problem of corruption. Soft States are 
dominated by powerful interests that exploit the power of the State or government to serve their 
own interests rather than the interests of their citizens. It signifies the discrepancy between 
authority and control
454
 Policies decided on are often not enforced, if they are enacted at all, and 
in that the authorities, even when framing policies are reluctant to place obligations on people 
especially in matters of corruption. There is a general lack of social discipline, deficiencies in law 
enforcement, disregard of the rules by public officials at all levels, and their collusion with 
persons whose conduct it was their duty to regulate.
455
 This conscious inability to enforce social 
reforms coupled with the lack of desire to institute reforms ensures that the legal system and its 
paraphernalia are moribund or at least ineffective.
456
 Relating this theory to the Nigerian state 
could not have been better captured than with the meaning of the theory given by the definition 
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which stated that a soft state is ―one which formal rules (laws, officially stated administrative 
rules and practices etc.) are applied copiously and in a lax manner rather than vigorously and 
consistently. It is one in which private advantage can be gained and private bargains struck 
concerning the enforcement or non-enforcement of the rules, as when a business man bribes a tax 
official.‖457 These are all pertinent features of the Nigerian state, and even more symptomatic of a 
wider societal problem are other variables of a soft state such as forms of enticement other than 
money, and in this case, kinship settlement and favour from superiors. An example of this within 
the Nigerian context is the politics of god fathers wherein individual(s) are supported onto the 
ascension of public offices by an individual or a group of individuals in return for favours of 
varying degrees. An apt description of what a godfather is can be perfectly understood by this 
quote wherein the modus operandi of a godfather is perfectly captured…‘‘The godfather is not in 
the business of philanthropy. The godfather gives support to install the godson oftentimes by 
devious means. They are merchants of fear. They dispense violence freely and fully on those who 
stand in their way. In this, they play the additional role of warlord. They establish, train, and 
maintain a standing personal ‗army‘ which they ostensibly supplement with sprinkling of official 
police detachment. In order to effect electoral change, they bribe election officials to deliver the 
winning election figures. They also bribe the police and other security agents to look the other 
way when they traffic in ballot boxes and sack opponents strongholds. The godson having taken 
office returns the gesture hundredfold to the point that the godfather becomes an intractable 
parasite on Government. The initial support given by the godfather then becomes an investment 
with a colossal rate of returns…458‖  With such comes the absence of any will to initiate the fight 
against corruption because the political elites who use corruption as an instrument and as a means 
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to political domination do everything within their means to maintain the status-quo due to the 
indispensability of the relevance of corruption to such politicians.  
5.5 A Nigerian Conundrum  
Corruption has been a huge challenge in the public administration of Nigeria and it has seriously 
impeded the growth and effective utilization of resources in Africa in general.
459
 It remains a 
daunting challenge for most African countries, and in Nigeria‘s case, thick within the fabric of the 
society. The intrinsic link between effective Anti-Money laundering regulations and successful 
implementation of Anti-Corruption policies has already been discussed in this work, and several 
factors have accounted for the comfortable abode the Nigerian state provides for corruption to 
thrive. Nigerian leaders have variously been blamed, with the country having suffered from 
leaders that looted the resources of the state, and would not deliver services to the people.
460
 The 
trouble with Nigeria was simply and squarely a problem of leadership.
461
 Between 1960 and 1999 
alone, Nigerian leaders siphoned more than $440BN out of the economy. This is six times the 
Marshall plan, the sum total needed to rebuild devastated Europe in the aftermath of the 2
nd
 world 
war.
462
 There have been initiatives to curb corruption by successive Nigerian Governments and 
this has been extensively discussed in earlier parts of this work, but it is fair to say that the desired 
results have not been achieved. In a country where an estimated 100 Million people live below 
the poverty line, economic hardship within a vast number of Nigerians presents the perfect 
platform for corrupt practices due to the amenability of such impoverished individuals to corrupt 
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practices, and in this case by being recipients of bribes for favours. Corruption is both a symptom 
and a consequence, in that it breeds poverty and poverty aids corruption to flourish.
463
 The 
absence of a genuine political will to initiate fights against corruption is also another factor, as the 
elites who occupy the political positions with the powers to carry out initiatives against corruption 
are not in any way inclined to do so. There is no reason why leaders will want to change a corrupt 
system from which they earn massive rents.
464
 The short termism and inconsistent 
unsustainability‘s of tackling corruption has also been another huge factor as to why anti-
corruption policies have failed. Tackling corruption is a challenging long term undertaking, not a 
one-shot affair.
465
 It requires a high level of commitment and continuity in policies but the policy 
discontinuations and political instability that have been the hallmark of most of Nigeria‘s history 
is not a conducive base for any serious anti-corruption policy to hold sway. This was perfectly 
summed up by a former Nigerian leader who stated thus: ‗‗I have not seen the will of persistency 
and consistency in Nigeria [to fight corruption] because the people that are involved in 
corruption are strongly entrenched and unless you are ready to confront them at the point of even 
giving your life for it, then you will give in, that is the end of it.‘‘466  
The current Nigerian Government has set itself a zero tolerance to corruption agenda, and in doing 
so has initiated probes into the activities of the immediate past Government with the President 
stating in unequivocal terms that his government would recover all the money stolen from 
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Nigeria‘s coffers ―no matter where it is hidden and no matter how long it will take.‘‘ And in one of 
a number of moves put in place already was the signing of a memorandum of understanding 
between the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the United Arab Emirates, UAE, 
to enable the extradition of corrupt Nigerians hiding stolen funds in Dubai. This agreement was 
signed in January 2016 due to the perception that Nigerians, especially the politically exposed 
persons have in the last decade seen and used Dubai as a safe haven for enjoying their looted 
wealth. The pact also covers Mutual Legal Assistance on Criminal Matters, as well as Commercial 
Matters, including the recovery and repatriation of stolen wealth, and this aspect of the pact holds 
the potential to trap billions of dollars in bank deposits and choice property suspected to have been 
acquired with proceeds of fraud. The pact would enable such funds to be frozen pending the 
prosecution and conviction of offenders and the repatriation of what they stole in Nigeria. It could 
also block fraudulent transfer of funds to Dubai, which has lax laws unlike Europe and the United 
States. Going further, Nigeria is a signatory to the 2003 United Nations Convention against 
Corruption (UNCAC) which is a multilateral convention negotiated by members of the United 
Nations and is the first global legally binding international anti-corruption instrument. This 
instrument obliges countries to render specific forms of mutual legal assistance in gathering and 
transferring evidence for use in court, to extradite offenders. Countries are also required to 
undertake measures which will support the tracing, freezing, seizure and confiscation of the 
proceeds of corruption. It also provides for the return of assets to countries of origin as a 
fundamental principle.
467
 Nigeria will benefit from these provisions because there seems to be a 
genuine desire to tackle corruption in Nigeria today but the government of the day is on a four year 
mandate, which brings to bear the issue whether a new regime that succeeds it on completion of its 
tenure will carry on the initiatives in like manner. Already, there are allegations of bias and a 
political witch hunt by members of the immediate past regime who view the Anti-Corruption 
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moves of the current Government as a way of settling political scores. In the event that the 
opposition get back in government in 2019 when the next general elections come around, it is fair 
to say that all those who have been affected by the strong stance of this Government will be left off 
the hook. This is irrespective of the genuineness or otherwise of the initiatives in the first place. 
There is precedent for this in Nigeria, and ironically, with the current President when he was ousted 
as military head of state in a bloodless coup in 1985. Operating a tough stance against corruption as 
today, the then Military ruler had jailed a large number of corrupt politicians after unseating a 
democratically elected Government in 1983 but once overthrown by his fellow officers in the army 
and put in custody, the new Government went ahead to review a lot of the cases. This led to a lot of 
the politicians released from prison and their loot mostly returned to them.
468
 This Government will 
go ahead to be viewed as one of the most corrupt in the history of Nigeria, showing that rescinding 
the decision of the preceding Government regarding the corrupt politicians was not done in good 
faith as was postulated but rather another way of settling old scores. This stop-start approach 
towards fighting corruption has a huge nullifying effect on the potency of the initiatives.  
Conclusion 
Based on factors discussed extensively in this chapter, compliance with international AML 
standards seemed to be an academic one rather than practical. It was on paper, not on the field, and 
the practicability‘s of the theoretical compliance has left a lot to be desired. The failure of anti-
corruption policies means there will perpetually be illicit funds in circulation being proceeds of 
corrupt practices, which in natural turn and instinctively on the part of the holders of such funds 
will need to be laundered. The Anti-Money regulations in place notwithstanding, the prevalence of 
corruption means that such funds have usually been found to go through Nigerian financial 
institutions without detection. Also of particular concern is the fact that these funds get across 
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international borders to the safe confines of banks in Nations as developed and as technologically 
sophisticated as the United Kingdom and the United States of America.  These are countries that 
are at the forefront of the international initiatives against money laundering, and the fact that they 
escape any form of significant censure from appropriate bodies‘ calls into question, the 
genuineness of the international drive against money laundering.  
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Chapter Six 
Anti-Money Laundering Initiatives: International Commitment and/or Culpability? 
6.0 Introduction: 
To state that money laundering has become a global phenomenon is merely stating the obvious, 
and the ever increasing connectivity that technological advancements offer with the global 
financial system being increasingly based on digital or ‘‘megabyte‘‘ money means funds are 
moved rapidly and anonymously, traded, exchanged, and cleaned or legitimized via an array of 
financial instruments such as derivatives and futures.
469
 This means there is an upsurge in the 
magnitude of illicit money circulating the world economy due to the ease with which criminals 
may launder illicit gains without detection these days. This transnational dimension to the crime of 
money laundering means that the crime cannot be fought in isolation hence the International 
initiatives aimed at containing it. London for instance, is one of the world‘s largest and most 
important financial hubs. Unfortunately, this strategic position is accompanied by undesirable 
consequences of which money laundering is one.
470
 Nigeria, being a former British colony enjoys a 
harmonious relationship with Britain, and this relationship has been exploited by Nigerian 
politically exposed persons to launder illicit funds. Other countries like the United States of 
America (USA) have equally been utilised by such persons. The factors that militate against 
successful implementation of AML laws in less developed countries like Nigeria are not 
particularly apparent in the developed nations. Therefore, with international cooperation as one of 
the cardinal principles of international AML initiatives, it is perplexing somewhat how illicit funds 
from foreign countries get successfully immersed into their financial institutions. This begs the 
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question if it is it naïve to think that the Western countries should help Nigeria police the theft of its 
patrimony? Or do they in many ways benefit from Nigeria‘s corruption? 
This chapter seeks to (i) analyse the commitment of the international community (specifically 
Britain and the USA) towards stemming the flow of illicit funds to their respective jurisdictions; 
(ii) appraise the culpability of banks and financial institutions within these stated jurisdictions as 
regards the regulatory standards demanded of them; and (iii) examine the deterrence efficiency of 
sanctions for breaching regulatory standards by the banks and financial institutions within these 
jurisdictions. 
6.1United Kingdom Anti Money Laundering Framework  
The United Kingdom adopts a tripartite system in its fight against money laundering consisting of 
its civil, criminal and regulatory regimes. The Government is responsible for passing money 
laundering legislation which contains and defines the applicable money laundering offences. The 
Financial Services authority (FSA) is the main body responsible for regulatory oversight while the 
Joint Money Laundering Steering group (JMLSG) issues important guidelines on money 
laundering regulation.
471
 The requirements of the UK anti-money laundering regime are set out in: 
The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (as amended by the Crime and Courts Act 2013 and the Serious 
Crime Act 2015); The Money Laundering Regulations 2007; The Terrorism Act 2000 (as amended 
by the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, the Terrorism Act 2006 and the Terrorism 
Act 2000 and Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Amendment) Regulations 2007 
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6.1.1 The Proceeds of Crime Act  
The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA) set out the legislative scheme for the recovery of 
criminal assets with criminal confiscation being the most commonly used power.
472
 It sought to 
‗‗establish the Assets Recovery Agency … to provide for confiscation orders in relation to 
persons who benefit from criminal conduct and for restraint orders to prohibit dealing with 
property, to allow the recovery of property which is or represents property obtained through 
unlawful conduct or which is intended to be used in unlawful conduct, to make provision about 
money laundering.‘‘473 Prior to this Act, confiscation proceedings had been limited to the powers 
under the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and the Drug Trafficking Act 1994. The Proceeds of Crime 
act extended the confiscation powers to financial crime and gave the Courts wide ranging powers 
to confiscate assets and to make ‗assumptions‘ as to how certain assets had been obtained. With 
this came an upsurge in confiscation proceedings wherein anyone convicted of a crime could be 
ordered to pay with the court calculating how much they were required to hand over, and the 
person may face imprisonment if they failed to pay. Any money earned as a result of or in 
connection with an offence can be recovered under the terms of the Act, and this includes assets 
bought with the proceeds of crime. Confiscations occurs after conviction but other means of 
recovering the proceeds of crime which do not require a conviction are provided for in the Act, 
namely civil recovery, cash seizure and taxation powers. The Police could for instance seize 
£1,000 in cash or more if there is a reasonable suspicion that such was earned through 
criminal/illegal activity. The Act expands the law on money laundering to cover any crime rather 
than just drug-related offences. It applies a single set of guidance on money laundering offences 
and targets the proceeds of any criminal conduct that would be an offence in Britain.  
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The money laundering provisions were contained in Part 7 of the Act wherein a person is deemed 
to have committed an offence if he or she conceals, disguises, converts or transfers criminal 
property or removes it from England and Wales or Scotland or Northern Ireland; enters into or 
becomes concerned in an arrangement which he or she knows or suspects facilitates the 
acquisition, retention, use or control of criminal property; acquires, uses or has possession of 
criminal property. The Act also introduced a negligence test, meaning a professional working in a 
sector regulated by money laundering regulations (such as banks and other financial institutions) 
can commit a criminal offence for failing to report money laundering if there are reasonable 
grounds for knowing or suspecting that it is taking place. This was a paramount requirement even 
where a person was not in the regulated sector, as they must report any suspicious activity 
through their trade, business or profession. Failure to report could result in a five-year prison 
term. In summary, the Act sought to ‗‗provide wide ranging powers to deprive these criminals of 
their main motivation – their money and the property they have accumulated through their illegal 
activities.‘‘474  
6.1.2The Serious Crime Act (2015) 
This Act amended the POCA with the key changes being (i) Increase prison sentences for failure to 
pay confiscation orders; (ii) Ensure that criminal assets cannot be hidden with spouses, associates 
or other third parties; (iii) Require courts to consider imposing an overseas travel ban for the 
purpose of ensuring that a confiscation order is effective; (iv) Enable assets to be restrained more 
quickly and earlier in investigations; (v) Reduce the defendant‘s time to pay confiscation orders; 
and (vi) Extend investigative powers so that they are available to trace assets once a confiscation 
order is made. The changes to confiscation orders emanated from the criticism of the POCA 
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regarding the gulf that existed between the orders made and the amount of money recovered by 
authorities on behalf of the Government. This was in part due to the fact that the determination of 
an offender‘s benefit, for the purposes of the Act, is his criminal turnover rather than his criminal 
profit, so in hidden assets cases the order may well exceed what an offender could in fact pay, even 
if he was so inclined. To remedy this, the new Act increased the term of default sentences; 
decreased the amount of time available to repay; mandate the consideration of travel restrictions; 
take money directly from bank accounts and more efficient consideration of third party interests. In 
decreasing the number of default sentences, the SCA slashed from 12 under the POCA, to four the 
range of default sentences, with a maximum of fourteen years for a failure to pay an order of more 
than £1 million and a minimum of 6 months for a failure to pay an order of more than £10,000.
475
 
Similarly, in relation to the changes in time available to repay, the SCA stipulates that where a 
defendant cannot pay immediately he or she can be given up to three months to repay; in 
exceptional circumstances this can be extended up to six months.
476
 This extension of time is only 
granted where Court is satisfied that the offender is unable to pay the full amount due on the day 
the order was made and if more time is required to realise funds from a specific asset, e.g. the sale 
of a vehicle or house. The deadlines under the previous regime were six and twelve months 
respectively.
477
  
Specifically, the amendment relates to money laundering via the suspicious activity reports 
whereby certain professionals are obliged to make Suspicious Activity Reports (often referred to 
as SARs) to the National Crime Agency (―the NCA‖) where they have reasonable grounds to 
know or suspect that their client is engaged in money laundering. It is a criminal offence not to 
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report in these circumstances. The difficulty with this provision comes about with situations 
where if a disclosure is made, the maker may be at risk of liability from the subject of the 
disclosure for failure to carry out the transaction or for a breach of confidence, whereas, if a 
disclosure is not made those carrying out the transaction could be guilty of a money laundering 
offence. The POCA gives protection against breach of confidence by stating explicitly that 
―authorised disclosure is not to be taken to breach any restriction on the disclosure of 
information (however imposed).‘‘478 However, there has been extensive litigation by customers of 
banks disgruntled by bank refusal to carry out transaction in accordance with their instructions. 
The courts have refused to impose civil liability on the banks where to do so would in effect be to 
require them to commit an offence by carrying out the transaction whilst suspecting it to involve 
criminal property.
479
 The Act has therefore introduced a welcome protection for those who report 
suspicions of money laundering in good faith by providing that ‗‗where an authorised disclosure 
is made in good faith, no civil liability arises in respect of the disclosure on the part of the person 
by or on whose behalf it was made.‖480 The effect is to make it clear that provided only that the 
maker is acting in good faith; persons who make disclosures to relevant authorities are protected 
from civil liability for doing so. This ensures that the UK complies with the obligation to this 
effect under the third money laundering directive. The amendment is a clear recognition of the 
importance of reporting money laundering suspicion and of a consideration that reporting 
genuinely held suspicions of money laundering, which the law requires, should not place 
institutions at risk of civil liability. Lord Bates stated, when presenting the amendment, that: 
―While the Government recognise the concerns of customers, we believe that where an institution 
has suspicions regarding the transaction and report those to law enforcement authorities in good 
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faith, as the law requires it to do, that institution should not be liable for civil claims for 
damages.‖481 
6.1.3 Money Laundering Regulations (MLR) (2007)  
This is the most essential piece of legislation enacted thus far and it implements, in part, Directive 
2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the prevention of the use of the 
financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing (The Third Directive). 
The Regulations require the financial, accountancy, legal and other sectors to apply risk-based 
customer due diligence measures and take other steps to prevent their services being used for 
money laundering or terrorist financing. This third directive builds on the obligations imposed on 
member states by the First Directive (91/308/EEC) which came into force on 01.01.1993 as 
amended by the Second Directive (2001/97/EC).
482
 The third directive sought to update European 
legislation on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering 
and terrorist financing so that it better reflects the 40 Recommendations on money laundering made 
by the Financial Action Task Force.
483
As well as ensuring a level playing field for firms across the 
EU, the Third Directive also protects the EU Anti-Money laundering/counter terrorist financing 
defences by preventing criminals from taking advantage of weaker regimes. A major improvement 
upon the earlier directives here is that this third directive challenges corrupt Government officials 
from countries such as Nigeria, who had essentially been left free to filter their stolen funds 
through British banks and institutions by designating such people as politically exposed persons 
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(PEPs).
484
The previous directives contained no such caveats. In ensuring this, the law
485
 explicitly 
states that the process of due diligence involves the following- (a) Identifying the customer and 
verifying the customer‘s identity on the basis of documents, data or information obtained from a 
reliable and independent source; (b) Identifying, where there is a beneficial owner who is not the 
customer, the beneficial owner and taking adequate measures, on a risk-sensitive basis, to verify his 
identity so that the relevant person is satisfied that he knows who the beneficial owner is, 
including, in the case of a legal person, trust or similar legal arrangement, measures to understand 
the ownership and control structure of the person, trust or arrangement; and (c) Obtaining 
information on the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship. Here, businesses must 
be mindful of forgeries in the documents although there is nothing to suggest that such must be 
carried out by experts in forged documents. This customer due diligence requirement must be 
carried out when establishing a business relationship, carrying out an occasional transaction, where 
there is a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing or in the case of any doubt about the 
veracity or adequacy of documents, data or information previously obtained for the purpose of 
customer due diligence.
486
 Of particular importance in this regard is the distinction between 
occasional transactions and long-lasting business relationships because of its relevance to the 
timing of customer due diligence and the storage of records. In an occasional transaction likely to 
increase in value or develop into a business relationship, an early conduct of customer due 
diligence will avoid delays later in the retainer. There shall also be an on-going monitoring of a 
business relationship and this means ‗scrutiny of transactions undertaken throughout the course of 
the relationship (including, where necessary, the source of funds) to ensure that the transactions are 
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consistent with the relevant person‘s knowledge of the customer, his business and risk profile; and 
keeping the documents, data or information obtained for the purpose of applying customer due 
diligence measures up-to-date.
487
 There is also a clear-cut distinction between two types of 
diligence the law advances, namely the simplified due diligence as well as enhanced due diligence. 
The law regarding the former sets out the terms where the application of the customer due 
diligence requirement could be waived under explicitly stated circumstances,
488
 but more 
imperative to the scope of this work is the terms of the latter wherein relevant persons are 
mandated to apply risk-sensitive basis enhanced customer due diligence measures and enhanced 
ongoing monitoring. Here the law mandates a relevant person who proposes to have a business 
relationship or carry out an occasional transaction with a politically exposed person to have 
approval from senior management for establishing the business relationship with that person; take 
adequate measures to establish the source of wealth and source of funds which are involved in the 
proposed business relationship or occasional transaction; and where the business relationship is 
entered into, conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring of the relationship.
489
  
A politically exposed person in this sense is defined as  (a) an individual who is or has, at any time 
in the preceding year, been entrusted with a prominent public function by— (i) a state other than 
the United Kingdom; (ii) a Community institution; or (iii) an international body, including a person 
who falls in any of the categories listed in paragraph 4(1)(a) of Schedule 2; (b) an immediate 
family member of a person referred to in sub-paragraph (a), including a person who falls in any of 
the categories listed in paragraph 4(1)(c) of Schedule 2; or (c) a known close associate of a person 
referred to in sub-paragraph (a), including a person who falls in either of the categories listed in 
paragraph 4(1)(d) of Schedule 2. For the purpose of deciding whether a person is a known close 
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associate of a person referred to in paragraph (5), a relevant person need only have regard to 
information which is in his possession or is publicly known. For the purposes of regulation 14(5), 
and specifically for the identification of a PEP, they are — (a) individuals who are or have been 
entrusted with prominent public functions include the following— (i) heads of state, heads of 
government, ministers and deputy or assistant ministers; (ii) members of parliaments; (iii) members 
of supreme courts, of constitutional courts or of other high-level judicial bodies whose decisions 
are not generally subject to further appeal, other than in exceptional circumstances; (iv) members 
of courts of auditors or of the boards of central banks; (v) ambassadors, chargés d‘affaires and 
high-ranking officers in the armed forces; and (vi) members of the administrative, management or 
supervisory bodies of state-owned enterprises; (b) the categories set out in paragraphs (i) to (vi) of 
sub-paragraph (a) do not include middle-ranking or more junior officials; (c) immediate family 
members include the following— (i) a spouse; (ii) a partner; (iii) children and their spouses or 
partners; and (iv) parents; (d) persons known to be close associates include the following— (i) any 
individual who is known to have joint beneficial ownership of a legal entity or legal arrangement, 
or any other close business relations, with a person referred to in regulation 14(5)(a); and (ii) any 
individual who has sole beneficial ownership of a legal entity or legal arrangement which is known 
to have been set up for the benefit of a person referred to in regulation 14(5)(a).
490
 
6.2 Regulatory Application; Complicity or Compliance? 
The takings from the legal and regulatory framework of the British AML regulations reveals 
sufficient efforts when put through academic analysis. However, formal compliance and actual 
compliance represent two distinct scenarios especially with suggestions in some quarters that the 
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British regulations have never been effectively enforced by financial regulators and banks.
491
 This 
is supported by notions that financial institutions know they can get away with paying lip service to 
the rules.
492
  The purpose of the rules is to impose a burden on banks and financial institutions to 
ensure they have a clear picture of the provenance of any money they receive from a client, as well 
as knowing as much as possible about such clients, their businesses, source of funds, and in the 
case of politically exposed persons, ensure that the monies been deposited are not in fact the 
proceeds which have been stolen from another country‘s treasury.493 Before discussing the level of 
compliance practiced by banks and financial institutions, it is important to analyse the attendant 
risks that comes with the adherence to obligations under AML regulations. There is the potential 
for banks overstepping their AML obligations, thereby exposing them to the possibility of civil 
cases by aggrieved customers. As a result, there exists a potential of risk involved in both non-
compliance and compliance and this was highlighted in the case of Hosni Tayeb v HSBC Bank 
PLC.
494
 Although decided under the Criminal Justice Act 1988, it enunciated the creed that banks 
must exercise caution when observing compliance to regulations because excessive zeal in 
compliance has the potential of exposing such banks to civil litigation by customers. The facts in 
the case involved a customer who sold database to an overseas buyer who agreed to make 
payments from a Barclays Bank account held in London. The account to be credited was in the 
name of the claimant at an account he held at a HSBC branch in Derby. The sum of £944,114.23 
was subsequently paid into this account by the buyer through a CHAPS transfer. However, the 
claimant was not successful in drawing any part of this money when he attempted to do so because 
                                           
491
 See Rowan Hastings, ‗How London became the money laundering capital of the world‘ 
http://www.ianfraser.org/how-london-became-the-money-laundering-capital-of-the-world/ 
Accessed July 15th, 2012 
 
492
 Ibid  
 
493
 Ibid  
 
494
 [2004] EWHC 1529; [2004] 4 All E.R. 1024 
188 
 
 
 
the manager of the HSBC branch upon receipt of the funds found the transaction to be of a 
suspicious nature. This prompted a meeting between the manager and the claimant after which the 
manager remained unconvinced as to the legitimacy of the transaction. The main aim of this 
meeting was for the claimant to explain the origin of the transfer and to provide supporting 
evidence as to the legitimacy of the transaction. The manager however, still held a strong suspicion 
about the transaction, as a result of which the funds were returned to the payee bank after 
consultations with the fraud unit of the bank. One fundamental issue the bank manager failed to 
realise however was the rules that govern CHAPS transactions which relies upon absolute finality 
in payments. Such transactions usually require real-time settlement of payments by the receiving 
bank and that a transfer of funds be finalised in favour of the payee on the same day as the account 
of the payer is debited. And in the event that transactions cannot be completed, payments are 
required to be returned to the originating bank by the following day.  
In the instant case, after two years of not doing anything about the case, the claimant brought action 
against the defendant bank seeking to recover the debt that he claimed existed in his favour from 
the bank following its receipt of the CHAPS transfer and also claimed damages for breach of 
contract. It was held Per Colman J. that a bank was obliged by the implied terms of its contract 
with an existing customer to accept all incoming CHAPS credits to an account capable of receiving 
them and to apply them in accordance with the rules governing such transactions. S.93 (A) of the 
CJA made it a criminal offence for a bank to act on a customer‘s instruction where it knew or 
suspected that the relevant assets were the proceeds of criminal conduct. This may have been the 
thinking behind the managers‘ refusal to honour the transaction, but the provisions of the law did 
not release a bank from liability if it declined to accept a transfer because the credit of the funds 
into the claimants account created a subsisting debt from the bank to its customer and the return of 
those funds by the bank did not stop the claimants entitlement to them. The proper course of action 
the manager should have taken once any amount of suspicion was entertained was to either apply 
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to court without notice, with the serious fraud office as a party, for a declaration.
495
 This would 
have shielded the bank from any subsequent action brought by the customer. The main risk with 
compliance is the propensity of the banks to go ultra vires and this was the case with the defendant 
bank here. Despite being bound by the then Criminal Justice Act to report transactions,
496
 this 
obligation only operated to limit the banks civil liability to its customer only to the extent that the 
civil liability arose from complying with the statute. By returning the money to the payee bank 
despite the CHAPS transfer, the bank had acted without recourse to legislation and was therefore in 
breach of terms of agreement with the complainant because the CJA did not operate to remove 
liability from a bank if it declined to accept a transfer. A clear case in contrast however, is that of 
Squirrel Ltd v National Westminster Bank Plc, HM Customs and Excise (Intervenor).
497
 And 
although decided under a different legislation, it highlights a case where a bank took the requisite 
steps and stayed well within legal realms in reporting what it felt was suspicious. Here, the 
applicant (a mobile telecommunications business) found that its bank had ceased accepting 
instructions relating to its account and had in fact frozen the account without stating any reasons. 
The bank suspected that the account may have been used to carry out a VAT fraud, but whether or 
not the customer was guilty of this was held not to be material. The fact that the bank entertained a 
reasonable ground for suspicion sufficed as long as it also followed up by complying with the 
provisions of the Proceeds of Crime Act regarding obtaining appropriate consent, 
498
making an 
authorised disclosure
499
as well as complying with the anti-tip-off provisions which specifically 
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states that banks are prohibited from notifying a customer that an investigation is taking place on 
such a person‘s account. At this point, it becomes an obligation incumbent upon the bank to block 
such an account until such time as the relevant authority has given its directions for complying with 
its obligations under POCA or until such time for the relevant authority to do so has expired. It was 
held in this case that the conduct of the bank despite the blunt outlook as well as causing serious 
financial detriment to the applicant company, was ‗‘unimpeachable‘‘ and completely aligned with 
the intents and purposes of the legislation.
500
 
What however, justifies suspicion, and how is a balance struck between suspicions with the 
breach of a customer‘s rights? Forming the suspicion is one thing, justifying it another. Suspicion 
in this regard must not be based on reasonable grounds. In Ahmad v HM Advocate
501
 it was stated 
that there is nothing in the language of the Proceeds of Crimes Act which states or requires that 
money laundering is in fact taking place.
502
 It is plain that the obligation thereunder can arise if a 
person suspects or has reasonable cause for suspecting that it is. In Iraj Parvizi v Barclays Bank 
Plc
503
 Mr Parvizi, a professional gambler, sought to bring a claim against Barclays for breach of 
contract. He argued that the bank, in freezing his account at a critical time, had caused him to 
suffer considerable financial losses, namely by preventing him from making significant gambling 
gains. Barclays‘ contrarily, justified its actions on the fact that it detected suspicious activity on 
the account and then carried out an analytical review of the account following an internal report 
from the Holborn branch of Barclays bank. The officer in charge based the suspicion on several 
large transfers of money to gaming companies and the inability to link Mr Parvizi to the source of 
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funds in relation to four particular transactions, subsequent upon which a Suspicious Activity 
Report was sent to the National Crime Agency (then the Serious Organised Crime Agency) 
seeking permission to carry out the claimants instructions. Mr Parvizi contended that there was no 
reasonable ground for the suspicion in the first place, but the onus was on him to establish, at 
trial, that the officer in charge did not have a relevant suspicion that was more than fanciful. And 
to argue this, he contended that the officer in charges‘ statement lacked coherence and gave no 
indication of how the suspicion that his gambling constituted money laundering was formed. He 
submitted that, as a professional gambler, the transactions were all with reputable bookmakers. 
The defendant bank on its part urged the court to strike the action out, and in agreeing to that, the 
High Court concluded that, despite the fact that Mr Parvizi had probably suffered financial  loss 
as a result of his account having been frozen, he had no real prospect of success at trial. There 
was no real prospect of him establishing that Miss Walley [officer in charge] did not have a 
relevant suspicion that was ―more than fanciful.‖ In arriving at its decision, the High Court stated 
that suspicion must be more than ―a vague feeling of unease‖ and the law ―does not require the 
suspicion to be ‗clear‘ or ‗firmly grounded and targeted on specific facts‘ or based upon 
‗reasonable grounds.‖ Suspicion must be ―more than fanciful‖ but it is for the party alleging 
suspicion, i.e. the bank, to prove the existence of suspicion to the extent that it provides 
justification for not following client instructions.
504
 The Court did concede that there was 
arguably a lack of reasoning in some of what Miss Walley had said in support of her suspicion. In 
particular, it highlighted that it was difficult to understand why she did not make an inquiry of Mr 
Parvizi‘s relationship manager at the bank and why the details in the witness statement did not 
appear precisely to match those in the SAR. However, it was satisfied that the evidence 
established that her suspicion was more than merely fanciful. The case was duly struck out. This 
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means in essence that a bank can freeze the account of a customer where it has a genuine of 
suspicion of money laundering without fear that it will be breaking its contractual obligations 
towards that customer by not following its instructions. However, it will be for the bank to 
establish the primary fact of suspicion in order to justify not following customer instruction. The 
bank must also ensure that there is in place, a structured process for dealing with such suspicions. 
A careful written record should be made of the suspicions, the reasons behind those suspicions, 
the discussions with any relevant persons, and an appendix of any relevant documentary 
evidence. The SAR should be produced carefully and with sufficient detail on the assumption that 
it may be subject to examination in Court on a later date. Particular caution must also be 
exercised by the bank in this process to guard against tipping off. A person is guilty of an offence 
[of tipping off] if: (a) he knows or suspects that a constable is acting or is proposing to act in 
connection with an investigation which is being or is about to be conducted into money 
laundering; and (b) he discloses to any other person information or any other matter which is 
likely to prejudice that investigation or proposed investigation. This has been a massive challenge 
to financial institutions because as discussed earlier, if the bank pays the money out after holding 
suspicions about a transaction, such bank is held as a constructive trustee to the money paid. 
Prudent banks can be caught between possible equitable liability or liability for contempt on the 
one side and serious criminal liability on the other--or, indeed, between criminal liability for 
assisting (if they pay a money laundering customer) and criminal liability for tipping off (if they 
do not pay). If it stops payments, it may well tip off the suspect. So it is a case of ‗‗damned if you 
do, damned if you don't.‘‘505 This dilemma played out in the case of Governor and Company of 
the Bank of Scotland v A Ltd, B & C
506
where the bank was torn between its suspicions that some 
individuals involved in a transaction were involved in fraud, as such obliged to report, and its 
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fears of not falling foul of a tipping off. The facts of the case here were that a company, A, 
opened and operated an account to which substantial sums of money were transferred. Worried 
that there may have been links to fraudulent activities by the operators of the account, the bank 
notified the police who then notified the bank that a person who appeared to be closely involved 
with the company was being investigated. Considering that a Bank could face either criminal or 
civil liabilities if it declined a customer‘s transactions or actually went ahead with it, it is 
―unthinkable that the law should put an honest institution in such a position‖507 In the instant case, 
the Bank of Scotland sought directions from the court, in private and without notice to its 
customer. However, it was hampered in giving information to the court, because the Metropolitan 
Police told it in strong terms that they did not wish the information resulting from the bank's 
inquiries to be revealed, even to the court. At the hearing, it was the Judges‘ suggestion that an 
order should be made freezing A Ltd.‘s account, to which the bank complied. The freezing order 
however turned out to be a very unusual one as it was being covered in secrecy even to the 
customer as well as omitting normal safeguards for the customer. As a result, A Ltd, unable to 
obtain its money and even to discover why not, became increasingly angry. Eventually, and 
predictably, it realised that it was the subject of a serious criminal investigation--in other words, it 
had been tipped off, by deed rather than word. By the time of the hearing before Laddie J., there 
had been a number of hearings, by which the order had been denuded of its force, and most of the 
funds had been unfrozen. However, the bank still needed clarity as to which party bears the 
considerable cost of proceedings and guidance as to what steps banks should take in the future.  It 
was the contention of the bank that the costs should be bore by the customer --if liability in equity 
had been proved, indeed, the bank could plausibly have claimed that the customer's frozen 
accounts amounted to a trust fund from which the costs could be paid, but when it became clear, 
as it did, that there was no reason to believe that the customer had been guilty of any fraud, the 
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account could not be considered in that light. There was no doubt in the judges‘ mind that the 
despite the banks fighting attempt to show that true innocence was not the same as not having 
been proved guilty, which it maintained was the case here, that the customer was innocent and 
should not bear the cost. The thinking behind this was that it would be oppressive for innocent 
customers to have to bear the costs of litigation in these circumstances. The court duly ruled that 
the bank was liable for costs. The bank felt aggrieved because it felt it was being made to pay for 
being scrupulous and as thorough as the law demands, but the appellate court per Lord Woolf CJ 
agreed with the lower court on this count albeit with some sympathy, that although the bank had 
been in a genuinely difficult situation, it had tried to get assistance in the wrong way. The court 
stated that there should have been an investigation with the police (by now the Serious Fraud 
Office (SFO) as to the information which could be disclosed, and, if the police were 
uncooperative, it was the SFO which should have been the correct defendant in proceedings for 
directions by the bank--in which case the customer would not have needed to know about the 
hearing. However, on the authority of K Ltd v NatWest,
508
 it is now settled law that the courts will 
not order a bank to act where to do so would result in criminal liability under POCA.
509
 In the 
instant case, Longmore LJ stated that  ‗‗the ‗temporary illegality‘ of performing the mandated 
transaction ‗suspended‘ the bank's obligations:  If the law of the land makes it a criminal offence 
to honour the customer's mandate in these circumstances there can, in my judgment, be no breach 
of contract for the Bank to refuse to honour its mandate.‘‘510 
On paper, the United kingdom has some of the strictest anti-money laundering legislation in the 
world so it comes as a surprise somewhat that London is in some quarters referred to as the ‗money 
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laundering capital of the world.‘511 This insinuation becomes the more pertinent when it is put into 
perspective that the British capital for instance, has become the default destination for wealthy 
Russians in trouble from home thereby accounting for a large number of Russian oligarchs who 
live and work in Britain. Russia is acclaimed to be controlled by a ‗gangster culture‘ and these 
oligarchs (many of them with political baggage) for good reasons and bad, view London as a safe 
haven.
512
 There is an apparent presence of complicity and culpabilities in the practices of some of 
the world‘s biggest financial institutions and this is all the more disturbing when the Financial 
Services Authority‘s own investigation into London banks revealed that a third of the banks 
appeared willing to accept very high levels of money-laundering risk. Over a half of those banks 
failed to use meaningful due diligence in higher risk situations, a third dismissing serious 
allegations about their clientele without adequate review, a third failing to properly identify 
politically exposed persons and importantly, three-quarters failing to affect sufficient measures to 
establish the sources of some of their clientele's sources of wealth.
513
 The paucity of money 
laundering cases being successfully prosecuted when rules are routinely flouted by financial 
institutions suggest that the pertinent financial rules and regulations are largely treated by a lip 
service and box-ticking mentality towards compliance procedures.
514
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6.3 The ‗Invincibility‘ of Financial Institutions. (The case of the HSBC Bank) 
A threat assessment study carried out by the National Crime Agency in July 2015 found that 
‗‗…hundreds of billions of Dollars of criminal money almost certainly continue to be laundered 
through UK banks, including their subsidiaries, each year.‖515 The same agency had previously 
warned that despite the UK‘s role in developing international standards to tackle money 
laundering, the same money-laundering networks used by organised crime were being used by 
terrorists as well, thereby constituting a ‗strategic threat to the UK‘s economy and reputation.‘516 
There exists, a sense of feeling that UK banks and financial institutions have cultivated a habit of 
circumventing the Know your customer rules designed to curb criminals‘ abilities to launder the 
proceeds of crime, and a notion that the British ‗treat it as not their problem because there are no 
corpses on the streets.
517
 In 2012, a number of UK-domiciled banks attracted extensive media 
attention when US authorities charged and later settled with them out of court for alleged money-
laundering activities across border. UK regulators followed with appropriate enforcement actions 
subsequently, and the HSBC was one of those banks. Firstly, it is worth noting that the HSBC‘s 
international network comprises around 7,500 offices in over 80 countries and territories in 
Europe, the Asia-Pacific region, the Americas, the Middle East and Africa.
518
 This dramatic 
development at HSBC was not sudden or new, as way back in April 2003, the Federal Reserve 
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Bank of New York and New York state regulators had issued warnings of suspicious money 
flows at the bank which led to the overseeing and installation of AML initiatives in the bank by 
an appointed federal public prosecutor. These revelations coming almost a decade after the 
aforementioned warnings suggested a failure of these initiatives and particularly the office of the 
Controller of the Currency (OCC), its US regulator which failed to initiate a single enforcement 
despite being aware of multiple severe AML deficiencies at the bank ranging from failure to 
conduct AML due diligence before opening accounts for HSBC affiliates, large backlogs of un-
reviewed accounts of suspicious transactions and the failure to monitor some US$60 Trillion in 
wire transfer and account activity.
519
 The bank through its head of group compliance (who was to 
resign dramatically in the centre of a congressional enquiry)
520
 admitted that the bank fell short of 
both its own as well as regulators expectations despite its apparent compliance with AML laws 
like the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as well as the Bank Secrecy Act. Between the years 2007 
and 2008, there was a transaction involving the transfer of US$ 7 Billion from the bank's Mexican 
affiliate into its US operations which ultimately led to the assertion that the bank used its US bank 
as a conduit to feed the needs of its affiliates for US dollar services around the world which the 
OCC did not effectively question. In the face of fines from the Mexican authorities for 
noncompliance with AML systems and controls and late reporting of suspicious and unusual 
transactions and others forthcoming from other jurisdictions, the bank reportedly set aside some 
US$ 1.5 billion to cover a potential fine for breaching AML laws.
521
 In the end, this was 
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subsequently settled with American regulators at US$ 1.9 billion together with a deferred 
prosecution agreement.   
Considering the seriousness of this massive scandal across borders, one may argue that it should 
have brought about the criminal prosecution of senior officials of the bank and not just a mere fine 
which the HSBC could effectively offset with weeks of profit. It does seem that the HSBC have 
been serial offenders on the money laundering score but have also repeatedly received the 
friendliest of nudges from the hammers that should have hit hardest. In April 2003, with 9/11 still 
fresh in the minds of American regulators, the Federal Reserve sent HSBC's American subsidiary a 
cease-and-desist- letter, ordering it to clean up its act and make a better effort to keep criminals and 
terrorists from opening accounts at its bank. Instead of punishing the bank, though, the 
government's response was to send it more angry letters. Typically, those came in the form of so-
called ‗MRA‘ (Matters Requiring Attention) letters sent by the OCC. Most of these touched upon 
the same theme, i.e., HSBC failing to do due diligence on the shady characters who might be 
depositing money in its accounts or using its branches to wire money. In just one brief stretch 
between 2005 and 2006, the HSBC received 30 different formal warnings.
522
 HSBC affiliates 
frequently discussed processing Iranian U.S. dollar transactions for various Iranian financial 
institutions and entities through their HBUS correspondent accounts. At the same time, HSBC 
Group, HBEU and HBME bankers were pushing to expand contacts with Iran.
523
 Similarly, during 
this period, one of the banks biggest customers was Saudi Arabia‘s Al Rajhi Bank which had one 
of its founders previously listed by the CIA as one of the early financiers of the Al Qaeda network, 
and by extension, a financier for terrorism. This made the HSBC through its American arm the 
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HBUS sever all ties with the Saudi Arabian bank albeit temporarily, because upon the threat by Al 
Rajhi to pull out all its businesses from HSBC worldwide, HBUS resumed the supply of US 
Dollars to the same bank in 2006. This, the subsidiary claimed was due to pressure from HSBC. 
There was also the case of HSBC reportedly laundering money for Iranian terrorists; a revelation 
that came about after an internal audit commissioned by the bank stated that HBUS carried out 
28,000 undisclosed sensitive transactions worth US$19.7BN between 2001 and 2007, the vast 
majority of which involved Iran. aside non-compliance, there was distinct intent and a well thought 
out plan towards circumventing the noose of authorities too, and in this instant case, the HSBC did 
this by its affiliates using a method called 'stripping,' where references to Iran were deleted from 
records. HSBC affiliates also characterized the transactions as transfers between banks without 
disclosing the tie to Iran.
524
 For more than half a decade, a whopping $19 billion in transactions 
involving Iran went through the American financial system, with the Iranian connection kept 
hidden in 75 to 90 percent of those transactions. In this age of international terrorism, drug violence 
on the streets and organised crime, stopping illicit money flows that aid and abet those atrocities is 
a serious national security imperative but HSBC‘s compliance culture has been ‗‘pervasively 
polluted to say the least.‘‘525 This brings into perspective, the effectiveness of deterrent measures 
against institutions that flaunt AML regulations. 
6.4 Punishments: How deterring?  
The banking industry has somewhat proved to be inherently criminogenic thereby necessitating 
deterrent action, and without discountenancing the punishments that have been handed down to the 
HSBC by regulators over time, there is the contention that those punishments have not been austere 
enough to serve as deterrent against further misdemeanours. From a strict criminal law standpoint, 
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the punishment of wrongdoings is usually classified under the justification of retribution, 
deterrence, rehabilitation and incapacitation (societal protection). There is also discussion and 
promotion of additional criminological tactics such as restorative justice and therapeutic 
jurisprudence as new and innovative responses to traditional punishment responses.
526
 
Understanding what constitutes punishment, they must involve pain or unpleasant consequences, 
must be a sanction for an offense against a specific rule or law, and it must be executed upon the 
specific offender who has allegedly or actually committed the crime. Punishment must also be 
administered intentionally by someone other than the offender and be imposed and administered by 
an authority constituted by a legal system against which the offense is committed.
527
 The 
deductions from these definitions of punishment is that they bear the same central themes i.e. 
punishment must be considered unpleasant to the offender, must be a direct action taken upon the 
defender for an actual or alleged crime, and it must be imposed and administered by an authority 
within a legal system. This notwithstanding, the rationale behind punishing offenders is often 
littered with philosophical and criminological debate with the four traditional principles of 
retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation and incapacitation advanced as explanations.  
6.4.1 The Retributive Principle 
The classic retributive principle of ‗‗let the punishment fit the crime‘‘ was the primary basis for 
criminal sentencing practices in much of Western Europe in the 19
th
 century. Often considered as 
the oldest form of punishment, it is a principle hinged on punishment being justified simply 
because it is deserved. Here, ―punishment restores an equilibrium that was upset by the crime.‘‘528 
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The thinking is that criminal behaviour upsets the peaceful balance of society, and punishment 
helps to restore the balance hence the retributive theory focuses on the crime itself as the reason 
for imposing punishment. Proponents of this theory argue that its main benefit is the effect it will 
have on the offender and suggests that punishment for the specific offence will reflect the 
communal values they have broken and will eventually be determined to act according to those 
values.
529
 This theory also recognises the fact that some offenders who commit similar offences 
may be less blameworthy or culpable than others due to factors outside of their control e.g. 
diminished responsibility, mental illness etc. This is based on the just desserts theory where 
punishment should fit primarily the moral gravity of the crime and to a lesser extent, the 
characteristics of the offender. 
6.4.2 The Deterrence Theory 
This maintains that people act rationally and are self-interested, thus deterrence works because the 
punishment is more painful than the crime is pleasurable. Proponents of deterrence believe that 
people choose to obey or violate the law after calculating the gains and consequences of their 
actions. The difference between the deterrence theory and the previously discussed retributive 
theory is that while the latter focuses more retrospectively, the former is futuristic in its thinking 
believing that punishment suffices if it has a deterrent effect on both the transgressor and the 
society as a whole. Adherents of the deterrence theory have consistently favoured policies such as 
―three strikes‖ laws, establishment of more prisons, increased penalties, longer sentencing severity, 
certainty of conviction and sentencing, and the hiring of more police officers. Together, these 
policies would control and reduce the recidivism (a return to the life of crime) of offenders who 
have been convicted, and curtail the participation in crime by future offenders. The theory of 
deterrence relies on three individual components: severity, certainty, and celerity, the three having 
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been propounded as the most effective way to administer punishment because it sends a message to 
society that the crime will not be tolerated.
530
 The more severe a punishment, it is thought, the 
more likely that a rationally calculating human being will desist from criminal acts. To prevent 
crime, therefore, criminal law must emphasize penalties to encourage citizens to obey the law by 
the use of punishments that are comparatively less pleasant than the commission of the crime is 
pleasurable. Deterrence seeks to make crime more costly so less crime will occur. One rationale for 
the principle of proportionality is that any excess punishment is unjust and represents little more 
than an act of societal violence.
531
 Punishment that is too severe is unjust, and punishment that is 
not severe enough will not deter criminals from committing crimes. One major drawback of this 
theory however, is its assumption of complete rationality on the part of individuals to think through 
their actions before the commission of offences. This assumption becomes a naivety when it is 
considered for instance, that half of state prisoners were under the influence of drugs and/or 
alcohol
532
 at the time they committed an offence thereby negating the assumption they could have 
been deterred by either severity or certainty of punishment due to the fact they were not in full 
control of their faculties. 
6.4.3 The Rehabilitative Theory  
This theory on its part, in contrast to the retributive theory where the punishment fitted the crime, 
hinges on the principle of ‗‗let the punishment fit the criminal.‘‘ Here the emphasis is on changing 
the criminal through correctional facilities. Strictly from a criminological angle, taking away the 
desire to offend is the aim of reformist or rehabilitative punishment. The objective of reform or 
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rehabilitation is to reintegrate the offender into society after a period of punishment, and to design 
the content of the punishment so as to achieve this.
533
 The notion of rehabilitation encompasses a 
deterrent effect, as it is suspected that with rehabilitation the offender will be less likely to 
commit crimes in the future.
534
 Rehabilitation models tend to include programs specifically 
designed towards the problems that an offender personally faces.  
6.4.4 The Incapacitation Theory  
Here the simple aim is to remove an offender from the society without necessarily trying to change 
behaviour through raising costs. While based on utilitarianism-like deterrence, the incapacitation 
model does not require any assumptions about the criminal‘s rationalism or ―root causes‖ of the 
criminal‘s behaviour. This theory rests on the presumption that for offenders to be prevented from 
continuing further crimes, their removal from the society is of paramount importance. This removal 
could either be temporary or permanent or by any other form or means that restricts the physical 
ability to reoffend in either the same or another way. The view is that incarceration is beneficial 
because the physical restraint of incarceration prevents the commission of further crimes against 
society during the duration of the sentence. Under criminal law, the most severe and permanent 
form of incapacitation is the capital punishment, and this is justified as being a deterrent, but how 
much it deters prospective offenders cannot be calculated with the accuracy of arithmetic. What is 
easily discernible and justified although, is that the individual who has directly paid the ultimate 
price by way of capital punishment is permanently removed from the society and as such, unable to 
commit further crimes. Other less severe forms of incapacitation involves restricting, rather than 
completely disabling offenders, and punishments such as driving bans and electronic tags on 
offenders fall under this category. Punishment under this theory hence is justified by the futuristic 
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risks individuals possess towards the society rather than the nature of the offender as with the 
rehabilitative theory, or that of the nature of offence as postulated by the retributive theory. 
6.4.5 The Relevance of the HSBC Punishments 
It is important to note at this juncture that the aforementioned theories of punishment relates to the 
punishment of criminals as individuals, and not of institutions like banks. However, this researcher 
has decided to use these theories as parameters to gauge the punitive effect the penalties regulators 
have handed out over the years could possibly have had on the HSBC. Each theory of punishment 
attempts to answer the questions relating to why we should punish an offender, and the extent to 
which we should punish an offender. As was stated earlier, the HSBC was fined in 2012 to the tune 
of US$1.9M after ‗‗being held accountable for stunning failures of oversight (and worse) that led 
the bank to permit narcotics traffickers and others to launder hundreds of millions of dollars 
through HSBC subsidiaries, and to facilitate hundreds of millions more in transactions with 
sanctioned countries.‖535 It was a record fine at the time but considering the humongous offence the 
bank was deemed to have committed, whether or not such a fine served the purpose of the 
punishment it sought was severally debunked by critics who believed that the long arm of the law 
struck rather too lightly. There were criticisms from far and wide and no less than the United 
States Senate Banking Committee when officials from the US treasury department and US Federal 
reserve were made to explain the way they had handled the HSBC affair. They were quizzed as to 
why no one individual staff of the bank went to trial, or was banned from banking, or as to why 
there was no hearing to consider shutting down HSBC‘s activities.536 This they defended by stating 
that they had ‗imposed on HSBC the largest penalties‘ that they ever imposed on any financial 
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institution having looked at the facts and determined that the most appropriate response was a very 
significant penalty against the institution.‖537  
Analysing this along the lines of the retributive theory of punishment, this particular fine could be 
justified as punishment simply because it is deserved. However, does the punishment fit the crime 
or the equilibrium upset by the crime get restored by this punishment? Under the ‗just desserts‘ 
theory of retribution, the core principle is proportionality wherein ‗‗if one asks how severely a 
wrongdoer deserves to be punished, a familiar principle comes to mind: severity of punishment 
should be commensurate with the seriousness of the wrong. Only grave wrongs merit severe 
penalties; minor misdeeds deserve lenient punishment. Disproportionate penalties are 
undeserved-severe sanctions for minor wrongs or vice versa.‘‘538 As huge as the fine handed 
down to HSBC may have been, considerations must be given to the fact that an institution as 
storied as the HSBC may be capable of making more sums than that in profit turnovers in a 
matter of weeks. This completely negates the doctrine of proportionality that the theory of 
retribution proposes when consideration is given to the fact that Billions of Dollars were 
laundered over the years by the bank, with some of those moneys being for Iranian terrorists and 
Mexican drug cartels. In the ever dangerous and vicious world of terrorism and drugs, it is fair to 
say that the HSBC have contributed in part to the death of every victim on the drug streets of 
Mexico or from any act of terror perpetrated by the terror suspects the HSBC admitted to dealing 
with. When this is taken into consideration, the fine imposed by the regulatory authorities is 
hardly commensurate to the offence committed by the bank. It is hereby submitted that were the 
punishment aimed at being retributive, the ends of punishment wouldn‘t have been met in the 
instant case.  
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Through the prism of the deterrence theory on the other hand, the suggestion is that the 
punishment served should be more painful than the offence pleasurable. The offender may choose 
to obey or to violate laid down regulations after considerations as to the gains or consequences of 
their actions. Where a transgressor feels there is more gain in not complying than there are 
consequences, the chances are that such a transgressor may make an opportunity cost of the 
consequences of not complying knowing that they stand little or nothing to lose as a consequence. 
It must be noted at this point that in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorists attacks on the 
United States, the Federal reserve sent ‗cease-and-desist‘ letters ordering the bank to clean up its 
acts and make more concerted efforts at keeping criminals and terrorists away from opening 
accounts with any of its branches. Despite repeated failings, the regulators persisted with these 
orders culminating in over thirty different warnings between 2003 and 2005. This is akin to an 
individual violating a parole order repeatedly without facing any consequences other than another 
order not to violate again. The fact here is the HSBC must have felt there was a lot more to gain 
by continuously flaunting the regulations than there was gain in compliance and this was 
perfectly summed up by Elizabeth Warren while appearing at the United States Senate Banking 
Committee in 2013 in the following words- ‗‘if you‘re caught with an ounce of cocaine, the 
chances are good you‘re going to go to jail. If it happens repeatedly, you may go to jail for the 
rest of your life. But evidently, if you launder nearly a billion dollars for drug cartels and violate 
our international sanctions, your company pays a fine and you go home and sleep in your own 
bed at night, every single individual associated with this.‘‘ Deterrence involves both an individual 
and general connotations, with the former demanding the punishment of offenders to the extent 
that they stop committing crime, and the latter revolving around deterring not only the primary 
offenders, but to the extent that other members of society may be deterred from committing the 
same crime or another crime, for the first time or otherwise, to reduce further crime by the threat 
or example of punishment. It is worthy of note that the HSBC had prior punishments, and there is 
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no evidence to suggest that previous punishments deterred it from future misdemeanours let alone 
other financial institutions. Relating the incapacitation theory of punishment to the HSBC 
punishment presents a more delicate scenario. Going by the dictates of this theory, the removal 
from society of offenders either by permanent or temporary means does constitute the most 
reliable way of keeping offenders from committing further crimes. This ‗removal from the 
society‘ could only have played out with the HSBC losing its banking licence either permanently, 
or temporarily (suspension), and this was asked of the regulators by Senator Warren in the 
following words- ‗‘what does it take — how many billions do you have to launder for drug lords 
and how many economic sanctions do you have to violate — before someone will consider 
shutting down a financial institution like this?‘‘ This was at the Senate Banking Committee where 
the Senator questioned officials from the U.S. Treasury Department and the U.S. Federal Reserve 
over why criminal charges were not pressed on HSBC or any HSBC official who helped to 
launder hundreds of millions of dollars for Mexican drug cartels. This was an option the United 
states Justice Department was not ready to take because it was worried that anything more than a 
slap on the wrist for HSBC might undermine the world economy. Had the U.S. authorities 
decided to press criminal charges, said Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer at a press 
conference to announce the settlement, ‗‗HSBC would almost certainly have lost its banking 
license in the U.S., the future of the institution would have been under threat and the entire 
banking system would have been destabilized.‘‘ This seeming allocution statement by the Justice 
Department portrays in no uncertain terms that the big financial institutions like the HSBC may 
never face the full wrath of the law irrespective of offences committed. An allocution statement is 
a direct address between the judge and the convicted defendant prior to sentencing. It provides an 
opportunity for defendants to accept responsibility, to humanize themselves and their 
transgressions, and to mitigate their sentences, thus ensuring that the sentences are tailored to fit 
both the crime and the person who committed it. In the instant case however, the HSBC did not 
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even put forward the defence in mitigation, it was done on its behalf by the regulators thereby 
highlighting more apprehension on the part of regulators to punish the bank rather than the will to 
do so. This juxtaposes the question whether a common man on the streets of America or Britain 
would be accorded the same leverage if he breaks into a bank vault at night because he is 
unemployed, impoverished and helpless then advances a plea that he committed the crime 
because he had to fend for his family. As ‗justifiable‘ as that may sound, there is no chance it 
extricates such an offender from criminal liability. Many are serving time in prisons all over the 
world for offences that translate far less to those committed by the HSBC. Perhaps the reality is 
that white collar crimes pay? The argument advanced in certain quarters is that if banks like the 
HSBC were to fail, ‗‗the effects would be felt throughout the global economy as the ripple out 
effects spread through the global banking system, due to the high levels of interconnectedness 
between all the major banks.‘‘539 This may be a factual statement but also a flawed one in all 
ramifications because it dresses the bank in robes of invincibility, which should not be the case.  
Furthermore, if the stature and spread of the bank as stated above means its failure may potentially 
have reverberating ripple effects on the global financial markets as well as work force, other means 
of punishing culpability could be exploited. The bank is manned by individuals and headed by 
executive officers who are responsible for the day to day running of its affairs. HSBC paid a fine, 
but no single individual went to trial, nobody was banned from banking, and there was no hearing 
to consider shutting down HSBC‘s activities.540 Money bills do not walk or travel across seas and 
transnational jurisdictions on their own; they do not wire themselves between accounts. For every 
illicit money wired across the world and in essence laundered for drug lords or terrorists as the case 
may be, there is an individual behind the computers effecting these transfers, and ahead of that 
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individual in hierarchy will be an executive at the top not only aware of the transfer, but also most 
definitely sanctioned same. And considering the litany of wrongdoings that have gone on, it is 
either the management of the bank were fully aware of what was going on or they were completely 
unaware, either way which they still remain liable for complicity or incompetence. As such, there 
is no tangible reason why no bank official has faced criminal charges on such counts till date. 
Among those dismissed, very few have been banned from the field for the future, as for the fines, 
they have been paid by the shareholders, not by the perpetrators. No doubt some executives see this 
as a cost of doing business; and politicians – a handy source of revenue. Few believe them to be an 
effective deterrent. Perhaps it provides a perverse incentive.
541
 Considering this, the punishments 
imposed by regulators on the HSBC do not satisfy the ends of punishment as far as the punishment 
theory of incapacitation is concerned. 
Conclusion 
An official of the United Nations Office on Drugs and crime recently stated that banks were 
welcoming dirty money because of their need for cash, liquidity during the financial crisis and the 
figures being too big to be rejected.
542
 Some authors have also wondered why during election 
campaigns for instance, no one ever comes out with strong views on money laundering, and the 
theory behind that it is the assumption that a good part of the money that comes from money 
laundering goes into the election campaign (not illegally, but legally because it can come in due to 
lack of regulation).
543
 In decades past, drug money was laundered offshore because the banks were 
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not ready to risk opening their doors to dirty money, a far cry from what seems to be obtainable 
today where the banks are seemingly more than ready to open their doors to the mafia 
organisations.
544
 As it stands today, there is very little public trust of financial services and 
institutions as far as the crime of money laundering is concerned, and to sum this all up, the 
following quotes from Robert Jenkins exactly depicts what this researcher believes is the current 
state of Anti-Money laundering regulations...... 
‗‘There has been a lot of breast beating on the topic. Hearings have been held. Commissions have 
been commissioned. Investigations have been legion. Large fines are frequent. But no bank has 
lost its banking license. No senior has gone to jail. No management team has been prosecuted. No 
board or supervising executive has been financially ruined. Many have kept their jobs, their 
salaries, their pensions and their perks….‘‘ 
‗‘The disturbing fact is that laws have been broken but law breaking has not touched senior 
management. In the US ―deferred prosecution agreements‖ is the order-of-the-day. Although 
such ―settlements‖ are announced with fines and fanfare, the detailed evidence and findings that 
lead to such agreements often remain hidden from the public eye.‘‘ 
‗‘Without better behaviour we cannot have faith in the market that underpins it. Without 
penalizing the perpetrators and their seniors we will not get better behaviour. And without 
greater courage from policy makers and regulators, we will get none of the above and more of 
the same.‘‘545 
                                                                                                                                           
 
544
 Ibid  
 
545
 From 2011-13 Robert Jenkins was a member of the Bank of England‘s Financial Policy 
Committee. He is a senior fellow at Better Markets and adjunct professor of finance at London 
Business School, where he teaches investment management and chairs the AQR Asset 
Management Institute. He is a former banker, fund manager and policymaker, and was latterly 
chief executive and then chairman of F&C Asset Management. Prior to his appointment to the 
Bank of England‘s financial policy committee, he was CEO and managing partner of New York-
based hedge fund Combinatorics Capital. He has chaired the Investment Management Association, 
co-chaired the chancellor‘s task force on the Future of the UK Investment Industry and served on 
the Takeover Panel. See <http://www.ianfraser.org/why-well-all-end-up-paying-for-the-feeble-
response-to-the-banking-crisis/> Accessed 19 September 2016 
 
211 
 
 
 
As a corollary, the United Kingdom has very recently set out to make the most significant changes 
to the UK‘s AML and terrorist finance regime in over a decade.546 In what the Government has 
termed an ‗action plan for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist finance‘ the initiative is 
hinged on three pertinent priorities bordering on an enhanced law enforcement response to the 
threats the UK faces (and that means building new capabilities in the law enforcement agencies and 
creating tough new legal powers to enable the relentless disruption of criminals and terrorists); the 
reform of the supervisory regime to ensure that it is consistent, effective and brings those few 
companies who facilitate or enable money laundering to task; and then to also increase the 
international reach of law enforcement agencies and international information sharing to tackle 
money laundering and terrorist financing threats.
547
 This initiative is motivated by the British 
Government‘s admission that its world leading financial system is at risk of being undermined by 
money laundering, illicit finance and the funding of terrorism because the laundering of proceeds 
of crime through UK institutions is not only a financial crime, it fuels political instability around 
the world, supports terrorists and extremism and poses a direct and immediate threat to Britain‘s 
domestic security as well as its overseas interests.  The action plan is designed to send a clear 
message that the country will not tolerate such activities in its financial institutions and to forge a 
new partnership with the financial industry to improve suspicious activity reporting, deliver deeper 
information-sharing and take joint action on enforcement. It is a well-intentioned move determined 
to act vigorously against the criminals and terrorists responsible, to protect the security and 
prosperity of British citizens, and safeguard the integrity of Britain‘s financial economy.548 
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The dilemma now is whether more time should be accorded the current state of affairs regarding 
the fight against money laundering or a different approach engaged, especially in the face of the 
harsh international economic climate and the rising threat of global terrorism. 
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusion: Where is The Bite in the Bark? 
7.0 Introduction 
Impelled by the recurrence of transnational flight of Nigerian moneys in the last decade and 
beyond, this research sought to examine the relevance of contemporary AML standards, the 
ineffectiveness of the preventive and punitive measures in place, and the reasons that have 
occasioned a below par outcome in the fight against the crime of money laundering. Having 
examined the various factors that underpin these factors, this chapter seeks to arrive at reasoned 
conclusions by generating recommendations/suggestions on ways of reform based on the 
considered findings of this research. This shall be briefly analysed under three AML indices- (1) 
regulation; (2) criminalisation; and (3) international cooperation. 
7.1 Regulation 
Theories have been propounded explaining the lack of overwhelming success of anti-money 
laundering activities. Authors have had varying views and suggestions have also been proffered. 
Among some of the commonly held views is that specific money laundering regulation may not be 
effective because it may be targeting the wrong area: money laundering is only the outcome of 
illegal activities; a symptom, but not the cause.
549
 This position is premised on the view that the 
feeder activities are the ones who should be regulated as their effective monitoring and control will 
naturally lead to a reduction in money laundering.
550 The reasoning is that the reputational 
concerns of financial institutions means that they will be wary of indulging in the laundering of 
illicit funds which then means that money laundering is kept under control. The view believes in 
                                           
549
 Chong, A. & Lopez‐De‐Silanes, F. (2015), ‗‗Money Laundering and Its Regulation,‘‘ 
Economics & Politics, vol. 27, no. 1, pp 78-123. 
 
550
 Ibid  
 
214 
 
 
 
the irrelevance of specific AML regulation to combat money laundering.  A similar view holds 
that, similar to the prohibition era, AML may be a classic case of ‗‗police creating increased 
demand for their services by inventing new crimes, which in turn creates a new criminal industry to 
evade the new laws.‘‘551 There is thus, the insinuation not only that specific regulation of money 
laundering could be thought of as either irrelevant or detrimental, but also in the extreme, that 
regulation cannot curtail money laundering in the current environment of financial markets 
liberalization.
552
 On the other side of the divide are those who believe that law actually matters as 
far as AML is concerned.  This group suggests a regulatory framework and emphasises the power 
of the enforcer and calls for the criminalisation of offences, better confiscation rules and increased 
international cooperation and intervention to curtail money laundering. They argue that several of 
the feeder activities to money laundering are not considered criminal acts in some countries; hence 
the belief is that criminalisation would raise the stakes for the criminal and would deter action 
and/or facilitate the work of courts. This theory also believes in the benefits of the use of a 
specialized agency, specifically empowered to go after launderers. There are valid arguments to 
both sides, but there is no intention at this stage of this research to critique the pros and cons of 
these views. This research maintained a critical analysis of the historical development and 
evolution of AML regulations at an international level through to national levels with an aim to 
picking out areas where the law could have been better couched to meet set-out aims. It must also 
be noted that the two sides of the argument are effectively covered at both global and national 
levels. Dealing with the first view which holds that AML laws may not be effective because it 
addresses a wrong area by not targeting the feeder activities to money laundering, this researcher 
begs to differ because there have been as much sufficient initiatives against money laundering 
predicate offences as there have been against money laundering itself. Within the Nigerian context, 
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the main predicate offence to the crime of money laundering has been identified in the course of 
this work as corruption. The diversity of the crime of corruption notwithstanding, the most 
common form it takes in Nigeria is official corruption by Government officials in public positions. 
These are people classified as Politically Exposed Persons and as such, (required to be) subject to 
more rigorous checks by financial institutions both within and outside the country. However, as 
already discussed, millions of Nigerian moneys have filtered through Nigerian financial institutions 
and found ways into foreign jurisdictions with relative ease. The laws are in place, so are the 
regulations. Banks are required to train their staff to identify suspicious transactions no matter how 
deceptive the launderers try to be. The duty to report suspicious transactions are explicitly stated, 
so are the penalties for default. At the international front, there have been sufficient initiatives 
aimed at dealing with money laundering predicate offences as well, which nullifies the claim that 
the wrong crime is being targeted by AML regulations. On the second leg of the argument that the 
criminalisation of the feeder crimes and the establishment of specialized agencies to go after the 
launderers, there is sufficient proof as has been elaborated upon in this work that the 
criminalisation of predicate offences as well as the establishment of specific AML agencies is one 
of the recommendations of the FATF. Nigeria has in place the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission charged specifically with dealing with money laundering cases. There are other allied 
agencies that have been specifically identified in the course of this research too. 
7.2 Criminalisation 
The Financial Action Task Force through its recommendations enjoins countries to criminalise 
money laundering on the basis of the Vienna and Palermo Conventions. Countries are to apply the 
crime of money laundering to all serious offences, with a view to including the widest range of 
predicate offences.
553
As discussed in chapter 4 of this work, Nigeria took the necessary steps 
towards complying with the FATF recommendations and this resulted in her name being struck off 
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the blacklist it had previously found itself. The crime of money laundering is criminalised under 
the Nigerian Money Laundering Act. The international criminalisation of the crime of corruption 
which this work has identified as the main predicate offence to the crime of money laundering in 
Nigeria is covered in main by the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), to 
which Nigeria is a signatory. Nigeria has availed itself the benefit of all the aforementioned 
fundamental principles of the convention. The establishment of anti-corruption agencies such as the 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the Independent Corrupt Practices 
Commission (ICPC) gives credence to this. Together with the Code of Conduct Bureau, these 
bodies are all aimed at the promotion of effective practices aimed at the prevention of corruption. 
The criminalisation of basic forms of corruption and the laundering of the proceeds of corruption is 
also incorporated within Nigerian laws. 
7.3 International Cooperation  
The discussion of international cooperation here is limited to the already identified main predicate 
crime to the crime of money laundering within the Nigerian context. Corruption is usually used to 
facilitate the process of placing tainted money into the mainstream financial system and to get it 
sent out of the country as legitimate. This means the International community is enjoined to work 
together, in formulating a framework to facilitate the repatriation of plundered wealth and thus 
reverse some of the damage afflicted on societies by corrupt politicians or officials.
554
 The 
transnational mode of most corruption cases means that Mutual Legal Assistance is critical for 
prosecution and deterrence of corrupt practices and a variety of instruments have been developed in 
recent years. Nigeria has equally benefitted immensely from the cooperation and mutual legal 
assistance of member countries in tracing the trail of looted funds. The same is true for recovery of 
assets and in this case, the repatriation of stolen funds siphoned from Nigeria and stashed in bank 
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accounts in various parts of the world. Very recently, Nigeria and Switzerland signed an agreement 
that paves way for the return of $300M confiscated from the family of Nigeria‘s former military 
ruler, General Sani Abacha. These funds were initially deposited in Luxembourg and confiscated 
by the Judiciary of the Republic and Canton of Geneva pursuant to a Forfeiture order dated 11th 
December 2014. The Nigerian Government has since stated its guarantee to use the funds once 
returned in the interest of the Nigerian country and its people. 
7.4 Research Findings. 
Before itemising the findings of this study, this researcher seeks to state a psychological theory 
initiated by an American Psychologist Martin Seligman. And although not related to the scope of 
this work, the findings of the experiment largely resonate with the findings of this research. As an 
extension of his interest in depression, Seligman propounded the theory of learned helplessness 
when he set about electrocuting dogs.
555
 In the classic experiment, working with 150 dogs 
specifically divided into three groups, Seligman placed some of them in a harness apparatus from 
which there was no escape, before proceeding to provide a shock to the animals‘ paws, a painful 
stimulus which the dogs could not terminate. The dogs in group one were subjected to painful 
electric shocks but could easily avoid them by a simple action, the second group received jolts of 
the same intensity at the same time but their pain was impossible to escape from no matter what 
they did. The third group had no jolts in electrocution at all. Seligman then proceed to transferring 
the dogs into a shuttle avoidance box in which the animals could escape pain by leaping over a 
divided barrier to the non-electrified side when a buzzer sounded or the room lights dimmed. Dogs 
from groups one and three jumped over the barrier and to the safe confines of non-electrocution as 
soon as the sounds and/or lights went off. The dogs from group two on the other hand made no 
attempt to escape even after hearing the buzzer. The experience from the first procedure had taught 
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the dogs in this group that there was nothing they could do to avoid the electrocution and as such, 
just withdrew to the corner of the cage helpless and dysphoric. It was an experiment understood 
from a cognitive psychological viewpoint as a model for explaining depression in human behaviour 
in that depressed people feel that whatever they do will be futile hence they have learnt to be 
helpless. There is equally a human analogue to this animal experiment.
556
 Here, college student 
volunteers were assigned to one of three groups of contrasting noise levels. In the controllable 
noise group, subjects received loud but terminable noises where all they had to do to stop it was to 
press a button four times. The subjects assigned to the uncontrollable noise group on the other 
hand, received noise that terminated independently of the response by the subjects. The third and 
final group on their part were subjected to no noise at all. A hand shuttle box was then introduced 
in the second phase of the interview whereby noise termination was controllable to all the subjects 
in the three groups by the mere action of moving a lever from one side of the box to the other. The 
results were that the first and third groups readily learned to shuttle, but the second group with 
subjects who received prior uncontrollable noise failed to escape. They listened passively to the 
noise. This is strikingly similar to the animal experiment because, just like with the animals in 
Seligman‘s experiment, the subjects in the second group had formed a notion of helplessness in 
that whatever they did, they had no control over the noise levels and as such, were not interested in 
making any escapes. 
In relating these two experiments to this particular study, I have tried to visualise contemporary 
international Anti-Money Laundering efforts as being one of the group of dogs in the first 
experiment, and/or one of the group of students in the second experiment. I have aligned myself 
and this research to the group that passed up the opportunity of escape despite the opportunity to do 
so. Upon hearing the buzzer, the dogs in the first experiment opted to retreat into a dysphoric state 
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of despair and making no move to escape the electrocution. Experience from the first procedure 
had taught them that the buzzer only precedes the pain of electric shock. The hypothesis from 
Seligman and his colleagues was that frequent experience with a lack of contingency between 
outcome and response (i.e. between a cessation of shock or an escape from pain and the animal‘s 
effort to escape an inescapable harness) led the organism to assume that escape attempts (and 
ultimately other actions) were futile. The same was true for the students who saw no need to 
attempt an escape from the noise, choosing instead to listen passively to the noise. It is my 
considered submission therefore, that international AML initiatives are as helpless as the guinea 
pigs used in the two experiments here. I submit with a considerably high degree of fairness that the 
fight against money laundering has reached a point where whatever laws are passed, and whichever 
measures are taken, success will remain far-fetched, hence the feeling of helplessness. However, in 
the psychological experiments, there were avenues of escape. And albeit reacting to prior 
experience, the assumption of helplessness formed by the two passive groups proved in fact to be 
misguided in part. This puts into perspective, my earlier notion of the ‗helplessness‘ of Anti Money 
Laundering measures. As such, should today‘s Anti-Money laundering efforts, given the 
debilitating factors against it, assume the passive stance of the dogs in Seligman‘s experiment or 
remain in the helpless trance of the subjects in Hitoro‘s?  This researcher disagrees in part. It is my 
considered opinion that anti-money laundering regulations are itself an admission on the part of the 
international community of a failure in other initiatives. It is trite that the war against drug-
trafficking had a major influence on the emergence of the anti-money laundering regime, and the 
cardinal principle in this regard is to deprive the traffickers the proceeds of their illicit funds. The 
same is true for other predicate crimes like corruption. The aim is to make it more difficult for 
terrorists to finance terrorist acts, to stop drug traffickers or to frustrate looters of country 
treasuries. However, as cogent as the reasons for going after money laundering may seem, an 
alternative approach may have been to be more vigorous in the channelling of efforts towards 
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‗nipping‘ money laundering predicate crimes in the bud, rather than ‗hitting them where it hurts.‘ 
This view is not an overall condemnation of global Anti-Money Laundering efforts, but rather a 
dispirited one based on the prevalence of money laundering activity despite what seems to be a lot 
of efforts towards curbing the scourge. A critical question will be if this researcher is suggesting 
that global Anti-Money Laundering efforts should be discontinued and as such let the launderers 
have a field day. This is not the case, but Anti-Money Laundering compliance is expensive 
especially for developing economies, thereby making it a case of double jeopardy to comply and 
still fall victim to laundering activity as has persistently been the case with Nigeria. A juxtapose of 
Nigerian Anti-Money laundering laws with the recommendations of the Financial Action Task 
Force does not reveal any shortcomings with the Nigerian reception of global AML standards. 
However, the flight of public funds from Nigerian jurisdiction abroad, and the use of local financial 
institutions to perpetrate the laundering of public funds have continued unabated. Similarly, as 
examined in-depth in chapter 4 of this work, the British AML laws are well grounded too, but that 
has not stopped transnational inflow of illicit funds into the country. And as the case of the HSBC 
discussed in this work depicts, there seems to be a genuine reluctance to punish offenders 
especially when the sums involved are much. If the developed countries genuinely want to lead the 
pursuit of AML standards with any credibility, they must begin to assist the smaller nations by not 
letting banking and financial institutions within their jurisdictions to be used as safe havens. 
Contemporarily, it may suffice to state that the fight against money laundering has reached a point 
where whatever laws are passed, and whichever measures are taken, an eerie feeling of 
helplessness abounds. For reasons advanced in chapters 5 and 6 of this research, Nigeria‘s 
compliance with global AML standards resonates with this researcher to be an academic exercise. 
The issue is much deeper lying than in mere compliance. 
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The key findings which emerge from this research therefore are drawn from chapters 4, 5, 6 and 
are adumbrated as follows: 
1) The very presence of Anti-Money Laundering laws and regime is in itself symptomatic of a 
failure of anti-corruption laws/regimes or efforts at combatting other money laundering 
predicate crimes. (Chapter 5) 
2) The reception, transposition and promulgation of Anti-Money Laundering laws have little 
bearing on the effectiveness and success of Anti-Money Laundering initiatives. Anti-Money 
Laundering laws are a theoretical means to an illusory end. (Chapter 4) 
3) Compliance with International Anti-Money Laundering standards especially with the 
developing countries are largely an academic exercise done only for the sake of compliance. 
4) The genuineness of efforts of the countries at the forefront of the fight against money 
laundering leaves a lot to be desired. (Chapter 5) 
Having identified these problems, the natural step to take next is to proffer solutions at 
circumventing them. When laws and regulations fail to achieve their intended results, the natural 
instinct is to hold that the laws may be defective and/or not properly couched. However, laws fail 
for a variety of reasons ranging from lack of proper implementation and the absence of a genuine 
desire on the part of stakeholders to see to the proper implementation and application of such laws. 
This researcher has perused Nigerian Anti-Money Laundering laws and despite not being an expert 
in drafting of laws, finds no major flaws with Nigerian laws but this is strictly from an academic 
perspective. Implementation however goes beyond having well-constructed laws and regulations 
neatly written down in books. No case highlights the problem of Nigerian implementation of laws 
as much as the inglorious case of Mr James Ibori who was accused by Nigeria's anti-corruption 
agency of stealing more than $290m (£196m) of state funds while in office in the oil-rich Delta 
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state. British investigators say he channelled much of the money into banks in the UK. In 2005 the 
authorities in Nigeria in conjunction with the Metropolitan Police began to investigate James Ibori 
in relation to corruption and theft whilst he was in office.
557
 In 2007 a London court froze UK 
assets worth $35m allegedly belonging to him.
558
 This sum was in no way commensurate to his 
legitimate earnings which were at that time reportedly pegged at an annual income of less than 
$25,000.
559
After serving as Governor of Delta State over two terms of four years each (1999-2007), 
Mr Ibori was charged by the Nigerian Anti-Corruption unit on 170 charges for various offences of 
embezzlement, corruption and money laundering. However, all charges were quashed and 
dismissed by a Nigerian law court. By providence however, foreign investigators had been 
following the activities of African politicians and Mr Ibori happened to be one of those under the 
radar. The investigation revealed huge amounts of money being transacted, transfers coming in 
from Nigerian companies, and huge amounts of cash being paid into the accounts of prominent 
Nigerian Politically Exposed Persons who were living extortionate lives. According to the 
Metropolitan Police of the United Kingdom, their investigations revealed in part $180,000 per 
calendar month being spent on credit cards in the name of Mr Ibori.
560
 After a failed attempt to 
arrest him in Nigeria which was thwarted by his supporters physically barricading him and fighting 
the Nigerian Police off, Mr Ibori was arrested in the United Arab Emirates and extradited to 
London to face trial. He pleaded guilty to 10 of the 23 counts on the indictment, which pleas were 
accepted by the Crown.
561
 Mr James Ibori was subsequently sentenced to a 13 year custodial term. 
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The James Ibori case is particularly instructive here because it provides a unique case where an 
individual who was found not guilty in Nigeria was actually jailed in another country on identical 
charges. This begs the question if Nigeria‘s implementation of the international Anti-Money 
Laundering laws was not a mere case of transposition of laws. Recently, the Nigerian Government 
moved in on Federal Judges who were deemed to be corrupt and ‗selling justice‘ to the highest 
bidder. In the course of the operation, the Nigerian Department of State Services (DSS) claimed it 
recovered $800,000 (£645,200) in cash in raids targeting senior judges suspected of corruption.
562
 
Juxtaposing this event with the James Ibori case referred to earlier presents a gloomy picture and 
an indication as to why implementation, not the law, is the bane of the Nigerian state as far as the 
fight against money laundering and allied offences are concerned.  
7.5 Recommendations 
Despite my assertion that the issues with Nigerian AML laws go beyond mere laws and more to do 
with the lack of will power to implement the beautifully couched laws, the privilege of 
constitutional immunity accorded a certain category of public office holders is counter-productive. 
This researcher believes expunging this provision of immunity from the constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria will set the country on a better pedestal to fight the crime of money laundering 
and its attendant predicate offences. The constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria holds that  
―Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution, subject to subsection (e) of this 
section -(a) no civil or criminal proceeding shall be instituted or continued against a person to 
whom this section applies during his period of office; (b) a person to whom this section applies 
shall not be arrested or imprisoned during that period either in pursuance of the process of any 
court or otherwise; and (c) no process of any court requiring or compelling the appearance of a 
person to whom this section applies, shall be applied for or issued: Provided that in ascertaining 
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whether any period of limitation has expired for the purposes of any proceedings against a person 
to whom this section applies, no account shall be taken of his period of office.‖563 This provision 
means a legal immunity from prosecution for the category of office holders during the span of their 
terms in office. This concept finds its roots in the doctrine of ‗rex non potest peccare‘ (the King can 
do no wrong). The thinking behind the immunity clause is that any public office holder who falls 
within the definition of the provision should enjoy absolute immunity to enable them carry out their 
official duties with no distractions whatsoever, be it in the form of civil or criminal litigation. With 
the evident unrepentant manner with which most Nigerian public office holders divert public funds 
into private use, this well thought out provision of the law is a disservice to the Nigerian state. 
While they lose this immunity once they are out of office, what the clause gives them is the time to 
obliterate the trail of any illicit funds before the immunity lapses. Nothing stops an office holder 
from defending himself in court on allegations of corruption if such arises. If there is no theft, there 
will be no court case in the first place. It is my considered opinion therefore, that the immunity 
clause serves the purpose of only the public office holders and should be expunged from the 
Nigerian constitution. 
On an international level, considering the insidious and universal effects of corruption and money 
laundering and in view of the negative consequences on developing countries (including 
devastating long term/generational impacts) it is my humble submission that consideration be given 
to the thoughts of making money laundering predicate offences such as corruption and the drug 
trade count as crimes against humanity? Adopting this approach would attract the application of 
the concept of universal jurisdiction which means that any country on trial regardless of whether or 
not the prosecuting country is directly or indirectly affected by the crime (similar to war crimes, 
genocide or maritime piracy). Alternatively, once declared a crime against humanity, the next step 
could be the development of an international institutional framework similar to the International 
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Criminal Court of Justice with specialist jurisdiction in prosecuting the crimes of corruption, drug 
trafficking and money laundering. A crime against humanity is defined to include ‗‗any of the 
following acts committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian 
population, with knowledge of the attack: murder; extermination; enslavement; deportation or 
forcible transfer of population; imprisonment; torture; rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, 
forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable 
gravity; persecution against an identifiable group on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, 
religious or gender grounds; enforced disappearance of persons; the crime of apartheid; other 
inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering or serious bodily or 
mental injury.‘‘564 Crimes such as corruption and illicit drug trade despite not being explicitly 
stated within the wordings of this definition can easily be categorised under ‗other inhumane acts 
of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering or serious bodily or mental injury.‘ 
Similarly, corruption could in fact be the root cause of most of the offences listed in the definition 
of a crime against humanity. As discussed in earlier parts of this work, the devastating effects of 
corruption on the developmental structure of Nation States cannot be overstated. A crime against 
humanity is not necessarily only of physical violence, and to avoid the vagueness of interpretation, 
an explicit mention of such crimes within the definition of a crime against humanity may have 
sufficed. The most important denominator as to what constitutes crimes against humanity is the 
grave affront to human security and dignity. Nigeria has recently been contending with a brutal 
insurgency that almost especially crippled the North-Eastern part of the country. Terrorist 
insurgents were at a time speculated to have been in control of Nigerian territories commensurate 
to the size of Belgium. Lives were lost in high numbers, citizens displaced in droves, and a fair 
number kidnapped. Nigerian soldiers were being overrun by the insurgents on a daily basis and 
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many of them abandoned duty posts at the sight of the terrorists. This they claimed was due to 
being ill-equipped with the requisite military hard ware enough to quell attacks, an allegation 
which the Government of the day always denied.  Subsequent investigation by a new 
administration revealed afterwards that the moneys budgeted for and approved by the Government 
for the purchase of military hardware and gear were in fact criminally diverted to personal use by 
top officials of Government especially within the office of the National Security Officer. An 
enquiry conducted by the Presidential Panel on arms procurement had established that the bulk of 
the sum of $2.1 billion and N643 billion ($4 billion) earmarked for the purchase of military 
hardware to fight terrorism was criminally diverted by senior officials of the immediate past 
Government through the office of the National Security Adviser. The enquiry also alleged that the 
said National Security Adviser colluded with some serving and retired military officers and 
civilians to divert the sum of $2 billion and N29 billion set aside for the procurement of fighter jets 
and other equipment for the Nigeria Air Force. As stated earlier, the development of an 
International court akin to the International Criminal Court will force blatantly corrupt countries 
like Nigeria to extradite offenders, and by doing so, take the criminals out of their comfort zones 
where justice may never be served. 
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